



# **OBJECTIVES OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM FOR THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA**

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### **Executive Summary**

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Resource Centre for Human Rights (CReDO)  
Al. Hajdeu 95 "A", CHISINAU, MD 2005, Moldova  
(373 22) 212 816, fax (373 22) 225 257  
[ostaf@CReDO.md](mailto:ostaf@CReDO.md), [www.CReDO.md](http://www.CReDO.md)

**Harry Frankfurt, philosopher, Princeton University<sup>1</sup>: *It's impossible for someone to lie unless he thinks he knows the truth. Producing bullshit requires no such conviction.***

The Venice Commission, OSCE/ODIHR clearly states: “*the choice of an electoral system is the sovereign right of each state; however it should be decided and agreed upon through broad and open discussions in the parliament with the participation of all political forces*”.<sup>2</sup> This study proceeds from an equidistant and unbiased position on all existing proposals, it uses a rational approach and is based on policy evidences, challenges and rationally quantifiable situations in order to reach conclusions and recommendations on the electoral system for the Republic of Moldova. This opinion should be seen in essence, it refers to the choice of the electoral system and not to the policy objective. The policy objective is the exclusive sovereignty of the state, and the electoral system must be selected so as to implement the legitimate objective of the state.

The purpose of the study is the systemic analysis of the proposals to modify the electoral system discussed in the Parliament. Initially (in April 2017), the study focused on assessing the systemic impact of the uninominal electoral system (including the draft law), and later (in May 2017) it was expanded to include the mixed electoral system (including the current draft law). The study answers a number of questions:

- 1) What effects were produced by the current proportional system based on party lists for the political competition, public institutions, governance stability, implementation of reforms in economic and social fields? To what extent does the current system correspond to the challenges of the situation?
- 2) What is the correlation between the electoral system (proportional, majority, mixed) and challenges, problems of the current situation relevant in light of potential contribution of the first? What political objectives should a new electoral system resolve and contribute to?
- 3) What effects can have the proposed electoral solutions: the uninominal majority system in 101 constituencies and the mixed majority system in 50 constituencies and in parallel on proportional party lists?
- 4) What solution can be recommended for a future electoral system according to the policy objectives set?

Analysis methods are those that traditionally used in the analysis of electoral policies accepted in the Western tradition for consolidated democracies and in developing ones. The analysis framework is adapted<sup>3</sup> from the reference source of the professional American Political Science Association which sets methods for analysing the impact of electoral rules/legislation on governance, democratic institutions, political system, political parties. The key approach consists in: understanding the policy objective, looking for the electoral system best suited to this policy objective, detailed analysis of the relevant societal context, including coercive and non-coercive factors, determining possible electoral solutions. The details are explained.

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
“It is impossible for someone to lie unless he thinks he knows the truth. Producing bullshit requires no such conviction.”, <http://www.stoa.org.uk/topics/bullshit/pdf/on-bullshit.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> European Commission, Concerning Thresholds which bar parties from access to parliaments, 2015 [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI\(2015\)022-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2015)022-e), European Commission, Concerning Thresholds which bar parties from access to parliaments (II) 2010 [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2010\)007-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2010)007-e) Fair Apportionment in the View of the Venice Commission's Recommendation <http://econ.core.hu/file/download/mtdp/MTDP1338.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> APSA, <http://www.apsanet.org>, Political Science, Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance, 2013

Chapter 1 explains the role of electoral system in the functioning of democratic institutions in societal context. The electoral system is not an isolated system, but functions within the society along with other institutions and within a societal context. Electoral system is not an objective in itself. The electoral system is an element of public policy that must ensure a specific goal. This explains the link between policy objectives and electoral systems. **An electoral system exists because it can contribute to achieving a specific policy objective. There are no good or bad electoral systems, each electoral system is the expression of the implementation of a concrete policy objective**, such as: **1) ensuring a stable government, 2) ensuring proportional representativeness of the vote in society, 3) ensuring mechanisms of direct accountability before citizens** and others. *A good electoral system is attested if its settings are consistent and consequent and do not create imperfections and especially deficiencies. A poor electoral system is attested if its settings create imperfections (transposes electoral systems objectives inadequately) and deficiencies (counter electoral system objectives).*

*The logic of decision on electoral system*



**Once the policy objective is determined, an electoral system is selected to best ensure the transposition of this policy objective**, including the formatting of consistent settings of selected system. Chapter 2 reconstructs the logic and objective of current policy and therefore of the proportionate electoral system based on party lists. It examines the consistency of list-based system settings, highlights imperfections and especially the shortcomings of the current system. *Imperfections* are defined as settings that are compatible with the chosen electoral system but require context improvement. *Deficiencies* are the incompatible settings and inconsistencies of the electoral system, which have the effects of undermining the objective initially proposed by the chosen electoral system.

Chapter 3 systematises the policy proofs and evidence regarding the correlation and dependence of the electoral system on some phenomena and some important considerations for society. The evidences are systematized using the method of in-depth study of secondary sources that comprehensively documents the impact of different electoral systems regarding the: 1) economic performance (economic growth, investments in infrastructure, investment climate, etc.),

2) government stability and sustainability, 3) consolidation of the structure of political parties, 4) fight against poverty, 5) representativeness of minority groups and gender equality and other. Based on the experience of other jurisdictions documented in plausible and significant sources, including for countries in the course of democratic development, the impact correlation of the electoral systems is found, the influences and the corresponding impact are quantified. These conclusions are taken into consideration in order to evaluate the electoral solutions proposed for discussion in the final chapter of the study.

The decision maker, initially, determines the policy objective. Subsequently, based on the existing algorithm of relevance and effectiveness of achieving this policy objective, a particular electoral system is selected from the broad spectrum of electoral systems, and it is followed by the procedure of setting specific characteristics of the system compatible with the objective of the electoral system. Electoral rules work in a specific societal context. There are coercive and non-coercive factors that have an effect on the implementation of electoral rules. A policy analysis is not made pro-forma or purely formal. Societal factors influencing the functioning of the elected electoral system can have a context effect facilitating the implementation of electoral rules, but can prevent and consequently have adverse effects on the transposition of the objectives of the chosen electoral system.

Realities critically important for determining the policy objectives and thereafter of the electoral system are discussed in Chapter 3. These are the non-coercive factors selected for summary analysis based on existing secondary sources or by analysis performed for the first time in this study on the basis of existing data and information. These include: party structure, division axes in society based on ethnic, geopolitical criteria, stability of the state and their effects on the electoral system are discussed with the presentation of relevant sources and models of analysis. Chapter 4 discusses coercive factors. These include: electoral fraud, corruption of votes, corruption of electors.

The last chapter considers some options for possible policy objectives. For the discussed policy objectives, several options of relevant electoral systems are generated. Possible outcomes are assessed, as well as the impact of the electoral systems already proposed for public discussion.

### **Conclusions on the current electoral system (Chapter 2):**

1. The current electoral system is a proportional list-based blocked system accomplished in a single national constituency, the threshold for accession of parties into the Parliament is 6%, and 2% for individual candidates. The system was adopted in 1994 following discussions on 2 possible options, including the discussed option of the uninominal majority system. The main reason for adopting the list-based system was to ensure the legitimacy of Transnistrian population representation, given that deployment of polling stations in this region is impossible.
2. The current system, proceeding from its objectives, should produce the following effects: 1) to ensure good representativeness in Parliament of different opinions and various societal groups, 2) to facilitate the formation of political parties in order to express different opinions and foster political association as democratic institutions. The justification for these objectives was clear: a) Linguistically and ethnically, Moldova is a fairly diverse country with the concentration of minorities in certain regions, therefore the choice of proportional system in continental European traditions is explicable - representation as objective being the most important goal to be achieved, b) political parties are at an early stage of development and need consolidation.

3. Proportional system implemented in 1994<sup>4</sup> **only partially produced the expected results, but produced also a number of adverse effects:** 1) political parties partially reproduce the representation of societal structures in the legislative body, 2) the accumulated index of disproportionality is 7-9% (quite high index), contrary to the concept of proportional system (due to the highly set threshold for acceding to Parliament) and it does not ensure the adequate representativeness of more ethnic groups, societal categories (due to prohibitions on political association, which requires 50% representation under the law of political parties) , 3) lack of competitiveness and internal democracy in the party makes the party being formed of a leader on which the whole party depends.
4. **Disadvantages of list-based proportional electoral system** have been resolutely materialised: 1) Instability and fragmented support in forming the Government, the need for broad coalitions, 2) **political instability within governmental coalitions emphasizes contradictions and internal struggles** - causes the frequent fall of governments, 3) **implementation of reforms** in a number of key areas witnesses **systematic delays** (a number of strategic areas (energy, financial-banking, justice, etc.) are not reformed over a long period of time), 4) **individual responsibility of politicians is indirect** (through parties) and perceived as lacking, 5) **concentration of influence in parties focuses in a narrow group** and in the party leader as a result of electoral campaign policies predominantly based on the media, **the party responsibility is weakened and diffused**, 6) the disproportionality index is in the range of **7 to 9% - the segment most vulnerable of corruption in political system**, 7) **transformation of parties into groups dependent on economic interests** and circles of interests that dominate party leadership with excessive concentration of power in hands of several people at the top of the party.
5. In the context of regional confrontations, long penetration of pro-Russian media propaganda, pro-Russian subversive influences, as well as inadequate reforms in the areas of energy, financial, etc., **the public opinion and society was polarized** and divided at the first stage based on linguistic/ethnic criterion (speakers of Romanian language versus Russian speakers), subsequently on the criterion of geopolitical orientation (European vs. Russian). **Political parties have become the expression of geopolitical differences**, with the paternalist electorate being associated with the Soviet past and pro-Russian option, and the pro-European electorate being fragmented and divided among 2-3 parties. **The level of polarization on the pro-European segment reaches maximum levels**, resulting in personalized confrontation and tension within pro-European centre-right coalition.
6. The adverse consequences were multiplied and reached the situation of **lack of trust in the democratic institution of political parties** (from 25% of trust in 2010 to 7-8% in 2016), the chosen formula of the **proportional system based on party blocked lists** with the high accession threshold is the least representative, a system that **emphasizes a series of systemic flaws discussed**. There is a lack of clarity on the policy objective that should be achieved by the proposed electoral system.

### Conclusions and recommendations (Chapter 6):

7. **From the very beginning, the priority policy objective for R.Moldova should be determined.** This decision has to be taken mainly on the basis of lessons learned from the

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<sup>4</sup> At that time, 2 proposals were discussed: the main - SMD or MMD or list-based elections, the final solution being the list-based to ensure the representation of voters from Transnistrian region as the main argument. O.Protsyk, I.Osoian, Party Institutionalisation in a Resource-Scarce Environment, in Public Finance and Post-communist Party Development, ed. S. D. Roper, J. Ikstens.

functioning and impact produced by proportional list-based blocked system since 1994. Ex-post analysis of the current system will be taken into consideration: 1) legal consistency of the current system, 2) what objective was pursued by this electoral system, 3) what contextual challenges exist for this system, and finally 4) what are positive practices from other jurisdictions transferable to the Republic of Moldova. The Republic of Moldova, after 25 years, has to decide in favour of one of the primary legitimate objectives, *all of them fit into the European and world democratic tradition:*

- 1) proportional representation in the legislative body, or
  - 2) ensuring stable government, capable of action, or
  - 3) ensuring the individual accountability of the elected ones, of the voted political group, or
  - 4) ensuring a clear political majority in the legislative body.
8. As these are the main objectives, it is necessary to provide some complementary objectives, through specific and concrete settings, in the determined electoral solution:
- a) *diminishing the effect of political corruption,*
  - b) *ensuring gender equality, minority equity,*
  - c) *fostering the trust in public institutions.*

**The final policy solution will promote a main objective and ensure compliance with the complementary objectives (a), (b) (c).**

9. If the Republic of Moldova chooses as a policy objective, again after 25 years of experience, **to ensure proportional representativeness**, then the current list-based electoral system requires substantial changes. The current system, with existing rules settings, has generated significant distortions in the political structure, the functioning of democratic institutions. The electoral system recommended to achieve this objective, at least involves: a) party list blocked on national constituency<sup>5</sup>, b) reduction of the threshold for accession to parliament till 1%, c) allowing the formation of political parties without the requirement to represent at least 50 % of local authorities of II level (see Netherlands' experience). The decision-maker must be aware of the predictable effects of the genuine/faithful implementation of the proportional electoral system: i) further radicalization of political class, ii) further fragmentation of parties, iii) continued instability of Parliament, and iv) frequent investment of Government through unstable coalitions. The result of these effects is discussed in detail in this study.
10. If the Republic of Moldova chooses as objective **to ensure the individual accountability of the elected person**, then the electoral system needs to be substantially modified. The most appropriate system would be PFPT (majority) in 75 constituencies with a turnout threshold of at least 35% or in two rounds with the majority of votes, filled in with 26 elected MPs for diaspora, minority groups, gender equality either on party lists or as individual candidates<sup>6</sup>. The decision-maker must be aware of the negative effects of implementing this electoral system: i) regional myopia and the priorities of the elected officials against national priorities, ii) fragmentation of support for Government by focusing on short-term projects, iii) behaviour

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<sup>5</sup> The alternative of a flexible list-based system on national constituency is liable to increase the phenomenon of political corruption. Another alternative of list-based system blocked in 10-12 jurisdictions with constituency size (number of electors) of 3-4 does not ensure adequate proportional representativeness (therefore, It's no longer proportional), setting complementary objectives is difficult.

<sup>6</sup> An alternative to elections in 101 constituencies, of which up to 10 seats will be reserved for diaspora is viable, but it does not differ from our proposal, but it is less representative for gender equality (quotas) and minorities. Another alternative of elections in 101 constituencies with the absolute majority vote and, where appropriate, the organization of the 2<sup>nd</sup> round provides a good individual accountability, but it can have similar list-based fragmentation effects with a very low accession threshold. Another alternative of organizing 30-35 plurinomial constituencies with the size of constituency (number of electors in constituencies) of 3-4 elected ones (the first 3-4 ranked with or without the accession threshold) is a system combining the proportionality and individual accountability of the elected one, but with a very high degree of fragmentation and radicalization.

of elected ones accommodating to the interest of co-participation in the accumulation of the political rent<sup>7</sup>. The adverse effects accumulate particularly in the case of homogeneous constituencies that transfer the polarizing character of the relations within the society into the legislative body.

11. If the Republic of Moldova choses as objective **to ensure the stable government capable of promoting reforms**, then realistically two electoral systems are possible: a) a variation of the majority system either FPTP or SMD (50%+1, in 2 rounds) in medium constituencies, or b) list-based proportional system blocked with the 5-6% accession threshold for the case of left-wing gain, which accounts for almost 50% of the electoral spectrum (the right-wing parties are fragmented). In the latter case (b)), the decision-maker must be aware of the negative effects of the electoral system: i) the left-wing government in conditions of economic, geopolitical vulnerabilities, ii) geopolitical division produces stagnation of market economy reforms and democratization, and for the first solution, it is difficult to achieve the complementary objectives discussed here.
12. 5 simulations of the electoral systems (PR-list, PR-list on 12 constituencies, mixed system, plurinominal MMD with 3 elected in 12 circulations) are made in the study. In all these simulations, although the results are different, 3 parties dominate the election result in any configuration: PSRM, PAS and DPM. Small parties such as PPEM, PCRM and LP are advantaged when there is competition among candidates or smaller-regional constituencies. The number of parties that qualify for acceding in parliament is practically the same - 7 in all electoral systems. **PR-list electoral systems are more favourable for left-wing parties (PSRM, PN, PCRM)**, namely the PR-list on national constituency (option 1) and the PR-list on 12 constituencies (option 5). **The other electoral systems cumulatively favour the right, centre and pro-European parties (PAS, DPM, LP and PPEM)**. In reality these simulations depend very much on the outline of electoral constituencies, the size of the constituency and the number of voters in each constituency.
13. In the author's view, **the policy objective, under the current challenges, must ensure the stable Government, sustainable in implementing reforms and the political compensatory (party) representativeness**. As complementary objectives, conditions for compensating gender loss and minority equity can be accomplished. The electoral system should prevent the radicalization of society on the axes dividing the society (geopolitical, linguistic, ethnic), to foster the trust in election institutions and public institutions, the proper management of the risks related to political corruption - all through concrete settings of the electoral system.
14. This objective associates several solutions of electoral systems. In order to achieve a **stable and sustainable government, a majoritarian component of the system is needed** as a primary element that will favour the most popular politician in the uninominal constituencies in the legislative body, who under the conditions of the parliamentary system will be interested in establishing a stable Government. Elected in uninominal constituencies are not interested in repetitive elections, the phenomenon frequently observed in the paradigm of the domination of parties and their leaders in the Republic of Moldova. In order to reduce the influence of coercive factors, the constituencies should be set, on one hand, heterogeneously (counteract radicalization and promote moderate elected officials), on the other hand, reasonably representative in the region (future regional development and territorial administrative reform) and appropriate constituency (from the perspective of regional development, but also to minimize the domination of regional myopia, perhaps at least 40 thousand voters). The winner must accumulate at least 30% of the participants in the voting in order to ensure the necessary

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<sup>7</sup> An alternative to this system is the list-based proportional system blocked in 10-12 jurisdictions with the constituency size (number of electors) of 3-4 already discussed above.

regional legitimacy. The second component of the electoral system will be proportionally representative of the parties that redistribute the remaining seats. Thus, the proportional component will depend on the outcome of the elections in majority constituency (the German system at its beginning in 1949), installation of a threshold of at least 5% of the elected ones based on majority system (or at least 5 elected based on majority one), provided that the list includes gender and minority quotas.

**15. The recommended system is similar to the majority compensatory mixt system (MMp) from the initial election system in Germany (1949):**

- **Majority component: a) PFPT (51 constituencies, elected by at least 30%), or b) MMD<sup>8</sup> (17 constituencies with the size 3 – i.e. the first 3 from each constituency), at least 2 majority seats will be given to diaspora,**
- **Proportional component: PR-list blocked (50 ceiling elected on the basis of percentages gained on majority component with redistribution between parties that accumulated at least 5% of votes or at least 5 majority elected), the requirements for gender, minorities equality.**

Study limitations. The study does not:

- examine the compliance with legal requirements of the draft law on uninominal electoral system and the mixed electoral system<sup>9</sup>,
- aim at analysing the compliance with the requirements of decisional transparency in the process of examination and voting of the draft laws approved recently in the first reading by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> Plurinominal with the constituency size of 3

<sup>9</sup> It analyzes the proposal of principle of the draft law adopted in 1<sup>st</sup> reading, taking into account the findings of this study, and the detailed legal analysis is underway.

<sup>10</sup> The text of the statement on this issue is published separately on [www.credo.md](http://www.credo.md)



## Terminology used

Proportional electoral system - vote based on party lists, party PR-list blocked/closed/open, within a single national constituency or within multiple regional constituencies with lists adapted for each constituency.

Majority electoral system - uninominal vote (one winning candidate - SMD) or plurinominal (several winning candidates – MMD, it is also called plural) in a constituency, produces a clear majority (50%+1).

Mixed electoral system - simultaneous vote in at least 2 electoral systems: majority and proportional, there is a *mixed parallel majority system* (MMM) and *proportional mixed system* (MMP).

Blocked list - the order of members on the list is determined by the party, the vote is given to the list in its entirety, the closed list - the vote is given to a candidate on the party list and therefore to the party, the vote modifies the order of the list, the open list (flexible), including partial (golden seats) - the vote is given either to the member included in the party list, or another member is entered and voted by changing the order on the list, in the last 2 cases the party may set up a top of several seats that remain unchanged.

Electoral District with a Single Elected Member (SMD) - *uninominal majority* electoral system chooses a single winner (one or several rounds) in one or several rounds of voting.

Electoral District with Multiplied Elected Members (MMD) - *plurinominal majority* electoral system, chooses more than one winner (two and more) in one or several voting rounds.

Mixed Electoral System Parallel Majority Membership (MMM) - mixed electoral system (majority and proportional component), each component functions independently, in parallel the candidates are elected on a majority (SMD or MMD) and proportional (PR-list) basis.

Mixed Member Proportional Electoral System (MMcP or MMP<sup>11</sup>) - mixed electoral system (majority component plus proportional component), initially the majority one is voted SMD or MMD (usually to fill 50% or more of legislative seats), depending on the percentage accrued on party lists, the majority seats are allocated proportionally (usually under conditions of passing the electoral threshold based on the majority system, from 4% or 3 elected MPs).

Mixed Member Electoral System (MMcM) - *initial German (1949) version of the mixed electoral system* (the majority component plus the proportional component), initially the SMD is voted, depending on the percentage accumulated in the electoral constituencies, the seats on the party lists are proportionally allocated (usually provided that electoral threshold is passed based on majority system, from 4% or 3-5% of elected MPs).

FPTP (FirstPastThePost) - *majority uninominal* electoral system (SMD), the winner accumulates a simple (relative) majority (sometimes at least 20% or more are required).

Preferential voting - voting mode used in *majority/plural electoral systems, called preferential* (several votes are given in priority order (*preference 1, preference 2, preference 3*) to candidates or parties, this voting method is used in plurinominal electoral systems, MMD: AV, STV, SV.

Alternate voting (AV or IRV) - *preferential uninominal majority electoral system (SMD) with only one election round, but possibly with several rounds of recalculating the preferences*, the winner will accrue 50%+1 of preference 1, if no candidate accumulates them, the candidate with the lowest votes is eliminated, in the 2<sup>nd</sup> round of calculation the preferences 2 of the remaining candidates are distributed, it is repeated if necessary, after the elimination of the slacker, similar to the preferences 3, the winner is the one with the biggest number of preferences 1 + preferences 2 (2<sup>nd</sup> round) + preferences 3 (3<sup>rd</sup> round).

Supplementary Vote (SV) - *preferential single majority voting system (SMD), with only one round of voting, but possibly with several rounds of recalculating the preferences*, if no candidate accumulates 50%+1 of preferences 1, all are eliminated except for 2 winners (with biggest number of preferences 1), in round 2

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<sup>11</sup> MMP or MMcP - Mixed Member Proportional (in Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Italy)

the preferences 2 are calculated (with the same value as preferences 1), if necessary in round 3 the preferences 3 are calculated to determine the candidate with the biggest number of cumulative preferences.

Transferable Vote System (SVT) - preferential plurinominal proportional electoral system (MMD, the number of elected ones is specified) in one election round, but possibly in several recalculation rounds, the winners exceeding the accumulation quota of preference 1 (specified) are elected, otherwise, the slacker is removed, preferences 2 are recalculated to the remaining ones, it is repeated in the case of equal votes, if necessary.

Non-transferable voting system (SnTV) - non-preferential electoral proportional plurinominal system (MMD, specifying the number of elected ones) in one election round, the winners accrue most of votes.

The 2-rounds system (TRS) - uninominal majority voting system (SMD), the winner accumulates a specified quota (typically 50%+1, but in some countries it may be 30%), if necessary the second round is organised with the participation of two candidates remaining in the race.

D-Hondt or Sainte-Lague transfer - methods of reallocating the lost votes in the proportional system to the winning parties favouring the parties that have accumulated a higher percentage of votes.

Vote in Block (BV<sup>12</sup>) - plurinominal majority voting system, MMD, in one round of voting, those candidates win (specifying the number of candidates in the constituency) who gain the most of votes (a quota might be specified)

Block Party voting (PBV) - multiparty majority electoral system, MMD, in a single round of voting, that party wins (specifying the number of parties in constituency) which gains the most of votes (quota might be specified).

Gerrymandering - deliberate manipulation of the boundary of the constituency in order to obtain a desired result, usually without any justification,

Disproportionality index - deviation from the proportionality between the number of voters and elected ones (lower).

Magnitude of constituency (electoral district) - the number of electors, usually higher than 2-3.

The size of constituency (electoral district) - the number of voters in the constituency.

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<sup>12</sup> BV - Block Vote

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## 1 The Role of Electoral Systems

This chapter considers the policy objectives that should be reached and adopted by the society, as they are primary ones, as well as the secondary character of the concrete electoral system that is adopted and intermediates the achievement of the given objective.

Electoral systems are subsidiary to major policy objectives in society. The electoral system does not reflect simplistically the voters' preferences, neither the social structure of society or the configuration of existing political parties. No electoral system succeeds in transposing voters' preferences precisely as a result of voting within the legislative framework. The electoral system is a mechanism that favours citizens' preferences and translates them into electoral results.

*Table 1.1 The political connection of democratic process<sup>13</sup>*

Stage	A	B	C	D	E
<b>Societal situation</b>	Citizens' preferences (perceptions, visions)	Citizens' vote	Election results	The process of public policies between elections	Public Policies
<b>Mechanism</b>		<b>The electoral system</b>		Efficient functioning of Government	
	<b>Democratic institutions, public policies, etc.</b>				

There is a mutual link between the electoral system and citizen's vote, so that the electoral system has direct influence on the way how the vote is given. Any electoral system reflects the achievement of a concrete policy objective. All electoral systems contain inherent imperfections. In some cases, the incorrect design of the electoral system has adverse effects - these are called deficiencies in the design of the electoral system.

Thus, imperfections are predictable and desirable because they are associated with the strengths of the chosen system, and system failures are the result of system design errors, creating undesirable and unpredictable side effects that annihilate the positive effects of the system. Weaknesses should not be allowed, this is the indicator that an improper system has been chosen.

### 1.1 Electoral system in wide context


Electoral rules are within a context in society. The following graph presents the link between the electoral rules and their final result over society. The electoral rules produce intermediary effects and final effects, the transmission being accomplished through mechanical tools

<sup>13</sup> L. Ezrow, *Linking Citizens and Parties: How Electoral Systems matter for Political representation*, Oxford University Press, 2010, P.6

(continuous lines) and behavioral tools (broken lines). Yet the electoral rules intend to produce the desired effects within a concrete societal context in which the coercive and the non-coercive factors are (bold lines).

The coercive factors (intimidation, electoral fraud, administrative constraints and manipulations) negatively influence the application of the electoral rules. These influences get tenser in transition democracies. The non-coercive factors are: 1) political variables, 2) economic variables, 3) cultural and social variables. The political variables are the polarization of political preferences, political hostility, institutionalizing parties, the cooperation culture of the elites, the elites' self-consciousness for the country's future, the quality of the candidates and the voters' trust in the political class. The economic variable are: the level of poverty and development, the media's presence, the macroeconomic stability – these factors influenced over the government's stability and the acors; strategic conduct in elections. The cultural factors refer to the trust within and among social groups, the level of education and information, the social diversity.<sup>14</sup>

Graph 1.2 Effects of electoral rules over political system



The electoral rules can have medium- and long-term outcomes. The medium-term outcomes have effects over the stability of parliamentary governments, the parties' institutional structure, the ideological representation, the governments' accountability to citizens. It's obvious that the contextual influence in this regard should not be underestimated.


Duverger distinguishes 2 types of influence of electoral rules: mechanic and behavioral. The mechanic influences result from the electoral rules, while the behavioral effects result from the perceptions, interpretation and rationalization of the rules by people. As is shown in the graph, if the coercive factors do not interfere, the outcome of mechanic and behavioral influences is clearer.

The electoral rules determine the ratio between the number of voters for a certain party and the seats it gets in the legislature<sup>15</sup>, the exception being when the coercive factors affect the loyal reproduction of the outcome, or, in some cases, the drawbacks of the design of the electoral system (the case of incoherent design of the electoral system). The electoral rules have no direct influence over the structure of the political institutions of political parties and their number, the contextual factors (coercive and non-coercive) are more influential. The graph below shows the structure of parties in regional and national constituencies render this influence.

<sup>14</sup>APSA, Political Science, Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance, 2013


<sup>15</sup>FPTP results from high level of disproportionality, while the PR-list improves the proportionality

Graph 1.3 Effects of electoral rules over the number of political parties



The electoral rules do not directly determine the shaping of the Government in terms of its political support, it's rather a contribution next to others which makes the conditions more or less adequate. Shaping the Government through the support of political coalitions depends of the structure of parties and on the contextual interaction of parties (ideological or doctrine-based parties, anti-system parties, personal rivalries as crucial in the relations among parties). The electoral rules via the party structures at district and at national levels have influences over the support by a single party or by a coalition of parties for a Government. In the middle-term democracies, the party fragmentation is significant. The contextual factors (polarization, hostile personal relations, geopolitical confrontations) can strongly influence the formation of coalitions to support the Government what does not depend on the electoral rules.

Graph 1.4 Electoral rule and ideological preferences



The stability and accountability of Government emerges as an outcome intermediated by stages as was discussed (the number of parties, their structure and cooperation, etc). There are a series of factors and influences in the parliamentary systems which affect the Government and its performance. The shape of party discipline, the cooperation among parties are important. The

Government's stability and support are directly influenced by the Government's economic and social performance. The Government's negative results may erode the support within the coalition and among parties.

Accountability means the voters' capacity to influence the Government and, as is the case, to dismiss the government not delivering the expected outcomes. The accountability stimulates the performance of Governments. In the parliamentary ruling system, a single party forming the Government is directly electorally responsible of its performance, while the parliamentary platform provides the room for actively supervising the Government's outcomes. The representativity has two components: ideological and geographic. The ideological representativity is influenced by contextual factors. Studies carried out in the last decades demonstrate that both systems -- majority (SMD/MMD) and proportional (PR-list) have similar performance in relating with the voter dedicated ideologically or doctrinally. The geographic representativity implies a good linkage with minority or social interests concentrated territorially. SMD and PR-listă in small constituencies favor the concentrated representation of minorities or of concentrated interests, while the PR-list in national districts favors scattered and wide interests. If the party systems are strongly development and contain few parties as a rule, then the competition is based on promises. If the party system is weak, then the elected will focus on the dominating interests of districts, will focus, in concrete districts, on specific promises, sensitive for these districts, thus stable Governments are produced on the basis of the given interests.

*Partial conclusions 1.1 (electoral system in wide context):*

*1.1 The electoral system should be chosen when it is clear what is **the objective of policies needing application**. The chosen electoral system does not produce the outcome directly; it creates conditions to gain the intended effect in time.*

*1.2 **The concrete rules of the electoral system** chosen should be **consistent with the chosen electoral system**, otherwise the accumulating drawbacks can annihilate the expected objective. **The contextual factors** have important effects over the functioning of the electoral system.*

## 1.2 Objectives of electoral policy

No state strives to accomplish a single objective by adopting an electoral system, a cluster of objectives is accomplished. Given the concrete situation in the country, the decision-makers form an electoral system having not just a single objective, but several objectives to achieve.

The German electoral system aims at realizing the responsibility in front of citizens for the governance's outcomes and balancing the representativity. Thus, the German system is a mixed one, grounds on a majority system balanced by the proportional one, thus the government is made accountable by the majority vote but the parties receive balancing influence nationally depending of the outcomes of the majority constituency. Seats are distributed to parties depending on the results in constituencies.

Oftentimes the electoral objectives are not voiced by decision-makers, but a certain existent tradition is followed or they adopt some traditions to certain concrete objectives of short electoral duration. For example, the Anglo-Saxon countries<sup>16</sup> prefer the majority systems as a basic vehicle

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<sup>16</sup> UK, USA, Canada, India, Australia, African and Asian countries with Anglo-Saxon influence

with a series of adaptations to concrete objectives. For example, the FPTP is traditionally preferred in these countries, which insure a clear leadership of a stable and sustainable Government, this being the tradition and the investment in competitive personalities accountable to citizens for the outcomes of the governance.

On the other hand, the European continental electoral tradition is grounded on the PR-list proportional system and variations of that one. Electoral traditions are not necessarily replicable instruments and perfectly adjustable to very different societal situations, although some countries may be influenced by other countries with longer traditions in time. The modern traditions in electoral system have undergone substantial change for the last decades, including by combining electoral systems and mutually borrowed elements.

An electoral system can actually mirror some of these policy objectives, not necessarily in that order<sup>17, 18</sup>:

1. Proportionality of representation,
2. Accountability and responsibility to citizens,
3. Government’s sustainability and stability,
4. Interethnic and interreligious conciliation,
5. Representing minorities, special groups, women,
6. Victory of winners-personalities.

Choosing the objectives of the electoral system depends on the contextual factors of the political system, social context and the effects already produced by the electoral system over political parties.

An electoral system can follow the specified objective or reproduce a less loyal outcome, if it contains formulation deficiencies in the conditions of similar endogenous factors. The contextual factors (social preferences, voting patterns, party structure and other factors are influential over the reproduction of the objective of the electoral system).

In a reference analysis<sup>19</sup>, a representative number of specialists in policy analysis and political analysis set the hierarchy of the importance of objectives in an electoral system. Thus, by importance they are ranked: 1) individual and collective accountability, 2) stable and functional government, 3) proportional representation, 4) clear outcome of election, 5) representativity of minorities, 6) policies as expected by voters, 7) cohesion of political parties, 8) representativity of women, 9) single party forms government.

*Table 1.5 Goals of electoral system by importance (8 – most important)*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1.accountability of elected	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue
2.stable government	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
3.proportional representation	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
4.clear political outcome	Purple	Purple	Purple	Purple	Purple	Purple	Purple	Purple
5.representing minorities	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
6.policies supported by median voter	Cyan	Cyan	Cyan	Cyan	Cyan	Cyan	Cyan	Cyan
7.coherent, consolidated parties	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
8.representing women	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
9.government formed by single party	Orange	Orange	Orange	Orange	Orange	Orange	Orange	Orange

<sup>17</sup> D.Horowitz, Electoral Systems and Their Goals: A Primer for Decision-Makers, 2003,

<sup>18</sup> Another set of objectives: 1) consolidated legislature, 2) accountability of the elected, 3) support for stable government, 4) vote equity, 5) avoiding tactical voting on secondary preferences, 6) principle accept by parties, 7) promoting conciliation within society, 8) promoting parties supporting diverse representation, 9) resistance to setting changes which are inconsistent, p.39-40, [https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/state\\_structure\\_electoral\\_systems\\_0.pdf](https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/state_structure_electoral_systems_0.pdf)

<sup>19</sup> APSA, Political Science, Electoral Rules, and Democratic Governance, 2013



Every country decides on the goal of the electoral system to be applied resulting from the situation, the traditions and the realization of politics. In this chapter, we present the main objectives and electoral systems which make it easier to reach these objectives without touching concrete and specific aspects of the social context and the structure of parties. The last aspects will be put in context when applying these conclusions to the situation in the Republic of Moldova.

The Table below tells on the preference for a better representativity, considering the electoral system better suited for that: mixed compensating, PR-open list and STV.

*Table 1.6 Correlation of electoral systems by policy objectives (accumulated samples)*

	MM-mixed compensating	PR-open list	AV	STV	PR-blocked list	SMD-two rounds	SMD-majority	MM-mixed parallel
1. Individual responsibility of the elected	--				-	+	+++	
2. Stable Government						++	+++	
3. Political proportional representation	+++	+++	---	++	+++	---	---	
4. Clear majority						++	+++	++
5. Minorities representation	+	+++		++	+++		---	
6. Policies supported by median voter			++					
7. Coherent and consolidated parties		--					+	
8. Women representation		++		--				
9. Governments politically supported by single party						++		

*Legend: + means positive linkage and – means negative linkage*

*Partial conclusions 1.2 (objective electoral policies):*

**1.3 Selecting the electoral system is secondary to the object of determining the policy objective** (accountability/responsibility, government stability, proportional representation, clear outcome, etc),

**1.4 As a rule, 1-2 policy objectives are set** (primary and complementary) **given concrete situation and provisions** and depending on them, later electoral system is chosen.

**1.5 The concrete design of the electoral system depends on:** a) contextual factors (coercive and non-coercive), b) capacity of implementing institutions, c) support and electoral tradition, etc.

### *1.2.1 Insuring representation proportionality*

There is an important opinion current maintaining the electoral system should reproduce a proportional political outcome. We notice this objective is placed 3rd in the experts' opinion (graph 1.5). This practice means that 20% of votes should be transferred to 20% representative seats in the Legislature. Another representation outcome, according to the current of opinion, would be inadequate. This viewpoint mirrors the attempt of the large masses engulfing democracy.

There several electoral systems which can contribute to reaching this outcome: 1) the proportional system (PR-party list, either based on the list within a single constituency or several constituencies with blocked, closed or open lists) and 2) the transferable vote system (STV). As a rule, the proportional system has the only objective of better representing the votes and has adverse effects over other mentioned objectives. As a principle, the proportional systems may be combined with other electoral systems in order to reach several objectives. However, establishing the aspects of the electoral system can overthrow the initial objective of the PR electoral system. The proportionality degree of the outcome depends on the number of representatives elected within the constituency, if the number falls (for example from 6 to 3), it is more suitable for large parties, thus the proportionality decreases. One recommends a representative number of at least 4 and more. The proportional system backs a system with many political parties.

The PR-party list<sup>20</sup> is the best known proportional system, though it's not the only one, which can be unfolded on the basis of the party list within a single national constituency or in several constituencies, for example in 10-15 cu with different party lists. The lists, predetermined by the party leadership (the voter cannot modify the list) or the closed list (the voter votes for a candidate on the proposed list possibly modifying the hierarchy, even preference 1, preference 2 and preference 3) or the open list (the voter can introduce, into the party list, new candidates, even preference 1 preference 2 and preference 3)<sup>21</sup>. In the case of a single national constituency, setting a high passing threshold (or even a higher threshold for a bloc of parties) may reduce the aspect of proportional representation, for example in the case of 5% and higher, the same is valid for several constituencies. In the case of multiple constituencies, if its dimension is small, consequently the number of representatives is small, and thus the large parties are favored.

The STV<sup>22</sup> system has similar effects of proportional representation with several candidates elected within the same constituency. The voters pick up (the party or individual candidate) by preference: preference 1, preference 2, preference 3, so the vote is not lost but is duly allocated. There several variations of transferring the vote according to preferences. STV reduces the influence of political parties since some candidates may be elected on the basis of the vote from secondary preferences. STV produces proportional results only in the given constituency and does not guarantee the proportionality at national scale. STV is a genuine alternative to the PR-list in several constituencies.

*Experience of reforming in achieving given objective:*

*The Canadian Government (Trudeau) in 2015, immediately after the parliamentary elections and installment<sup>23</sup>, announced as a priority the change of the electoral system aiming at insuring a better representation in the Legislature. Now Canada uses the PFTP system, but takes into account the proportional system (the list or the preferential vote), remote voting and the obligation to vote. The Trudeau*

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<sup>20</sup> The PR-party list is used in Albania (4% threshold), Armenia (5%, blocked list at national elections and closed list for 13 constituencies, two parties with the best results can additional seats from redistributing lost votes), Austria (4%), Belgium (5%), Bosnia, Bulgaria (4%), Croatia (5%), Czechia (5%), Denmark (2%), Estonia (5%), Finland, Germany (5% for constituencies), Greece (3% with redistribution to winners), Italy (4%), Latvia (5%), Macedonia, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Poland (5%), Portugal, Serbia (5%), Slovakia (5%), Slovenia (4%), Turkey (10%),

<sup>21</sup> Switzerland (even can introduce new candidates on the list) or Belgium (voters can: vote entire list, 2) vote for one or several candidates, 3) vote for alternative candidates, 4) not vote at all), G. Sartori, Party and Party System, A Framework for Analysis, ECPR press, 2005, p.161

<sup>22</sup> STV is broadly used in Anglo-Saxon countries: Ireland and Malta, since 1921, for parliamentary, European and local elections, Northern Ireland and Scotland for the same elections, Australia for legislative elections in territories and for federal elections and for local elections, New Zealand for all types of elections, Canada in some provinces, the USA in some local jurisdictions, India and Pakistan for electing senators.

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.liberal.ca/realchange/electoral-reform/>, <http://www.fairvote.ca/>

Government however decided to postpone the electoral reform because of the popularity of the present system with the Canadians<sup>24</sup>. The proposal to modify the electoral system is reasoned:<sup>25</sup> 1) turnout drop from 76-80% to 70%, 2) perception of inequity in representation on the basis of the present majority system (39.5% votes yielded 54% seats in Parliament). Now the winning Liberal Party formed a stable government, which substituted the conservative government, which had governed for the last 8 years (the Harper Government).

*Partial conclusions 1.2.1 (objective proportionality):*

1.6 Insuring **the proportional representativity** is one of the objectives that may be achieved through **proportional vote (PR-list) or through majority electoral system (STV)**,

1.7 The design of the electoral system much depends on particular settings, which must be provided to be compatible with the chosen electoral system, otherwise the drawbacks of the chosen electoral system will appear, which produce adverse effects and impact hindering the achievement of the policy objective.

### *1.2.2 Insuring accountability<sup>26</sup> in front of constituents*

Two aspects of accountabilities are outlined: of the Government and of the elected (collective and respectively individual). The Government's accountability refers to making responsible the government for policy performance in the economic, social, institutional sectors, while the accountability of the elected means penalizing elected individual politicians or the entire political group.

The elections produce a certain shaping of representation of the elected. *The responsibility and accountability of the elected in front of citizens is a key objective.* The expertise opinion (Graph 1.5) places this objective on position 1 out of 9. Generally speaking, the PR-party list electoral system within the national constituency produces a larger dependence of representatives as to party leaders than to voters. This is especially valid in the case of blocked lists, but also in the case of closed lists because the party leaders form the lists in both cases. H. de Soto, probably one who clearly gets conspicuous by his critique of the proportional system in the reality of Latin America<sup>27</sup>, invokes the lack of accountability of the politicians elected on the basis of the proportional PR-list electoral system.

It's evident there are electoral systems rendering even higher degree of responsibility and accountability as the majority system, and the FPTP system (the first garnering relative majority). This system disadvantages the representatives of small parties or the minorities on the account of clear accountability.

There a variation of the PR-list electoral system, and namely the PR-party list in multiple regional constituencies with at least 3-4 elected within those constituencies, which confer better traits of responsibility and accountability in front of voters. Diminishing the domination of party

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<sup>24</sup> <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/most-canadians-like-current-voting-system-according-to-results-of-liberals-electoral-reform-survey>, <https://www.canada.ca/en/campaign/electoral-reform/learn-about-canadian-federal-electoral-reform/mydemocracyca-online-digital-consultation-engagement-platform.html>

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/electoral-systems/>

<sup>26</sup> There is no such a word as accountability in Romance languages and it is replaced by responsibility, which renders the meaning but partially

<sup>27</sup> H.de Soto, *The Other Path-The Economic Answer to Terrorism*, 2002, Basic Books

leaders over the party list set up for regional constituencies is done through closed or open list (cf. with blocked list). Although this adaptation does not loyally render this objective.

*Experience of reforming in achieving this objective:*

*Romania has a long history (2006-2012) of modifying the electoral system. There were several competing views within society concerning the goal of modifying the electoral system<sup>28</sup>: 1) view (APD<sup>29</sup>) emphasized the need for change on reason of losing votes through redistribution from 10 to 20% following the imperfections of the proportional system with blocked lists – one proposed a compensating mixed system, another view was promoted by president Băsescu (earlier backed by the PSD) PFTP majority vote – insuring a clear government (the referendum to introduce the majority system), another view represented by a coalition of parties pleaded for seeking a better representation for different groups – the preference for a parallel mixed system. The 2012 parliamentary elections unfolded according to the mixed parallel electoral system, an option agreed by the parties later forming a majority within the USL with the main reasoning of insuring adequate representation. The APD view was considered too intricate for citizens (compensating mixed system: PFTP majority vote for nominal constituencies (1.50% of deputies)+2. in district colleges (coincide with counties) the votes garnered by the party within constituencies are gathered and one gets the percent of the elected on the party lists + 3. At national scale, they gathered the undistributed rests and, according to the d'Hondt method, they distributed to parties). President Băsescu's proposal with a majority system in two rounds, insuring an absolute majority, was seen as not insuring the representative proportionality, while insuring the absolute majority was taken into account. They voted the law with parallel mixed system. It was viewed as simpler and clearer, and finally with a better proportional representation. The electoral system had the following components: vote within uninominal colleges with absolute majority, and if it lacks, the seats are proportionally distributed at the level of county college, with the proportional compensation of the representation at national level. The electoral threshold was set at 5% or 4 deputies and 2 senators.*

*This Government was formed initially by the PSD and other parties and was headed by premier Ponta, but later in 2014, following scandals, the technocratic Ciolos Government was installed to act till new elections. In the 2016 parliamentary elections, Romania returned to the PR-blocked list system, which insured the PSD's clear victory and a stable government.*

*Partial conclusions 1.2.2 (objective accountability):*

***1.8 The electoral system alone cannot produce the achievement of the expected policy objective, the electoral rules contribute to the creation of the respective conditions. In Romania's case, the 2014 electoral system should have produced a clearer responsibility that it also has a significant majority component, probably the 2 governments within four years serve as a partial conclusion in backing this approach, but as Romania, in the 2016 elections, returned to the PR-list proportional system, it produced a clearer and more stable majority. Thus, the influence of contextual factors is proven.***

### *1.2.3 Insuring Government's sustainability and stability*

*Forming a stable and sustainable Government is a justified objective. The experts' opinion (Graph 1.5) places this priority on position 4 out of 9. The excessive fragmentation of the Legislature can have impact upon the formation of a Government backed up by a stable majority of at least 50%+1 of deputies. The solution with coalitions is relevant and taken into account, but the probability of forming coalitions can also be compromised if there are important cleavages and*

<sup>28</sup> Asociația Pro Democrația (APD), *Istoria unui dezacord UNINOMINAL*, 2008

<sup>29</sup> APD – Asociația pentru Democrația Participativă

contradictions within society and among political parties, especially among their leaders. The excessive fragmentation sometimes occurs not only because of multiple parties not able to set up a coalition, but also because of a wide spectrum within the party, often hard to reconcile.

The degree to which parties can impose discipline on their elected to carry out the program priorities depends on the congruence degree within the party. The existence and functionality of inner tools of imposing discipline and organization are important.

Producing a stable and sustainable Government is important to promote reforms and policies in a consistent and responsible manner. It's more important to avoid political instability and imprevisibility in robustly and coherently adopting and implementing policies, if the coalitions are fragile.

As the majority electoral systems (traditional system or FPTF) are known to favor, by redistribution, the parties garnering most of the votes, the winning parties including to form the Government. The Governments resulting from majority systems are directly accountable and responsible in front of voters and make the Governments or possible coalitions to back up Governments more sustainable.

*Experience of reforming in achieving given objective:*

*Italy's Government (Renzi), in 2014, adopted the modification of the electoral system, called Italicum,<sup>30</sup> announcing it as a priority aiming at insuring a more stable governance. The electoral law provides for majority vote in 100 constituencies and grants absolute majority of 55% in the Deputies Chamber, provided the winning party garners 40% of votes, this insuring a stable and sustainable Government (in 2005 Italy adopted the majority electoral system FPTP (blocked lists) but Constitutional Court invalidated that law). The problem of the Government's stability is renowned, the Government having a duration of 1-2 years (60 premiers in 70 years), voted by wide unstable coalitions of 3-4 parties. The law also provides for the second round for two parties on the first two positions to get the first places for absolute majority, unless any party garners 40%. The Constitutional Court invalidated the second part of the electoral law (2017)<sup>31</sup>, thus, after the first round, if no party garners 40%, the votes are redistributed proportionally. The Renzi Government's attempt to reform the electoral system was partially postponed.*

*Ukraine's Government, in 2011, passed an electoral law returning the mixed system (of 2002)<sup>32</sup>. The Government's objectives were to strengthen the support for a stable Government. That system was considered as favoring the ruling party, the modification of the system was voted by most deputies, including the ones in opposition. The electoral law contains two components: 1) PFPT (50%, 225 votes) + 2) PR-blocked list with the threshold of 5% (50%, 225 votes). The results of the 2012 elections proved deputies supporting a stable government were elected within uninominal constituencies.*

*Partial conclusions 1.2.3 (objective Government stability):*

*1.9 Modifying the electoral system is not a simple procedure, there are series of impediments of legal blocking, of implementation capacity or of political support.*

#### *1.2.4 Insuring interethnic, ideological and interreligious conciliation*

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<sup>30</sup> <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/how-electoral-reform-will-affect-italian-politics>

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.dw.com/en/italys-constitutional-court-gives-mixed-verdict-on-italicum-electoral-law/a-37275408>

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2011-11-23/ukraine-new-electoral-regulations-are-effect>,  
[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/06/ukraines-next-electoral-challenge/?utm\\_term=.7f52caecbb83](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/06/ukraines-next-electoral-challenge/?utm_term=.7f52caecbb83)



The electoral systems promoting the Government's sustainability, responsibilities and accountabilities in front of citizens do not necessarily contribute to interethnic reconciliation. The challenge is to find such an electoral system which promotes moderate behavior by compromise with members of ethnic groups as part of electoral processes.

The practice is there to demonstrate such systems do exist. Lebanon's electoral system stimulates the cooperation between ethnic and religious groups and the candidates may not be elected on the basis of the representation of a single ethnic or religious group.

*Experience of reforming in achieving this objective:*

*The Lebanese system obliges to garner votes in constituencies with seats reserved to ethnic or religious groups different as to the candidate. Another pattern is to insure voters from several regions – this eases conciliatory behavior. The Lebanese system reserves, to every ethnic or religious group, some seats in the Parliament, the candidates must garner the votes of other ethnic or religious communities, that is a candidate declared as Christian competing for the seat reserved to Christians will have to garner votes including in Muslim communities which are part of that constituency. The essence of the system is the territorial formation of electoral constituency.*

#### *1.2.5 Insuring representation of minorities, special groups, women*

The modern opinion current exposes the proportional representation of minority groups. The electoral system may ease that an ethnic group representing 10% of the population will be represented to the same ratio of 10% in the legislative body. Thus, the proportionality of representing in society of the seats occupied by representatives of minority groups may be a justified objective. The experts place this objective on position 5 out of 9.

In majority electoral systems, this objective may be achieved by modifying the territorial aspect of constituencies to insure the homogeneity of the ethnic district. But these modalities are seen as circumstantial and in fact result in creating territorial circumscriptions with enhanced homogeneity without the representation of other ethnic or religious groups, thus conducting a lack of realization of the minority groups' interests and, consequently, the polarization of opinions.

The proportional representation may be achieved using a modified majority system, the so-called Anglo-Saxon PR, that is the STV system consequently has a better proportional representation. Another way is to reserve several guaranteed seats to minorities' representatives within a mixed system.

There is no magical electoral system to represent the minorities' interests, everything depends on the very concrete situation within society<sup>33</sup>. The FPTP will help the minorities somehow localized in clear-cut territorial constituencies. If there is no clear territorial positioning, then the PR-list with clearly specified quotas when designed is more adequate than the PFTP. The mixed system can have a series of accommodations of the representation of the minority through the majority or proportional component depending on different types of minorities.

#### *Gender equality*

Another legal objective is the minimum gender representation, for example a quota of at least 30 or 40%. The experience demonstrates the preference for the PR-list system with a quota of at

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<sup>33</sup> D.Hine, Electoral Systems, Party law and The Protection of National Minorities, DH-MIN (2006)013, 2009

least 30% for party lists, but there are well known practices in the MMD and SMD systems – as majority systems – in which quotas are imposed relatively successfully.

The PR-list system is a well-known proportional system with gender quota imposed to parties. Imposing compulsory quotas as a result of representation or as a request for the lists presented by political parties in national or regional constituencies can be achieved in majority systems.

Additional demands and stimuli of financial conformation can be attached both to proportional and to majority systems.

*Experience of other countries:*

*The SMD system can accommodate the gender quota by several approaches: a) districts by rotation, b) super-districts, c) the best losers – approaches practiced in Europe, Asia and Africa. In France (50%) and Uzbekistan (33%) – majority SMD, Bolivia (50%), Mexico (40%), Mongolia (20%), Nepal (33%) – mixed system with SMD majority component, use gender quotas from 33% to 50% with specifying the sanction (financial<sup>34</sup> or rejecting the candidates list). Another system of super-districts is be reserving the gender quota for a number of constituencies which make up for the gender inequality by contest available only for women (Uganda, Tanzania, Pakistan). The best loser system establishes a different threshold for women (Jordan, Mauritania), allotting quotas of 15% for the best losing women.*

*In France, law no.88-227/1988 on financial transparency sanctions by 150% (in 2002 this sanction reaching 3-4 million euro per party) for failing to observe the gender quota in the candidates list in SMD or in provincial elections in the PR-list system. The difference between the designation quota and the election quota has positively developed for the last 10 years from 30% in 2002 to 60 in 2012.*

*Partial conclusions 1.2.5 (objective special groups representativity):*

**1.10 The proportional and majority systems can be adjusted to insure the representativity of special groups, and to insure the principle of gender equality.**

#### *1.2.6 Insuring the popular winner victory*

It's a system conferring victory to the most popular candidate compared to any other candidate within the same constituency. But as a rule several candidates compete and it's not so simple to measure the most popular candidate, since candidate X could be more popular compared to candidate Y and compared to candidate Z, but in a direct duel candidate Y could overcome candidate X on the account of the votes from candidate Z.

The electoral systems producing the outcome when the most popular candidate wins are: the alternative vote system (AV) and the majority system on the basis and the majority system on the basis of the Coombs method<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>34</sup> In France, law no.88-227/1988 on financial transparency sanctions by 150% (in 2002 this sanction reaching 3-4 million euro per party) for failing to observe the gender quota in the candidates list in SMD or in provincial elections in the PR-list system. The difference between the designation quota and the election quota has positively developed for the last 10 years from 30% in 2002 to 60 in 2012.

<sup>35</sup> The vote on the basis of the Coombs rule is a majority system in regional constituencies which gradually eliminates the most unpopular candidate, and repeats until the winner of the majority elections remains, the most popular remains. Procedurally the candidate first garnering 50%+1 votes wins, including after the successive elimination of unpopular candidates.

### 1.3 Electoral system and autocratic trend

Selecting the electoral system generally has several explanations: 1) *political*, 2) *economic*, 3) *historical*. *From political perspective*, the PR-list electoral system is adopted in the conditions in which right-wing parties, being in power, are divided (Conservatives and Liberals), and confront with the growth of the left-wing party. Another explanation is that the parties with dispersed representativity of the electorate prefer the PR-list system, evidently, then the SMD, because they do not have a good concentration of the vote within a single constituency, thus garnering voters on electoral lists from all the constituencies.

*From the economic perspective* the right-wing parties adopt a proportional PR-list system if they are well placed in professional unions of employers, have good cooperation with employee unions, thus these structures ease the election of right-wing parties on the basis of their partnership. This cooperation prevents the formation of excessive public costs seen by right-wing parties as a consequence of the distributive policies promoted by left-wing parties. The countries with important quotas of foreign trade prefer the PR-list systems in order to insure stable international policies. On the contrary, the left-wing parties prefer the proportional representative electoral systems because they form more solid entities than fragmented and later promote redistributive social policies.

*From historical perspective*, because changing the electoral system is a task very hard to accomplish, although a new system could be more adequate and rational, an outdated and worn-out system is maintained.

A series of authors consider the correlation between the electoral systems and the autocratic regimes, either developed or developing.<sup>36</sup> The research is conducted at two levels: i) choosing the electoral system to maintain the autocratic regime and ii) the electoral system consolidates the authoritarian power. The evidence shows the strong autocratic regimes resort to the PR-list system which allows for imposing the will of fragmented political parties due to the electoral system. At the same time, the developing autocratic regimes use majority electoral systems of SMD type to expand and encompass the participation of national and regional elites in the ruling process.

In general, the SMD system has the capacity better effects for ruling parties, because they manage to incorporate elites, including regional, in the process of ruling, because regional elites are oriented towards maximizing regional benefits, than towards militant concerns and positioning, often contradictory. In certain situations, this incorporation is the result of offers from specific renter relations in certain lucrative economic sectors in exchange for the granted support. The SMD system also allows for redesigning constituencies depending on the preferences of regional elites, which could be less legal or manipulating.

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<sup>36</sup> A.Ahmed, *Democracy and The Politics of Electoral Systems Choice: Engineering Electoral Dominance*, NY, Cambridge UP, 2013, M.Higashijima, *The Choice of Electoral Systems in Dictatorships*, WIAS, 2016



## 2 Ex-post analysis of present electoral system

The first Moldovan Parliament (1990-94) was elected on the basis of the majority vote system in 2 rounds in 315 constituencies. Following that plebiscite, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia of the XIIth legislature had 371 deputies, most having been supported in the electoral campaign by the new political parties – the Popular Front from Moldova (I.Hadîrca, 27% of the elected deputies), the Movement Unitate – Yedinstvo (V.Morev), and the Communist Party of Moldova (P.Lucinschi), which later split into the conservative and modern wings.

The present electoral system – proportional representative – was introduced in 1994. 2 options were discussed at that moment: i) majority electoral system in 101 constituencies and ii) the proportional vote within a single national constituency with blocked PR-list with 101 deputies. After the Constitution was adopted in July 1994, the proportional electoral system was adopted. The main reason was maintaining the legality of representing the deputies within the Parliament given the situation in the eastern districts of Moldova - Transnistria – and strengthening the institution of political parties.

Thus, choosing the proportional electoral system was guided by better representation and representativity of the interests of diverse groups, including from Transnistria and maintaining the legality of the Parliament.

### 2.1 Proportional system

Since 1994, the proportional PR-blocked list electoral system within a single national constituency with a sliding accession threshold from 2% to 6% (including 9% and 11% for blocs of parties) has produced certain results. Institutionalizing political parties as democratic institutions and the main vehicle in forming the Government and of public and political manifestation of political options. The structure of political parties at the national level is determined by a number of 4-5 parties with real chances of acceding to the parliament with the threshold of 6%, while a threshold of 1-2% would yield a number of 7-8 parties in the parliament. But several political parties would have developed organization capacities and presence in most regions<sup>37</sup>.


The falling turnout from 80% in 1994 to 57% in 2014 correlates with the dropping trust of the population regarding the electoral process and the political class, and with the fact that a large number of citizens is abroad. As the following graph shows, the vote losses (the distortion of the representativity) is high, about 15% on average (in some elections up to 30%). The explanation for such a high degree of disproportionality of a proportional electoral system, which must have insured a good proportionality, is that the concrete settings of the proportional system were deficient. First, the electoral threshold is high, 6%, and it hinders a better representativity of more diverse societal interests. Second, the structure of the vote list is determined and blocked by the

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<sup>37</sup> Historically PCRM and later and most recently: PLDM, PDM, PL, and most recently: PSRM

party leader, often near the elections, and, finally, the entire electoral political campaign is built on the media promotion of one or several party front-runners.

Graph 2.1 Turnout level, losses of non-proportional distribution (%)<sup>38</sup>



One can clearly deduce the disproportionality degree of the present proportional electoral system is damaged by its incorrect settings which are drawbacks of the system. Or, if the proportional electoral system aims at insuring adequate and fair representativity of society, the settings of the electoral system, which should consistently insure the authentic objective of the proportional electoral system, but not undermine it. The comparative analysis of vote losses in the Moldovan electoral system with the vote losses in other countries using the proportional electoral system display the dysfunctionality of the electoral system from this country in this regard.

In the table below one calculates the disproportionality index (Gallagher index), which detects the high level of vote loss. The largest loss is remarked in 2001, 28% (over 400 thousand voters) or a disproportionality index of 16.3 and the smallest loss is in 07.2009 -- 4.2% or disproportionality index of 2.9. The average vote loss for the entire period is 16% (about 200 thousand voters) or disproportionality index of at least 9.

Table 2.2 Statistics of voting for Parliament: 1994-2014<sup>39</sup>

Year	Method of redistributing lost votes	Electoral threshold, %	Participated, %, included, participated	Parliamentary parties			Losses, %	Gallagher index <sup>40</sup> (LSq), deviations proportionality, %
				% garnered	No. of seats in parliament	Voters parties, no.		
1994	d'Hondt (proportionally to gain)	4	<b>79,3%</b> 2 356 614 1 869 090	FPRD (7,5%) BTI (9,2%) Unitatea-Edinstvo (22%) PDAM (43,2%)	FPRD (9) BTI (11) Unitatea-Edinstvo (28) PDAM (56)	FPRD (133 606) BTI (163 513) Unitatea-Edinstvo (390 584) PDAM (766 589)	<b>(18,1)</b>	9,5
1998	d'Hondt (proportion)	4	<b>69,1%</b>	CD (19,4%) PCRM (30,%)	CD (26) PCRM (40)	CD (315 206) PCRM (487 002)	<b>(23,6)</b>	10,3

<sup>38</sup> Calculus by author

<sup>39</sup> <http://www.cec.md/index.php?l=ro>

<sup>40</sup> Gallagher, Michael, 2017. Election indices dataset at [http://www.tcd.ie/Political\\_Science/staff/michael\\_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf](http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf) (measures disproportionality between the vote distribution and the seat distribution)

	ally to gain)		2 324 295 1 681 285	PFD (8,8%) MDP (18,2%)	PFD (11) MDP (24)	PFD (143 428) MDP (294 691)		
2001	d'Hondt (proportionally to gain)	4	<b>67,5%</b> 2 379 491 1 607 095	PCRM (50,1%) PPCD (8,2%) AB (13,4%)	PCRM (71) PPCD (11) AB (19)	PCRM (794 808) PPCD (130 810) AB (212 071)	<b>(28,3)</b>	16,3
2005	d'Hondt (proportionally to gain)	4	<b>64,8%</b> 2 430 537 1 557 828	PCRM (46%) PPCD (9,1%) MD (28,5%)	PCRM (56) PPCD (11) MD (34)	PCRM (716 336) PPCD (141 341) MD (444 377)	<b>(16,4)</b>	9,1
04.20 09	d'Hondt (proportionally to gain)	4	<b>57,6%</b> 2 704 103 1 556 083	PLDM (12,4%) AMN (9,8%) PCRM (49,5%) PL (13,1%)	PLDM (15) AMN (11) PCRM (60) PL (15)	PLDM (191 113) AMN (150 155) PCRM (760 551) PL (201 879)	<b>(15,2)</b>	8,6
07.20 09	d'Hondt (proportionally to gain)	5	<b>58,8%</b> 2 708 381 1 591 757	PLDM (16,6%) AMN (7,4%) PCRM (44,7%) PDM (12,5%) PL (14,7%)	PLDM (18) AMN (7) PCRM (48) PDM (13) PL (15)	PLDM (262 028) AMN (116 194) PCRM (706 732) PDM (198 268) PL (232 108)	<b>(4,2)</b>	2,9
2010	Equal for each party	6, 9, 11	<b>63,4%</b> 2 811 469 1 732 944	PLDM (22,7%) PCRM (39,5%) PDM (12,7%) PL (9,9%)	PLDM (32) PCRM (42) PDM (15) PL (12)	PLDM (506 253) PCRM (677 069) PDM (218 620) PL (171 336)	<b>(8,6)</b>	3,7
2014	Equal for each party	6, 9, 11	<b>57,3%</b> 2 800 827 1 649 402	PSRM (20,5%) PLDM (20,2%) PCRM (17,5%) PDM (15,8%) PL (9,7%)	PSRM (25) PLDM (23) PCRM (21) PDM (19) PL (13)	PSRM (327 912) PLDM (322 201) PCRM (279 366) PDM (252 489) PL (154 518)	<b>(16,4)</b>	7


The comparative analysis of the disproportionality index among countries with different electoral systems<sup>41</sup> shows that the disproportionality index in Moldova, within this period, is similar to the countries with majority electoral systems in which the electoral systems do not aim at promoting adequate representation (e.g. France). In the same context, the Venice Commission and the Council of Europe repeatedly opined concerning the need to lower the accession threshold<sup>42</sup> in order to authentically carry out the implementation of the representative electoral system. The authentic proportional electoral systems (the Netherlands, Austria) reproduce a situation with a much lower disproportionality index, firmly under 3-4, that is the vote losses are much smaller. A proportional representative system genuinely implemented is recommended to the countries having political parties and societal culture capable of negotiating societal differences within such representative institutions as the parliament. The countries with multiple internal divisions (ethnic, geopolitical, etc), if they implement the representative electoral system authentically they cope with the challenge of maintaining a stable government. Even in Germany's case, which implements a mixed electoral system, the disproportionality index is smaller. The median for the Republic of Moldova for this period is 9.

**Tabel 2.3 Indice de disproporționalitate în Moldova: 1994-2014<sup>43</sup>**

<sup>41</sup> [https://www.tcd.ie/Political\\_Science/staff/michael\\_gallagher/EISystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf](https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/EISystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf)

<sup>42</sup> Thresholds have provided a way for the ruling parties to limit participation in parliament by other parties, and the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODHIR, which provide joint opinions on Moldova's electoral code, recommended Moldova adopt lower thresholds in order to "encourage coalitions to provide more cooperation and stable government", Venice Commission and OSCE/ODHIR, Joint Opinion on the Electoral Code of Moldova as of March 27, 2007

<sup>43</sup> Calculul autorului



Cercetările asupra dinamicii interne în cadrul partidelor relevă dependența partidelor de centrele economice de influență<sup>44</sup>. Dependența partidelor de grupurile înguste, care finanțează partidele și prin urmare, odată ce acestea ajung în parlament transformă influența în rentă politică. Partidele dependente de grupurile înguste de influență, în cadrul sistemului parlamentar nu reproduc cu fidelitate sistemul parlamentar. Concluziile expuse în cercetările date atestă dependența partidelor de cel mult 5% din finanțatori ai partidului, prin urmare, partidul se manifestă ca un grup concentrat de influență economică. În condițiile setării pragului înalt de accedere în parlament, restricției de formare a partidelor politice pe criteriul regional și etnic, comportamentul strategic al grupurilor de influență este asigurarea influenței asupra partidelor politice, se formează un grup îngust care poartă partidul politic și se mișcă de pe o listă pe altă listă de partid.

Chiar dacă sistemul electoral actual ar fi trebuit să favorizeze consolidarea partidelor politice, setările sistemului electoral actual și al regimului partidelor politice produc efecte adverse, influențele centrelor economice înguste deformează realitatea în cadrul partidelor care ar trebuie să fie bazate pe participarea largă a cetățenilor conștienți. Partidele devin doar vehicule de accedere în parlament prin intermediul cheltuielilor de formare a imaginii. Acestea partide au șanse mici să revigoreze funcționarea sistemului parlamentar și sunt folosite pentru unele persoane pentru a transforma sistemul parlamentar în cel prezidențial sau semi-prezidențial.

Această realitate privind partidele politice reduce concurența intrapartinică, aranjamentele și interesele grupurilor economice maximalizează interesele acestora generând costurile de rentă asupra proceselor economice, sporește fenomenul corupției. Prin urmare partidele consolidează baza oligopolizantă și monopolizantă în economie și formează realități oligarhice în societate. Inevitabil încrederea în partidele politice scade și, prin urmare, scade încrederea în sistemul de guvernământ – sistemul democratic parlamentar.

În Tabelul care urmează se prezintă evoluția politică a partidelor, în funcție de clasificarea doctrinară declarată sau observată (prin intermediul politicilor propuse)<sup>45</sup>, performanța politică (scorul electoral) și componența persoanelor cheie. Prezentarea informației mai detaliate se face cu referire la partidele care au acces în parlament și care au demonstrat longevitatea pe parcursul a câtorva scrutine electorale.

<sup>44</sup>Centrul de Resurse pentru Drepturile Omului (CREDO) Finanțarea partidelor politice 2012, 2014, <http://www.credo.md/pageview?id=138>, <http://www.credo.md/pageview?id=488>

<sup>45</sup>Centrul de Resurse pentru Drepturile Omului (CREDO), Analiza doctrinară a propunerilor de politici ale partidelor politice din Republica Moldova, 2000-2014,

Tabel 2.4a Principalele partide politice, rezultatele electorale, mișcări pe liste<sup>46</sup>

	1994	1998	2001	2005	4.2009	7.2009	2010	2014	2018
<b>STÎNGĂ CONVENȚIONALĂ</b>									
<b>B.Unitatea-Edinstvo</b> 1994:Morev, Sornicov, Solonari, Crilov, Iovv, Trombitki, Sidorov, Senic, Prijmereanu, Todoroglo, Stepaniuc, Smirnov,	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
B.Patria-Rodina	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	
Ravnopravie (Klimenko)	-	-	0,5	2,8	-	-	-	-	
B.Uniunea Vamală Moldova	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,5	
P.Comunist Reformato	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,9	
<b>PCRM</b> , 1998:Voronin, Iovv, Neguta, Gutu, Misin, Stepaniuc, Tkaciuk, Muntean, Dodon, Greceeni, Prijmereanu, Cegan, Todoroglo, Postoico, Stoicov, 2001: Voronin, Neguta, Misin, Todoroglo, Iovv, Turcan, Stoicov, Stepaniuc, Prijmereanu, Tkaciuk, Bondarciuc, Tabunscic, Postoico, 2005: Voronin, Ostapciuc, Tarlev, Stepaniuc, Postoico, Misin, Stoicov, Panciuc, Tkaciuk, Prijmereanu, Turcan V, Bodnarenco, Iovv, Reidman, Stati S, Petrenco, Todoroglo, Vlah, 4.2009: Voronin, Lupu, Greceanii, Tkaciuk, Dodon, Stepaniuc, Ostapciuc, Balmos, Papsuoi, Zagorodnii, Todoroglo, Stoicov, Turcan, Misin, Muntean, Iovv, Petrenco, Vlah, Reidman, Domete, Gorila, 7.2009: Voronin, Greceanii, Turcan, Mindru, Tkaciuk, Dodon, Stepaniuc, Ostapciuc, Postoico, balmus, Todoroglo, Petrenco, Sova, Muntean, Abramciuc, Misin, Iovv, 2010: Voronin, Greceanii, Muntean, Postoico, Tkaciuk, Dodon, Misin, Vlah, Petrenco	-	30	50,1	46	49,5	44,7	39,5	17,5	
<b>PSRM</b> 2014: Dodon, Greceanii, Cegan, Turcan, Neguta, Batrincea, Tirdea, Corduneanu,	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20,5	
<i>Stîngă - partide parlamentare</i>	22	30	50,1	46	49,5	44,7	39,5	37,5	~40
<b>CENTRU CONVENȚIONAL</b>									
<b>P.Democrat Agrar (PDAM)</b> 1994:Motpan, Lucinschi, Sangheli, Andronic, Diaconu, Cunev, Suruceanu, Bulgari, Diacov, Rusu, Zabunov, Cegan, Muravski A, Oleinic N,	43,2	3,6	1,2	-	-	-	-	-	
<b>Partidul Social Democrat (PSD)</b> 1998:Nantoi, Filip Iu,2001:Nantoi, Pistrinciu, Filip Iu, 2005: Nantoi, Musuc, Roscovan E, Hadrabura, Ciobanu V, Panus E, Tirdea, Pistrinciu, 04.2009: Braghis, Selin, Musuc, Chendighilean, Bolboceanu, Panus E, Tirdea,	3,7	1,9	2,5	2,9	-	1,9	-	-	
<b>Alianța Civică Furnică</b> (Vrabie)	-	3,3	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<b>Al.Braghiș</b> 2001:Braghis, Cosarciuc, Sidorov, Gutu L, Morei, Morev, Oleinic, Petrache, Gutu, Morei, Plesca, Morev, Bulgari, Bolboceanu, Oleinic A, Burca E, Duca, Boisteanu C, Renita V,	-	-	13,4	-	-	-	-	-	
<b>Moldova Democratică și Prosperă (MDP)</b> , 1998:Diacov, Sturza, Muravski V, Solonari, Duca, Petrachi, Plesca, Morei, Muravski A, Guma, Morei, Tulbure, Trombitchi, Focsa, Tap, Gherasim, Turcanu A, Babenco O,	-	18,2	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<b>Uniunea Centristă</b> 04.2009:Petrache, Tarlev, Andronic, Amihalachioae, Klimenko, Avornic,	-	-	-	-	2,8	-	-	-	
<b>P.Democrat (PD)</b> , 07.2009:Diacov, Lupu, Lazar, Popov, Serebrian, Stoianoglo, Plahotniuc, Candu, Filip, Raducan, Guma, Ghilas, Buliga, Jantuan, Nantoi, Lucinschi Ch, 2010: Lupu, Plahotniuc, Lazar, Corman, Diacov, Raducan, Candu, Buliga, Filip, Botnari, Stoianoglo, Apolschi, Bolboceanu, Guma, Jantuan, Ghilas, 2014: Lupu, Plahotniuc, Corman, Diacov, Candu, Buliga, Filip, Botnari, Stoianoglo, Apolschi, Bolboceanu,	1,3	-	5	(5)	3	12,5	12,7	15,8	
<i>Centru - partide parlamentare</i>	43,2	18,2	13,4			12,5	12,7	15,8	~15
<b>DREAPTĂ CONVENȚIONALĂ</b>									
<b>B. Tăranilor și Intelectualilor</b> , 1994: Mosanu, Nedelciuc, Hadirca, Mindicanu, Ghimpu, Matei, Dedi, Cimpoi, Bostan,	9,2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

<sup>46</sup> Integrearea datelor de către autor

<b>Convenția Democrată (CD)</b> 1998: Snegur, Rosca, Andronic, Dolganiuc, Josu, Burca, Poalelungi, Catan, Rusu, Strimbeanu, Nemerenco, Neagu, Dediu, Mindicanu, Cubreacov, Strimbeanu, Mocanu, Renita, Secareanu, Cimpoi,	-	19,4 (15)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<b>P.Renașterii și Concilierii;</b> 2001: Snegur, Andronic, Ciobanu, Josu, incevschi, Catan, Tampiza, Poalelungi, Rusu, Severovan, Ciontoloî, Mardarovici,	-	-	5,9	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<b>Mișcarea Acțiunea Democrată</b> (Untila)	-	-	-	-	-	1,2	1,2	-	-	
<b>Moldova Democrată (MD)</b> 2005: Urecheanu, Diacov, Braghis, Filat, Gutu L, Oleinic, Cosarciuc, Untila, Serebrian, Bujor, Oleinic A, Bolboceanu, Guma, Cosarciuc, Buliga, Pavlicenco, Tulea, Klipii, Taranu A, Raducan, Gutu I, Stratan, Ciontoloî, Turcanu A,	-	-	-	28,5 (23,5)	-	-	-	-	-	
<b>Alianța Moldova Noastră (AMN)</b> 4,2009: Urechean, Oleinic A, Cosarciuc, Pavlicenco, Platon V, Cimpoi, Untila, Colesnic, Nujor, Osipov V, Plesca, Susarenco, Gutu I, Muravschi V, Onceanu A, Cernei O, Roscovan E, 7,2009: Urechean, Oleinic A, Cosarciuc, Pavlicenco, Untila, Colesnic, Nujor, Osipov V, Plesca, Gutu I, Onceanu A, Platon V,	-	2,2	-	-	9,8	7,4	2,1	-	-	
<b>PLDM</b> 4,2009: Filat, Tanase, Lucinschi, Palihovici, Tap, Nagacevschi, Balan, Vieru, Godea, Hotineanu, Leanca, Ghiletchi, Sleahitichi, Furdul, Strelet, Cimbriciuc, Deliu, Grama, Mocanu Gh, 7,2009: Filat, Tanase, Lucinschi, Palihovici, Tap, Nagacevschi, Balan, Vieru, Godea, Hotineanu, Leanca, Ghiletchi, Sleahitichi, Furdul, Strelet, Cimbriciuc, Deliu, Mocanu Gh, 2010: Filat, Tanase, Lucinschi, Palihovici, Tap, Nagacevschi, Balan, Vieru, Godea, Hotineanu, Leanca, Ghiletchi, Sleahitichi, Furdul, Aghachi, 2014: Filat, Gherman, Lucinschi, Sandu, Palihovici, Hadrabura, Tap, Balan, Vieru, Hotineanu, Leanca, Ghiletchi, Sleahitichi, Furdul, Aghachi, Belostecinic, Carpov, Balan,	-	-	-	-	12,4	16,6	22,7	20,2	-	
<b>P.Forțelor Democratice (PFD),</b> 1994: Matei, Certan, Nedelciuc, Mosanu, Dabija, Pavlicenco, Ghiletchi, Padurarul, Sleahitichi, Mindicanu, Ghimpu, Vovc, Cimpoi, Dumbraveanu, Jigau, Gremalschi, Usatii, Barbarosie, Baiesu, 1998: Matei, Nedelciuc, Mosanu, Dabija, Pavlicenco, Ghiletchi, Petrenco, Sleahitichi,		8,8	1,2	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<b>Dreapta - partide parlamentare</b>	9,2	28,2		28,5	22,2	24	22,7	20,2	~25	
<b>DREAPTA-UNIONIȘTII</b>										
<b>FPCD/PPCD</b> 1994: Rosca, Secareanu, Arama, Cubreacov, Susarenco, Nagacevschi, Corduneanu, Dolganiuc, Neagu, Secrieru, Colesnic, Burca, Mocanu, 2001: Rosca, Alexei, Cubreacov, Secareanu, Roscovan M, Osipov, 2005: Rosca, Secareanu, Arama, Cubreacov, Neagu, Cusnir, Susarenco, Nagacevschi, Varta, Corduneanu, Roscovan M, Vaculovschi Gh,	7,5	(5)	8,2	9,1	-	1,9	0,5	0,7		
<b>P.Național Țărănesc Creștin Democrat</b>	-	-	1,7	1,4	-	-	-	-		
<b>P.Național Liberal (PNL),</b> Pavlicenco	-	-	2,8	-	-	-	0,6	0,4		
<b>P.Liberal/Reforme</b> 4,2009: Ghimpu, Chirtoaca, Fusu, Salaru, Hadirca, Nimerenco, Gutu A, Grozavu, Bodrug, Moldovanu, Casian, Vasilachi, Carp, Munteanu, Poting, 7,2009: Ghimpu, Chirtoaca, Fusu, Salaru, Hadirca, Nimerenco, Gutu A, Grozavu, Bodrug, Moldovanu, Casian, Vasilachi, Vacarciuc, Brega, carp, Cebanu, 2010: Ghimpu, Chirtoaca, Fusu, Salaru, Hadirca, Nimerenco, Gutu A, Grozavu, Bodrug, Lupan, Popa,	2,4	-	-	-	13,1	14,7	9,9	9,7		
<b>Unioniștii - partide parlamentare</b>	7,5	(5)	8,2	9,1	13,1	14,7	9,9	9,7	~10	

**Legendă:** cu caracterele *acentuate* sunt evidențiate partidele cu prezența parlamentară pentru perioada respectivă, cu hașurat cei care s-au mișcat de pe o listă doctrinară pe o altă

Informația prezentată în tabelul de mai sus oferă o serie de informații. Clasificarea după domeniile doctrinare conturează dimensiunea eșichierului doctrinar de stângă, de centru, de dreapta inclusiv unioniștii. Dimensiunile electorale ale acestora respectiv sunt de 40%, 15%, 25% și 10%. Totodată, sunt posibile oscilații în limitele acestor curente doctrinare convenționale de 10%, astfel în dependență de prestația personanelor publice și a personalităților reprezentative și de calitatea campaniilor, dar și susținerea organizatorică, unele partide care se află în aceste domenii doctrinare pot atinge cote mai bune din contul domeniilor doctrinare adiacente. Analiza mai detaliată a evoluției domeniilor doctrinare sau ideologice, impactul reciproc și cooperarea acestora din perspectivă tactică, ideologică va fi realizată în ultimul capitol.

În tabelul care urmează este prezentată lista a 400 de ministeriabili în diferite guverne de-a lungul istoriei guvernamentale ale Republicii Moldova. Cel puțin 10% din aceasta listă a

ministeriabililor se regăsesc în câteva guverne diferite, deseori foarte diferite doctrinar convențional. Comparația cu lista precedentă conferă o suprapunere mai mare. Nu a fost prezentată lista vice-miniștrilor, șefilor de agenții și autonomii sau șefilor de direcții din perspectiva suprapunerii cu lista ministeriabililor, în cazul acesta suprapunerea este în jur de 30%. În realitate, analiza comună a personalia ministeriabililor și a aleșilor relevă concluzia mai tranșantă negativă asupra populației politicului.


Tabel 2.4b Ministeriabilii – personalia: 1990-2017

	1990	1994	1998	2001	2005	2009	2013	2016
<b>P r e m i e r</b>	M.Druc (1990), V.Muravski (1991), A.Sangheli (1992)	A.Sangheli (1994)  I.Ciubuc (1997),	<b>I.Ciubuc</b> (1998),  <b>I.Sturza</b> (1999),  D.Braghis (1999)	V.Tarlev (2001),  <i>(PCRM)</i>	V.Tarlev (2005),  Z.Greceanii (2009)  <i>(PCRM)</i>	<b>V.Filat</b> (2009),  <i>(PLDM+PL+PDM+AMN)</i>	Leanca (2013),  <i>(PLDM+PL+PDM)</i> Ch.Gaburici (2015),  <i>(PLDM+PDM)</i>  V.Strelet (2015)  <i>(PLDM+PL+PDM)</i>	Filip (2016)  <i>(PDM+PL+independenți)</i>
<b>M e m b r i g u v e r n u l u i</b>	<u>1990 (Druc):</u>  A.Barbu  <b>A.Barbăneagră,</b>  <b>A.Sangheli,</b>  G.Ghidirim, I.Costaș, I.Ungureanu, M.Druc, N.Matcas, N.Tiu, <b>T.Butnaru, V.Muravski,</b>  <u>1991 (V.Muravski):</u>  C.Antoci, <b>I.Costas,</b> A.Barbu, <b>A.Barbăneagră,</b> A.Plugaru, <b>A.Sangheli,</b> C.Tampiza, <b>I.Costas,</b> I.Ungureanu, N.Tiu, P.Sandulachi, <b>T.Butnaru,</b> T.Slanina, <b>V.Muravski</b>  <u>1992 (Sangheli)</u>  <b>I.Costas,</b> P.Creanga, <b>A.Barbăneagră,</b> A.Cheptene, A.Scobioala, B.Carandiu, C.Melnic, C.Antoci, C.Tampiza, D.Cimpoes, D.Nidelcu, G.Ghidirim, G.Hoara, I.Butnaru, I.Casian, I.Dumeniuc, I.Ungureanu, M.Coscodan, <b>M.Severovan,</b> N.Andronati, N.Matcas, N.Tiu, N.Oleinic, P.Sandulachi, S.Certan, T.Slanina, V.Cunev, V.Iconicov, V.Cebotari, V.Calmoi, V.Gorincoi	<u>1994 (Sangheli):</u>  <b>C.Ciobanu,</b> C.Antoci, D.Nidelcu, G.Gusac, G.Ojog, <b>G.Triboi, I.Casian,</b> <b>M.Popov,</b> <b>M.Severovan,</b> M.Cibotaru, P.Creanga, P.Gaugas, T.Mosneaga, <b>I.Gutu,</b> V.Cunev, V.Bobutac, V.Bulgari, V.Chitan, V.Calmoi, <b>V.Iovv,</b> V.Sturza, <b>V.Gorincoi</b>  <u>1997 (Ciubuc):</u>  <b>C.Ciobanu,</b> D.Nidelcu, G.Ciobanu, G.Cucu, G.Lungu, G.Tabunscic, <b>G.Triboi, I.Ciubuc,</b> I.Popovici, I.Casian, I.Badar, M.Magdei, <b>I.Gutu,</b> <b>M.Popov,</b> <b>M.Severovan,</b> M.Plamadeala, <b>N.Cernomaz,</b> <b>N.Tabacaru,</b> <b>T.Butnaru,</b> <b>V.Bulgari,</b> V.Chitan, <b>V.Pasat, V.Iovv,</b> <b>V.Sturza,</b> V.Vartic,	<u>1998 (Ciubuc):</u>  A.Arapu, <b>A.Grimalschi,</b> A.Capcelea, E.Gladun, G.Ciobanu, G.Tabunscic, I.Paduraru, <b>I.Sturza,</b> I.Tanase, <b>M.Severovan,</b> <b>N.Andronic,</b> <b>N.Cernomaz,</b> N.Tabacaru, O.Stratulat, <b>T.Botnaru,</b> T.Leanca, <b>V.Dolganuic,</b> V.Bulgari, <b>V.Pasat, V.Catan,</b> V.Gurintenco  <u>1999 (I.Sturza):</u>  A.Can, A.Muravski, <b>A.Arapu,</b> <b>A.Grimalschi,</b> A.Cucu, A.Capcelea, B.Gamurari, D.Croitor, E.Slopac, G.Ciobanu, E.Gladun, G.Tabunscic, I.Paduraru, <b>M.Severovan,</b> <b>N.Andronic, N.Tabacaru,</b> O.Stratulat, <b>T.Botnaru,</b> <b>V.Bulgari, V.Pasat, V.Catan,</b> V.Cheibas, <b>V.Filat</b>  <u>1999 (Braghis):</u>  A.Smochin, <b>A.Cucu,</b> A.Capcelea, <b>B.Gamurari,</b> <b>D.Braghis,</b> D.Croitor, E.Slopac, G.Ciobanu, <b>I.Vancea, I.Gutu,</b> I.Lesan, I.Raileanu, I.Russu, L.Gutu, M.Manoli, <b>N.Cernomaz,</b> <b>N.Tabacaru,</b> V.Sterbet, V.Revenco, <b>V.Cosarciuc,</b> V.Parasca, V.Gurintenco, <b>V.Pasat,</b> V.Turcan	<u>2001 (Tarlev):</u>  A.Cuptov, <b>A.Cucu,</b> A.Gherman, A.Stratan, C.Mihailescu, C.Mihailescu, D.Todoroglo, D.Croitor, G.Duca, G.Papuc, G.Sima, I.Timciuc, <b>I.Vancea,</b> I.Lesanu, I.Morei, I.Pacuraru, <b>I.Leanca,</b> M.Lupu, M.Garstea, M.Manoli, <b>N.Cernomaz,</b> N.Dudau, S.Urechean, S.Odagiuc, T.Colesnic, V.Beniuc, V.Cristea, V.Revenco, V.Plesca, V.Dolghieru, V.Draganel, <b>V.Iovv,</b> V.Sova, V.Zgardan, V.Madan, V.Gaicuc, V.Topa, V.Iftodi, Z.Greceanii	<u>2005 (Tarlev):</u>  A.Gorodenco, A.Stratan, A.Coza, C.Mihailescu, G.Balmos, G.Duca, G.Papuc, I.Dodon, I.Ababii, I.Corobcean, M.Formuzal, M.Pop, M.Gagauz, V.Guznac, V.Cristea, V.Revenco, <b>V.Lazar,</b> V.Plesca, V.Sova, V.Ursu, V.Stepaniuc, V.Tvircur, V.Ivanov, V.Pirlog, V.Vrabie, V.Antosi, V.Molojen, Z.Greceanii, V.Mejinschi, V.Baldovici, V.Sova, P.Buceatchi, M.Durlesteanu, L.Savga, L.Catrinici, I.Rosca, M.Barbulat,	<u>2009 (Filat):</u>  A.Oleinic, A.Tanase, A.Salaru, B.Focsa, G.Duca, G.Salaru, I.Cebanu, I.Negrei, <b>I.Leanca,</b> L.Bujor, M.Raducan, M.Formuzal, V.Buliga, <b>V.Cosarciuc,</b> <b>V.Lazar,</b> V.Negruta, V.Bodiub, V.Catan, V.Osipov, V.Marinuta, A.Usatii, E.Carpov, B.Focsa, A.Roibu, M.Sandu, M.Raducanu, M.Sleahitichi, O.Ticu, O.Efrim, P.Filip, V.Bumacov, <b>V.Catan</b>	<u>2013 (Leanca):</u>  <b>A.Arapu,</b> A.Candu, A.Usatii, D.Recean, E.Carpov, G.Duca, G.Salaru, M.Sandu, M.Raducan, M.Formuzal, M.Babuc, N.Gherman, O.Bodisteanu, O.Efrim, P.Filip, T.Poting, V.Buliga, V.Tapis, <b>V.Lazar,</b> V.Troenco, V.Botnari, V.Bumacov, V.Negruta, V.Marinuta  <u>2015 (Gaburici, Strelet)</u>  <b>A.Arapu,</b> A.Salaru, C.Fusu, G.Brega, G.Duca, I.Sula, I.Vlah, I.Chirinciu, L.Handrabura, M.Sandu, M.Formuzal, M.Buga, M.Babuc, N.Gherman, O.Balan, P.Filip, R.Glavan, S.Afanasenco, S.Palihovici, S.Bride, V.Munteanu, V.Bitca, V.Botnari, V.Osipov, V.Cibotaru, V.Cebotari, V.Grosu,	<u>2016 (Pavel)</u>  A.Jizdan, A.Salaru, A.Galbur, C.Fusu, E.Grama, G.Balan, G.Brega, I.Vlah, I.Cirinciu, M.Babuc, O.Armasu, O.Calmic, R.Glavan, S.Grigoras, V.Munteanu, V.Bitca, V.Botnari, V.Zubcu, V.Cebotari

În tabelul care urmează se produce corelația interconexiunilor dintre partidele politice de-a lungul istoriei politice a Republicii Moldova, accentul fiind plasat pe grupurile de persoana și mișcărilor acestora de pe o listă pe altă listă a partidelor.



Tabel 2.5 Conexiunile și personalia partidelor politice: 1994-2017<sup>47</sup>



Informația prezentată ne oferă imaginea mișcărilor personalităților politice în cadrul și dintre partidele politice. Analiza detaliată a mișcărilor este în curs de desfășurare<sup>48</sup>, însă concluzia preliminară este că cel puțin 15% din personalitățile politice și publice în perioada indicată se află în mișcare dintr-o zonă doctrinară în altă zonă doctrinară convențională. Mișcarea și recombinarea de pe listele mai multor partide și rolul strategic al unor persoane ca promotorii unor interese este parte a unui alt studiu, oricum, se atestă prezența de cel puțin 20% a persoanelor politice din primele 25 poziții pe listele de partid în alte partide. Aceasta atestă faptul circulației intense a persoanelor cu șansele de a accede în parlament dintr-o listă în altă listă de partid în funcție de conjunctură politică. Mișcările date pot fi explicate de evoluțiile interne ale politicii, apartenența unor grupuri economice și politice, sarcinile pe care le realizau aceste partide în campania concretă.

*Concluzii parțiale 2.1 (sistem proporțional):*

**2.1 Sistemul electoral PR-listă blocată, în coroborare cu alți factori de context, a creat ca efect multitudinea partidelor din care periodic 2-3 partide concurează pe același segment doctrinar, ideologic, însă în esență concurența se reduce la confruntarea grupurilor de oameni care populează listele partidelor politice, în special pe primele locuri.**

**2.2 Se observă mișcarea grupurilor de persoane de la un partid politic din aceeași categorie ideologică, combinarea blocurilor electorale din categoriile diferite dar și reproducerea**

<sup>47</sup> Integrarea datelor de către autor

<sup>48</sup> Centrul de Resurse pentru Drepturile Omului (CREDO), Mișcările politice și personala politică din Republica Moldova, 1994-2014,



*prezenței în partidele politice pe domenii ideologice foarte diferite, chiar contradictorii în proporție de 20-30% din vârful (primele 20 de poziții) listelor partidelor parlamentare.*

- 2.3 *Prin coroborare cu alte studii privind finanțarea campaniilor electorale reținem progresul inadecvat al democrațiilor interne în cadrul partidelor, dependența fiind maximă de grupuri dominante de cel mult 5% asupra finanțărilor și strategiei partidelor, astfel, PR-listă sistem electoral are efect foarte redus la consolidarea partidelor politice în sensul democratizării și reprezentativității acestora.*

## 2.2 Sistem majoritar și proporțional în alegeri locale

Alegerile în Găgăuzia sunt desfășurate în baza competiției directe a candidaților în 37 de circumscripții care aleg candidatul cu cel mai mare număr de voturi în turul 2 sau candidatul cu majoritatea absolută din turul întâi.<sup>49</sup>

### *Încrederea administrația publică locală*

Încrederea în administrația publică locală este mai mare, și constituie cel puțin 30% (nivelul de încredere comparabil acordat partidelor politice acum 10-15 ani). Alegerile primarilor se realizează în baza sistemului majoritar uninominal, dacă e necesar, în 2 tururi.

Consilierii locali și consiliile raionale sunt formate în baza listelor de partid PR-listă blocată. Logica de vot în cazul alegerilor locale este similară sistemului majoritar, pe când logica votantului în cazul alegerilor raionale este mai aproape votului parlamentar cu unele influențe locale.

### *Încrederea instituțiile publice Găgăuzia<sup>50, 51, 52</sup>*

În regiune se instituționalizează practică care atestă alegerea candidaților în Adunarea regională în calitate de candidați independenți și pe listele partidelor politice. Cea mai mare parte a candidaților și a câștigătorilor se înregistrează în calitate de candidați independenți, în proporție de peste 90%. Lipsește o explicație robustă a fenomenului.<sup>53</sup> Ulterior alegerii, Adunarea Generală formează fracțiunile politice, care capătă conturul politic și asociat partidelor politice naționale. Câștigătorii la funcția Bașcanului se promovează similar în calitate de candidați independenți.

Unii observatori califică asocierea în fracțiunile politice ulterior alegerii ca fenomen de corupție politică. Probabil, acest fenomen necesită totuși explicația rațională și argumentată, din perspectiva: 1) comportamentului politic de maximalizare a votului de către candidații, 2) analiza încrederii mici a partidelor naționale în regiune, 3) comportamentul de asociere în fracțiuni pentru maximalizarea accesului la resursele financiare și promovarea promisiunilor prin intermediul asocierii cu unele partide ulterior alegerii, etc. Toate ipotezele relevante trebuie discutate și probate decât simplă etichetare a aleșilor și a procesului. Probabil, sunt plauzibile și se materializează câteva ipoteze în cazurile și situațiile diferite, pe de o parte comportamentul de rent-

<sup>49</sup> Information report on elections in the Popular Assembly of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, Republic of Moldova (20 November 2016) <https://rm.coe.int/16806fe081>

<sup>50</sup> Опрос общественного мнения в функционировании социальных, экономических и политических институтов в АТО Гагаузия, 2007 [http://pilgrim-demo.org.md/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Opinion-poll-Gagauzia\\_2017.pdf](http://pilgrim-demo.org.md/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Opinion-poll-Gagauzia_2017.pdf)

<sup>51</sup> [http://cec-gagauzia.blogspot.md/p/blog-page\\_14.html](http://cec-gagauzia.blogspot.md/p/blog-page_14.html)


<sup>52</sup> <http://www.gagauzia.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=411&id=235>

<sup>53</sup> Probabil, încrederea în partidele politice, în condițiile existenței doar partidelor naționale (restricția de înregistrare a partidelor pe criterii etnice și regionale) este mica, astfel candidații își maximalizează votul prin formula de candidat independent. Deci, încrederea în partidele politice naționale (lipsa partidelor regionale) și încrederea joasă în partidele politice.

seeking a unor aleși, pe de altă parte alinierea la centrul executiv pentru maximalizarea resurselor financiare în satisfacerea interesului electoral.

“По отношению к политическим институтам регистрируем высокий уровень доверия к местным и региональным властям, а также к новоизбранному Президенту РМ — более 80% ответов. Правительство и Парламент страны соответственно регистрируют низкий уровень доверия — чуть более 25% опрошенных выразили свое доверие. Соответствующим образом оценена и деятельность данных органов/руководителей.”  
 “Относительно доверия к политическим лидерам региона, ситуация выглядит ...: отсутствие поляризации, ярко выраженный уровень доверия к одному политическому лидеру, для которого не наблюдается противовесов, около 88% отметили это относительно Башкана Гагаузии.”

Tabel 2.6 Încrederea în instituțiile publice în Găgăuzia



Concluzii parțiale 2.2 (sistem majoritar local, regional):

- Încrederea în competiții politici și în instituțiile publice este peste 50%.
- Candidații independenți în Adunarea Regională sunt cei mai electibili, asocierea cu partidele politice în procesul de alegeri este percepută ca dezavantaj, odată ce sunt

*aleși, membrii independenți se asociază în fracțiuni politice pentru ași maximaliza accesul la resursele financiare oferite din centru.*

### 2.3 Trust in political parties

Polls show that citizens' trust in political parties has fallen from 30% in 2004 to 16% in 2017, while over 80% of the citizens do not trust them. The situation is alarming. The poll released in March and April (please see below) demonstrates that the Parliament enjoys even less confidence. This situation occurs due to: lack of accountability of MPs and political parties to citizens, negatives perceptions of how the leadership and political parties operate, poor situation in the country and lack of responsibility of governments created by political parties, as well as permanent crisis situations among political parties.

The hierarchical structure of political parties is seen and criticized<sup>54</sup> as one of the major constraints to the proper functioning of political parties. Local authorities continue to enjoy more confidence, at around 30%, largely due to the direct benefits and their proximity to the citizens.

Table 2.7 Confidence in public institutions and political parties<sup>55</sup>

	Noi. 2003	Mai 2004	Noi. 2004	Feb. 2005	Dec. 2005	Apr. 2006	Noi. 2006	Mai 2007	Noi. 2007	Apr. 2008	Oct. 2008	Mar. 2009	Iul. 2009	Noi. 2009	Mai 2010	Noi. 2010	Mai 2011	Noi. 2011	Mai 2012	Noi. 2012	Apr. 2013	Noi. 2013	Apr. 2014	Noi. 2014	Mar. 2015	Noi. 2015	Apr. 2016	Oct. 2016
<i>Câtă încredere aveți în...? (Foarte multă încredere / Oarecare încredere)</i>																												
Guvern	40%	40%	47%	49%	38%	40%	37%	36%	32%	29%	30%	34%	31%	44%	27%	32%	23%	19%	30%	23%	15%	16%	28%	28%	13%	7%	7%	9%
Parlament	36%	35%	45%	46%	34%	39%	38%	32%	32%	28%	31%	34%	30%	41%	26%	30%	19%	14%	25%	19%	13%	14%	22%	24%	11%	6%	7%	6%
Președintele țării	57%	50%	56%	61%	43%	51%	44%	47%	39%	36%	38%	41%	36%	35%	24%	29%	20%	15%	28%	20%	13%	16%	25%	24%	11%	5%	6%	4%
Jușițe	30%	27%	31%	41%	31%	31%	33%	32%	24%	24%	37%	28%	27%	37%	23%	25%	24%	18%	26%	15%	13%	16%	22%	23%	15%	12%	10%	8%
Armata	40%	42%	46%	52%	41%	46%	38%	46%	39%	44%	44%	45%	47%	54%	44%	49%	50%	43%	56%	43%	41%	42%	42%	46%	40%	42%	33%	30%
Biserica	71%	75%	79%	80%	77%	79%	70%	78%	81%	77%	75%	82%	80%	80%	82%	74%	82%	80%	81%	82%	78%	84%	85%	80%	81%	74%	79%	73%
Primărie	52%	47%	54%	55%	43%	42%	50%	47%	50%	44%	50%	47%	44%	56%	51%	48%	47%	51%	58%	47%	43%	47%	54%	55%	43%	52%	47%	38%
Partide politice	24%	18%	28%	28%	20%	20%	22%	19%	15%	14%	14%	16%	22%	29%	17%	20%	17%	13%	20%	14%	9%	14%	19%	22%	11%	11%	8%	8%
Bănci	31%	27%	38%	37%	36%	40%	36%	39%	33%	36%	28%	30%	30%	39%	32%	31%	33%	29%	36%	27%	33%	27%	32%	34%	21%	16%	19%	15%
Poliițe	30%	24%	29%	38%	35%	33%	35%	28%	26%	29%	28%	31%	31%	38%	30%	30%	34%	32%	36%	25%	26%	31%	31%	39%	29%	31%	26%	25%
Mass-media (presă, radio, TV)	57%	47%	62%	61%	65%	63%	58%	66%	59%	54%	53%	59%	51%	62%	62%	57%	63%	57%	75%	55%	58%	52%	61%	60%	48%	49%	42%	31%
Organizații neguvernamentale	29%	23%	36%	34%	35%	32%	35%	39%	31%	28%	20%	28%	28%	34%	27%	30%	26%	24%	26%	23%	25%	22%	26%	26%	24%	24%	24%	15%
Sindicat	28%	20%	36%	29%	28%	24%	31%	31%	24%	21%	16%	23%	23%	29%	19%	22%	18%	20%	19%	20%	14%	13%	24%	22%	18%	15%	13%	12%


The table below shows that political parties have a level of confidence of 13%.

Table 2.8 Confidence in political parties<sup>56</sup>

<sup>54</sup> The typically hierarchical nature of Moldovan politics means that disagreements within the AIE will filter down to society. The last decade has also shown that the principles of democracy can be severely undermined in the pursuit of political objectives. <http://democracyinternational.com/media/Moldova%20Democracy%20and%20Governance%20Assessment.pdf>

<sup>55</sup> <http://www.ipp.md>

<sup>56</sup> Center for Insights in Survey Research, [www.iri.org](http://www.iri.org)



*Partial conclusions 2.3 (confidence in political parties):*

**2.4 Confidence in political parties in very low (8%), as is confidence in the parliament and the operation of political parties. The key reasons are lack of accountability to the citizens and poor governance record of political parties manifested within coalition governments they have created.**

**2.5 In comparison, confidence in local authorities, especially mayors' office, is at least 3-4 times higher (30-35%). At least 30% of public persons at the top of the party list (the first 20 slots) move there from previous party lists.**

2.4 Government stability, coalitions

The correlation between the system of government and the electoral system is an important dimension. The extent of the Government's efficiency is influenced by a number of contextual factors, including a) the electoral system which either favors government efficiency or impedes it, b) the nature and operation of political parties which to a large extent determine the government's overall health.

The following table covering the period after 2000<sup>57</sup>,<sup>58</sup>,<sup>59</sup> distills two different conceptual phases of operational practices: the period from 2000 until 2009 and the period from 2009 until 2017. The normative and constitutional dimensions show a parliamentary system interspersed with elements of the Prime Ministerial and Presidential systems, but in practice the system operated in a different manner. During the first phase (2000-2009), in the first time segment (2000-09), the prime minister was secondary to the president who assumed the entire decision-making process, so that in practice he clearly went beyond the parliamentary system towards a semi-presidential system. The explanation is clear, that the parliament was dominated by a single party (PCRM), which held the absolute majority and the President of this party was the President of the country, while the Prime Minister and the Government were an instrument for the implementation of the

<sup>57</sup> O.Protsyk, Prime minister's identity in semi-presidential regimes: Constitutional Norms and cabinet Formation Outcomes, European Journal of Political Research, 44, 721-748, 2005

<sup>58</sup> O.Protsyk, Politics of Intraexecutive Conflict in Semipresidential Regimes in Eastern Europe, East European Politics and Societies, v.19, n.2, pp.135-160, 2005

<sup>59</sup> W.Crowther, Semipresidentialism and Moldova's Flawed Transition, Semiparliamentarism and Democracy, Palgrave, 2014, pp. 224-245

party's policies. It is obvious that the PCRM's parliamentary majority of 71 votes provided full support to the President. Because in practice everything was decided by the party's President, the system has de-facto functioned as a presidential-parliamentary system.

In the period from 2009 until 2017, a political coalition managed the parliament, consisting from 3-4 governing parties (PLDM, PDM, PL, and AMN) and powerful opposition parties (PCRM, PSRM), with the Prime Minister who was delegated from one of the coalition parties (PLDM). For almost 2.5 years, the office of the President was vacant, with the Speaker being the Acting President. In the end, the President who was elected had an obvious non-political status. The Prime Minister was the Chairman of the key party from the center-right coalition. The parliamentary system with Prime-Ministerial and Presidential elements was the most operational precisely during this period, but Prime-Ministerial and Presidential elements were practically not used. The nomination of the Prime Minister came about as a result of political consensus in the parliament between the parties which constituted the parliamentary majority, with the President playing a largely ceremonial role as defined by the governing coalition.

A minority coalition government existed during 2015, and in 2016, the government was ran by a coalition created by two parties and a number of independent MPs. During this period, representatives of the ruling political parties<sup>60</sup> filled up all Cabinet positions. Within this period (2009-16), for the first time the parliamentary system functions properly; the system of government is not tampered with and is not replaced by a de facto Presidential system.<sup>61</sup>

Table 2.9 The correlation between the electoral system, the government system, government support levels and conflict levels<sup>62</sup>

1. Governing system de jure vs de facto	2. Electoral system	2. President	3. Prime Minister, timeframe	4.Support for the Cabinet (political forces)	5.Palriamentary parties, elections.	6. Conflict levels  (the conflict could be intra-executive between the President and the Prime Minister / Cabinet and inter-institutional between the President and the Parliament)  No conflict, low intensity, medium intensity, high intensity
Constitution adopted in July of 1994	Majority system	M.Snegur (Dec.91-Jan.97)	A.Sangheli I (July 92- Aprilie 94)	Ad hoc support	Edinstvo, Party of the communists, The Popular Front	- Examine the adoption of the majority electoral system and the proportional electoral system <b>- Adopt the proportional electoral system</b>
<b>The Constitution is adopted in July 1994</b>						
(C) Prime Ministerial- Presidential  (R) Prime Ministerial- Presidential	party list PR (from 1994 -...)	M.Snegur (Dec 91- Jan 97 – center-right)	A.Sangheli II (Aprilie 1994- Jjan 1997), close to PDAM	Center-left majority <b>PDAM (56), PSMUE (28)</b>	Feb.1994: <b>PDAM (56), PSMUE (28), BTI(11), FPCD(9)</b>	<b>1) President/Prime Minister – high intensity tensions</b> <b>2) President/Parliament (Lucinschi)- medium/high intensity tensions</b> <b>3) Prime Minister-Parliament – no tensions</b> <b><u>Snegur promises to adopt Presidential system</u></b>

<sup>60</sup> Filat I, Filat II, Leancă

<sup>61</sup> W.Crowther, Semipresidentialism and Moldova's Flawed Transition, Semiparliamentarism and Democracy, Palgrave, 2014, pp. 220-230

<sup>62</sup> Elaborated and aggregated based on CEC, ADEPT, own analysis and evidence

<b>DIFFERENCE Between C - Constitution and R-reality (C)</b> Premier-presidential (R) Presidential - Parliamentary	Proportional electoral system	P.Lucinschi (Jan 97-Dec 00), supported by PDAM	I.Ciubuc (Jan 1997-Mar 1998), close to Lucinschi	Technocratic (provisional)  <b>PDAM (56), PSMUE (28),</b>	<b>PDAM (56), PSMUE (28), BTI(11), FPCD(9)</b>	1) President/Prime Minister – no tensions <b>2) President/Parliament (Lucinschi)- medium intensity tensions</b> <b>3) Prime Minister-Parliament – medium intensity tensions</b>
		P.Lucinschi (Jan 97-Dec 00), ad-hoc, insignificant support	I.Ciubuc (Apr 1998- Feb 1999), close to Lucinschi, resigns	Left-wing majority <b>PDAM (56), PSMUE (28),</b>	<b>PDAM (56), PSMUE (28), BTI(11), FPCD(9)</b>  <u>Mar.19 98:</u> PCR (40), <b>MDP(24), CDM(26), PFD(11)</b>	1) President/Prime Minister – no tensions <b>2) President/Parliament (Diacov)- high intensity tensions</b> <b>3) Prime Minister-Parliament – medium intensity tensions</b>  <u>Lucinschi promises Presidential system</u>
		P.Lucinschi (Jan 97-Dec.00), no support at the Parliament	I.Sturza, PDM (Mar.-Dec.1999),	Center-right majority <b>PD(24), CDM(26)=CDM+PPCD, PFD(11)</b>	PCR (40), <b>MDP/PD(24), CDM(26), PFD(11)</b>	1) President/Prime Minister– medium level tensions <b>2) President/Parliament (Diacov)- high intensity tensions</b> 3) Prime Minister/Parliament– low-level/medium intensity tensions  <i>Lucinschi stands for:</i> <b><u>1) Presidential system, mixed electoral system</u></b> 2)28% take part in a referendum on the presidential system, the Presidential commission cuts the number of MPs to 70
(C) Premier-presidential (R) Premier-presidential						
<b>2000: Constitution amended into a parliamentary governing system, supported by PCR, PPCD, PD</b>						
<b>Substantial difference between C - Constitution and R - Reality (C)</b> <b>Parliamentary (R)</b> <b>Presidential</b>	Proportional electoral system	V.Tarlev (Apr 2001- Mar 2005), technocratic, PCR, majority government	Left wing majority <b>PCR (71)</b>	Feb.2001: <b>PCR (71), AB(19), PPCD(11)</b>	1) President/Prime Minister – no tensions 2) President/Parliament – no tensions 3) Prime Minister-Parliament – no tensions  <i>Confrontations between the majority (PCR+PPCD) and the opposition (PLDM, PL), democracy and human rights issues. De-facto vertical system of governance</i>	



I-Parliamentary	V.Voroinin (Apr 01-Apr 05), PCR	V.Tarlev II (Apr 2005- Mar 2008), PCR, majority government	Left wing majority PCR (56)	Mar 2005: PCR (56), PPCD(11) BMD(34)	1) President/Prime Minister – no tensions 2) President/Parliament (Lupu) – no tensions 3) Prime Minister-Parliament – no tensions  <i>Confrontations between the majority (PCR+PPCD) and the opposition (PLDM, PL), democracy and human rights issues, privatizations</i>
		Z. Greceanii I (Mar 2008- June 2009) Z.Greceanii II, PCR (June – Sep 2009)	Left wing majority PCR (56)	Joule 2009: PCR (48), PLDM(18) PL(15) PDM(13), AMN(7)	1) President/Prime Minister – low intensity tensions 2) President/Parliament (Ghimpu) – <b>high intensity tensions</b> 3) Prime Minister-Parliament – medium intensity tensions  <i>Confrontations between the majority (PLDM+PL+AMN+PD) and the opposition (PCR)</i>
	M.Ghimpu (Sep 09-Dec 10) (Acting), PL	V.Filat I, PLDM, (Sep 2009-Dec 2010)  V.Filat II, PLDM, (Jan 2010-May 2013), majority government	Center-right majority, PLDM(18) PL(15) PDM(13), AMN(7)	PCR (48), PLDM(18) PL(15) PDM(13), AMN(7)  <u>Noi.2010:</u> PCR (42), PLDM(32) PL(15) PDM(12)	1) President/Prime Minister– low intensity tensions 2) President /Parliament (Ghimpu)- low intensity tensions 3) Prime Minister /Parliament – medium intensity tensions  <i>Confrontations between the majority and the opposition (PCR), snap elections, majority<sup>63</sup>, adoption of the Constitution<sup>64</sup>: <b>- semi-Presidential system, direct election of the President,</b> <b>- expansion of the President’s powers,</b> <i>- Presidential vote, reduction of MPs<sup>65</sup>,<sup>66</sup></i>  <i>-2010 referendum on direct election of President declared invalid, only a 30% voter turnout<sup>67</sup></i></i>
	M.Lupu (Dec 10-Mar 12) (Acting), PDM	V.Filat II, PLDM, (Jan 2010-May 2013), majority government	Center-right majority, PLDM(18) PL(15) PDM(13), AMN(7)	Nov 2010: PCR (42), PLDM(32) PL(15) PDM(12)	1) President/Prime Minister–medium intensity tensions 2) President /Parliament (Lupu, Candu)- low intensity tensions 3) Prime Minister /Parliament – medium intensity tensions  <i>Confrontations between the majority and the opposition (PCR),  Impasse in electing the President, tensions within the coalition, spheres of influence, political control over government institutions.</i>

<sup>63</sup>Constitutional Court ruling from 06.07.2010 <http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=335153>

<sup>64</sup>Decree of 01.12.2009, <http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=332938>

<sup>65</sup>Constitutional Court 20.10.2010, <http://www.constcourt.md/libview.php?l=ro&id=230&idc=9>

<sup>66</sup> Human Rights Resource Center (CRDO), overcoming the current crisis requires cultivating political culture for the sake of consolidating democratic institutions: a solution to the current crisis, <http://www.credo.md/pageview?id=258>

<sup>67</sup>The Central Electoral Commission (CEC), 09.2010, [https://www.cec.md/files/files/5295\\_electoral-2010.pdf](https://www.cec.md/files/files/5295_electoral-2010.pdf)

(C) Parliamentary	N.Timofte (Mar 12- Dec 16), unaffiliated politically	Iu.Leanca, PLDM, (May 2013-Dec 2014), majority government	Center-right majority <b>PLDM(23)</b> <b>PDM(19)</b> <b>PL(13)</b>	Nov 2014:	1) President/Prime Minister–medium intensity tensions 2) President /Parliament (Candu)- low intensity tensions 3) Prime Minister /Parliament – medium intensity tensions <i>Confrontations between the majority and the opposition (PCRM), spheres of influence, corruption scandals, political control over government institutions, financial and banking crisis, political crisis. Changes to the Constitution through a Republican referendum, launched by PLDM on 22.09.2014<sup>68</sup></i>
		C.Gaburici, technocrat, PLDM, (Feb- June 2015), minority government	Ad-hoc majority PCRM (21), PLDM(23) PDM(19)		1) President/Prime Minister–medium intensity tensions 2) President /Parliament (Candu)- low intensity tensions 3) Prime Minister /Parliament – medium intensity tensions <i>Confrontations between the ad-hoc majority and the opposition (PSRM+PL), spheres of influence, corruption scandals, political control over government institutions, financial and banking crisis, political crisis.</i> <i>PSRM presses for direct elections of the President</i>
		V.Strelet, PLDM, (July – Oct 2015), majority government	Center-right majority, PLDM(23) PDM(19)  PL(13)		1) President/Prime Minister–medium intensity tensions 2) President /Parliament (Candu)- medium intensity tensions 3) Prime Minister /Parliament – medium intensity tensions <i>Confrontations between the majority and the opposition (PSRM), as well as within the governing coalition, spheres of influence, corruption scandals, V. Filat’s arrest, mass protests, drop in confidence in political parties which make up the governing coalition, financial and banking crisis, political crisis.</i>
	N.Timofte (Mar 12- Dec 16), unaffiliated politically	Gh.Brega, PL, Acting (Oct 15- Jan 2016)	Ad-hoc majority PDM, PL, PCRM, PLDM	<b>PLDM(23)</b> <b>PDM(19)</b> <b>PL(13)</b> PSRM(24) PCRM (21)	1) President/Prime Minister– no tensions 2) President /Parliament (Candu)- high intensity tensions 3) Prime Minister /Parliament – medium intensity tensions <i>Confrontations between the majority and the opposition (PSRM). Tensions within the majority coalition, spheres of influence, corruption scandals, arrest and subsequent sentencing of V. Filat, mass protests, drop in confidence in the governing coalition, Timofte nominates I.Sturza for PM, supported by PLDM only, CEC registers an initiative group created by DA platform to collect signatures for: direct elections of the President, cutting the number of MPs through a Republican referendum, with the decision of the Constitutional Court from 10.10.2015 (similar to 22.09.2014 filed by PLDM)<sup>69</sup>, rejected by CEC</i>
		P.Filip, PDM, Feb 2016-...	Ad-hoc majority coalition	Feb 2017: <b>PLDM(</b>	1) President/Prime Minister– high intensity tensions 2) President /Parliament (Candu)- high intensity tensions

<sup>68</sup>Decisin of the Constitutional Court from 22.09.2014 <http://www.constcourt.md/ccdocview.php?l=ro&tip=avize&docid=40>

<sup>69</sup>Constitutional Court, decision from 10.11.2015, the Constitutional Court issues a positive ruling on the civil initiatives to change the Constitution through a republican referendum  
<http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view&view=doc&id=362013&lang=1>,  
<http://www.constcourt.md/ccdocview.php?tip=sesizari&docid=370&l=ro>




		majority government	PDM, PL, 7) PDM(40) PL(11) PSRM(24) PCR(21)	3) Prime Minister /Parliament – no tensions <i>Confrontations between the majority and the opposition (PSRM).</i> <i>-PSRM denounces the Association Agreement with the EU</i> <b><u>- PDM proposes majority system (PFPT)</u></b> <b><u>- PSRM proposes mixed electoral system</u></b>
		Ig.Dodon (Dec 16-...), PSRM		

A predictable proportional election system produces coalition governments that can be unstable. In 2009-2018, support patterns for coalition governments changed almost every year. The reasons for instability are internal competition, control over resources and spheres of activity and external influences. The opposition’s role in generating instability within governing coalitions was not a substantial factor.

The degree of government stability or fragmentation is measured through several recognized methods<sup>70</sup>. The Coalition Fragmentation Index shows the degree of government instability. The first method is the instability index of the Government<sup>71</sup>, which is calculated by the following formula: n - the sum (of the components of the government support coalition) divided by the number of coalitions during the respective period. The Government of Moldova instability index for 1994-2017 is 8/37, or 0.2 which is equivalent to the most unstable parliamentary regime in support of the Government of all known parliamentary systems. The fragmentation index, as the table below attests, is lower than that of Italy, Finland, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Israel, which is 0.3.

Table 2.10 Fragmentation indices for governing coalitions in countries with parliamentary systems of governance

Table 37: Fragmentation of governmental coalitions in eighteen countries (systemic averages 1946–1974 circa)



<sup>70</sup> G.Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, ECPR, 2016

<sup>71</sup> On the bases of Table and the parliamentary legislators: 1994 (2+2+2=6), 1998 (4+2=6), 2001 (1), 2005 (1+1=2), 04.2009(4), 07.2009(4), 2010 (3+3=6), 2014(2+3+3=8), with 8 legislators during the period of 1984-2016

The fractionalization index of government coalitions is another quantitative and qualitative measure of government instability<sup>72</sup>. The index is calculated according to the Sartori method. It takes into account the nature of societal cleavages which lead to fragmentation, such as: 1) racial / ethnic / caste differences, 2) ideological differences, 3) differences in competition patterns by interest groups (competition for resources). Based on these distinctions, political structures are formed which could be EP - extremely polarized, EM-moderate/mixt or semi-polarized, SM - segmented and moderately polarized, M – moderately pluralistic, T – a system of 2 parties, P – system with a predominant party, H - system with a dominant party.

Note how in the following table the indices calculated for Moldova correlate with European parliamentary systems. Note that there are four groups of countries: the group ranging from 0.72 to 0.80 is classified as belonging to countries with extreme and polarized fractionalization. The countries in this group include Italy, Finland, Chile and France IV<sup>73</sup>.

Table 2.11 Sartori fragmentation indices

Table 43: Comparison of typology and fractionalisation scores (mean) of twenty-five democracies

Extreme and polarised (or semi-polarised)		Predominant	
Finland	.804	Norway	.691
Chile	.796	Sweden	.685
France IV	.790	Japan	.645
Italy	.721	Uruguay	.589
		India	.487
		Turkey	.461
Moderate multipartism		Twoparty	
Switzerland	.801	Canada	.574
Netherlands	.787	Australia	.565
Israel	.784	Austria	.556
Denmark	.755	United Kingdom	.512
Iceland	.716	New Zealand	.494
Luxembourg	.678	United States	.483
Belgium	.667		
Eire	.649		
France V	.620		
West Germany	.614		


The fractionalization index for Moldova is calculated for each political cycle for 1994-2017. Maximum ratios are 0.85 in 1998 and 2014 and minimum ratios are 0.713 in the April 2009 election. For comparison, the fractionalization index is collated against other countries from the same range.

Table 2.12 Fractionalization index for Moldova: 1994-2017<sup>74</sup>

<sup>72</sup> G.Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, ECPR, 2016

<sup>73</sup> France IV – the fourth French Republic, 1946-1958, a parliamentary republic in France which had a proportional election system, reached an impasse. The fourth parliamentary French republic collapsed following partisan confrontations, paving the way for General de Gaulle to assume charge of the State.

<sup>74</sup> Calculated by the author



A high fractionalization index with an extreme polarization rate makes Governments vulnerable and reduces the odds for creating political parliamentary majorities.

*Partial conclusions 2.4 (Government stability):*

*2.6 A predictable proportionate party list system contributes to a high degree of fragmentation of political parties, and therefore of political coalitions in support of governments. At their highest level, fragmentation indices become a factor of political instability, not least because the party list electoral system facilitates this process, but also because of contextual factors.*

*2.7 Government's longevity is very low, and interaction patterns between political parties are highly polarized and unstable.*

*2.8 A high degree of polarization is explained by pronounced ideological differences, the competition between the centers of economic power through political infighting within these parties, while the lack of genuine accountability in relation to citizens opens the way for contradictory and belligerent positioning between different identity groups.*

### 3 Electoral systems: policy evidence, comparative analysis

Electoral systems can be broadly defined as proportional, majority and mixed. Proportional and majority systems have been thoroughly studied for their impact on corruption, economic growth, representation of specific groups, the degree to which they contribute to the bridging of differences and cleavages in society. 3 electoral systems can be included in an easily accessible comparative analysis:

*Table 3.1 The logic of electoral systems*

<b>System</b>	<b>Majority</b>	<b>Proportional</b>	<b>Mixed</b>
<b>1. Historical origins</b>	Elitist	Mass democracy	Rationalized vote
<b>2. Period of implementation in democratic states</b>	Beginning of 20th century, introduction of universal suffrage	Mid-20th century	End of 20th century
<b>3. Representation logic</b>	Patronage	Identification and socio-cultural belonging	Demand for policy priorities
<b>4. Voting logic</b>	Recognition, democratic patronage	Militantism	The most credible policy offer
<b>5. Implementation logic</b>	Direct, card-blanc for action	Indirect ex-post	Contract for the implementation of priorities that people voted for
<b>6. Typical system</b>	PFPT/TRS	PR-list, STV	MM(c)P, MM(c)M

In this chapter we present research results on the three electoral systems above. An old and well-known dilemma is between the accountability/responsibility (efficiency) on the one hand, associated with the majority system and representation (equity), and associated with the proportional system, on the other hand. The solution is to identify the electoral system that can ensure accountability and responsibility of elected officials and the Government under the conditions of representation accepted by society. There are electoral solutions which meet both of these goals.<sup>75</sup>

The proportional system has 2 possible options: PR party-list system and STV (so-called proportional majority). The party list system highlights parties and party lists, elected in a single national constituency, or in the exceptional cases in a few regional constituencies. STV (e.g. Ireland) is used only in multiple constituencies. The result of these systems is better representation of different societal groups and better socio-economic positioning of different groups within the legislative system. The system may produce the expected results if its settings are consistent with the goals of the electoral system (the electoral threshold is low, there are no restrictions for participation and regional identities are associated with political parties). The proportional system institutionalizes within the legislature the whole spectrum of opinions, promoting mutual understanding and coalescence within the legislative body

<sup>75</sup> C.Simms, *Choosing the Who, the What, and the How: Maximizing Accountability and Representation through European Electoral Systems*, 2012, *Mapping Politics*, v.4

The majority system can have several forms. The majority system is heavily results- and performance-focused and emphasizes individual responsibility. The simplest and the best known option is PFPT (SMD, uninominal), which gives the winner which polls the relative majority of votes (starting from 30%) the possibility to form a stable government and a clear responsibility for the success or failure of this government. There are majority TRS systems which require an absolute majority vote, usually held in 2 rounds, which can form very stable governments. In this case, it is also necessary to design a consistent system so as not to damage its inherent effects (wider constituencies, the reach of larger constituency, non-discriminatory, accessible representation threshold for independent candidates).

Over the past two decades, mixed systems are increasingly used in many continental European countries. Mixed, properly built electoral systems can combine the positive effects of proportional and majority systems and avoid their disadvantages. The specific design of the electoral system is important. Synergetic effects of both electoral systems (proportional and majority) could be achieved through a careful design of the following components: 1) the relative weight of the proportional component, 2) the degree of proportionality of the majority component, 3) the number of elected officials and the number of voters in a given constituency (favoring large constituencies and a competition between several elected officials), 4) electoral threshold for the proportional component and the relative vote tally to return the winner, 5) accessibility and voting structure (favoring multiple or preferential choice).

### 3.1 Electoral systems

There are different ways to classify electoral systems<sup>76</sup>. Some of them are provided below. Table 3.1 is one of the ways to classify electoral systems.

*Table 3.2a Classification of electoral systems*


<b>Voting system</b>			<b>Typical countries and</b> (the number of countries within this system)
Majority system/ plurality of votes	FPTP	SMD – single member district – one member per constituency (uninominal)	GB, India, Canada (44)
		MMD – multi member district – more members per constituency (plurinominal)	Kuwait, Lebanon (10)
	Plural	MMD – multi member district – more members per constituency (plurinominal)	France, Vietnam (18)
Proportional system	Party-list PR	Block voting	Austria, Chili, Iceland, Israel, Morocco, Norway, Moldova
		Closed list	Denmark, Latvia, Poland, Sweden
		Open/flexible list	Switzerland, Luxembourg, Ecuador
	Voting formulas	Highest median	Argentina, Poland, Sweden, Norway
		The highest remaining	Algeria, Cyprus, Colombia, Russia

<sup>76</sup> M.Gallagher, P.Mitchel, ed. The Politics of Electoral Systems, Oxford, p.5

Mixed	Parallel		Bulgaria, Lithuania, Mexico (23)
	Personalized		Germany, Hungary, Romania (9)
Others		Alternative vote (AV)	Australia (2)
		Single transferrable vote (STV)	Ireland, Malta (2)
		Single non-transferrable vote (SnTV)	Afghanistan, Vanuatu (4)
		Borda count <sup>77</sup>	(0)


The following chart presents the geographical distribution of electoral systems.

Chart 3.2b Geographical distribution of electoral systems



<sup>77</sup> Borda count – all candidates are arranged in the order of preferences





The following table shows the correlation between electoral systems and the governing system.

Table 3.3 Correlation between government systems and electoral systems in advanced democracies and in developing countries (as on the date of the report)<sup>78, 79, 80, 81, 82</sup>

	<b>Parliamentary republic</b>	<b>Premier-parliamentary Republic</b>	<b>Semi- Presidential Republic</b>	<b>Presidential republic</b>
	Albania (block list) Austria (block list, 4%) Argentina (block list for Chamber of Deputies) Belgium (Open Party List) Bosnia and Herzegovina (party list) Czech Republic (closed list, 5%)	Bulgaria (block list, 4%) Croatia (block list, with reserved minority seats, 5%) Finland (block list in 12 constituencies + one reserved seat) Iceland (block list in national constituency)	<b>Chili</b> (closed list)	Costa Rica (blocked party list) Cyprus (closed list) Kazakhstan (blocked party list)

<sup>78</sup> CRDO: The importance of consolidating the parliamentary system in the Republic of Moldova, 2016, <http://www.credo.md/pageview?id=523>, [http://www.credo.md/site-doc/SistemParlamMD\\_CRDO\\_final0.pdf](http://www.credo.md/site-doc/SistemParlamMD_CRDO_final0.pdf)

<sup>79</sup> <http://www.oldsite.idea.int/esd> - electoral systems

<sup>80</sup> Venice Commission, Comparative report on Thresholds and Other Features of Electoral Systems which Bar Parties from Access to Parliament, [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2008\)037-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2008)037-e)

<sup>81</sup> Venice Commission, Proportional Electoral Systems: The Allocation of Seats Inside the list [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2015\)001-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2015)001-e)

<sup>82</sup> Compiled by the author

<p>Proportional electoral system</p>	<p>Denmark (closed list, 75%, winning redistribution - 25%)</p> <p>Estonia (block list in 12 constituencies)</p> <p>Israel (block list)</p> <p>Italy (for Chamber of Deputies and Senators block list + FPTP + quotas for diaspora)</p> <p>Latvia (block list)</p> <p>Netherlands (block list, 0.67% threshold)</p> <p>Norway (block list, 4% threshold)</p> <p>Spain (block list, 3%)</p> <p>Sweden (open list, 4% threshold)</p>	<p>Kyrgyz Republic (block party list)</p> <p>Macedonia (block party list)</p> <p>Poland (Chamber of Deputies blocked party list, 5%)</p> <p>Portugal (block list, no)</p> <p>Romania (2016, blocked list, 5% threshold)</p> <p>Serbia (blocked list, 5% threshold)</p> <p>Slovakia (open list, 5% threshold)</p> <p>Slovenia (blocked list, 4% threshold)</p>		
<p>Mixed electoral system</p>	<p>Germany (FPTP for 299 (50%) constituencies + 299 on party lists in constituencies with a 5% threshold)</p> <p>Hungary (106 FPTP + 93 party list in the national constituency)</p> <p>India (FPTP)</p> <p>Japan (295 on SnTV + 180 blocked party list in 11 constituencies)</p>	<p>Armenia (blocked list for national constituency + closed list in 13 constituencies after FPTP)</p> <p>Lithuania (71 in constituencies, 2 rounds + 70 on blocked party list)</p> <p>Georgia (blocked list in 73 SMD constituencies based on FPTP)</p> <p>Romania (2012, majority constituencies proportional county redistribution, proportional country redistribution, 3% threshold)</p> <p>South Korea (47 on blocked party list (3% majority threshold) + 243 FPTP)</p>	<p>Mexico (Chamber of Deputies: 300 FPTP + 200 party list)<sup>83</sup></p> <p>Russia (225 blocked list + 225 FPTP)</p> <p>Mongolia (48 FPTP constituencies (28% winning threshold) + blocked party list in 28 constituencies)</p> <p>Ukraine (225 FPTP constituencies + 225 on blocked party list with 5% threshold)</p>	<p>Mexico (Senate: 32 constituencies on FPTP, allocating 2 places to the winner, 1 place for the second place + party lists for the national constituency)</p>
	<p>Australia (STV-Senate)</p> <p>Canada (FPTP)</p> <p>Ireland (STV)</p> <p>Malta (STV)</p> <p>New Zealand (in 69 FPTP constituencies and 7 Maori seats + 51 party lists in multiple constituencies)</p>	<p>Poland (Senate FPTP)</p>		<p>USA (Senate-FPTP)</p> <p>USA (the House - FPTP)</p> <p>Azerbaijan (FPTP)</p>

<sup>83</sup> [http://www.ine.mx/archivos3/portal/historico/contenido/The\\_Mexican\\_Electoral\\_System/](http://www.ine.mx/archivos3/portal/historico/contenido/The_Mexican_Electoral_System/)




Plural majority voting system	Switzerland (federal: FPTP within constituencies)			
	United Kingdom (FPTP)			
	Argentina (MBS upper chamber, 2 for the winner, 1 for the opposition) Australia (IRV, House of Representatives) Switzerland (canton: candidates proposed by citizens in round 1 - absolute majority, for round 2 - relative majority)		France (candidates who poll below 12% in the first round are eliminated, candidate with the majority of votes in the second round wins)	

The table above leads to some observations. Countries with parliamentary and premier-presidential government systems prefer proportionate electoral systems or mixed electoral systems; however, there are a number of countries in these two categories which use the majority system. Countries with Presidential or semi-Presidential systems prefer mixed or majority systems, although there are two countries in this category which use the proportional electoral system.

In their benchmark analysis<sup>84</sup>, a representative number of specialists in policy and political analysis compiled a performance hierarchy of electoral systems. Their priority order is the following: 1) mixed member proportional system (compensatory), 2) proportional system with open / flexible lists (in multiple jurisdictions), 3) majority SMD + AV system, 4) majority STV system, 5) blocked / closed lists proportional system, 6) majority SMD + TRS system, 7) plural SMD system, 8) parallel mixed system (majority + proportional). A preference is notable for a few rather than a single winner in each jurisdiction.

Chart 3.4 Expert evaluations of electoral systems

Figure 7.2: Mean Rating Assigned to Electoral Systems



The table provides comprehensive information on the complexity and the cost of implementing each electoral system. Electoral systems are arranged from the simplest and least expensive to the most complex and costly.

<sup>84</sup> APSA, Political Science, Electoral Rules, and Democratic Governance, 2013

Table 3.5 Performance evaluation of electoral systems: districting, registration, bulletin structure, education, counting

	Boundaries			Registration			Ballots			Education			Number			The Count			TOTAL			
	L	M	H	L	M	H	L	M	H	L	M	H	L	M	H	L	M	H	L	M	H	
List PR	😊			😊			😊				😊			😊			😊			4	2	0
FPTP			😞			😞	😊			😊			😊			😊			4	0	2	
SNTV		😊			😊			😊			😊			😊					2	4	0	
Block		😊			😊			😊			😊				😊				1	5	0	
AV			😞			😞	😊				😞			😊			😊		2	1	3	
STV		😊			😊			😊			😞			😊				😊	1	3	2	
Parallel		😊				😞		😊			😊				😊				0	4	2	
MMP		😊				😞		😊			😞			😊				😊	0	3	3	
TRS			😞			😞			😞			😊			😊			😊	0	2	4	

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KEY: L = Low impact on cost and administration resources, M = medium impact, H = High impact.

The party-list PR system is the simplest to administer, the TRS is the most expensive. The complexity is in defining the boundaries and the territory of the constituency, voter registration, ballot design, voter education, number of voting days, counting the votes.

*Partial conclusions 3.1 (electoral systems):*

**3.1 The assertion that one electoral system is better or more appropriate than another is not based on scientific evidence and does not follow from the practice of other countries; therefore, this assertion is poorly informed and ungrounded.**

**3.2 Electoral systems can be classified from the perspective of their administration, for example party-list PR system, along with FPTP are the easiest to administer and two-round systems are the most difficult to administer.**

### 3.2 Impact on political parties, Governments

The majority system is known to consolidate political parties and even lead to the emergence of 2-3 dominant parties in the country. The proportional electoral system leads to the multiplication and fragmentation of political parties. According to the Duverger law, under the majority system the trend is the concentration of power in two dominant parties, and in a larger number of parties under the proportional system<sup>85</sup>. In the long run, the proportional system tends to consolidate the political center (conferring greater influence for centrist ideology and views), whereas the majority system leads to the concentration of government policies on the extreme left or right depending on the relative influence and impact of given social segments (everything becomes colored in doctrinal hues).

Electoral systems impact the evolution and behavior of political parties. Indeed, if a shift occurs from party list PR system to the FPTP system, it is likely that a broad coalition government will be replaced by a strong government which will rest on one or two coalition parties. This will

<sup>85</sup> M. Morelli, Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems, Ohio University, 1998

help consolidate parties through political personalities. A shift from the pure party list PR system to STV will produce similar proportional representation, but without party consolidation and with more pronounced accountability to citizens.

Democratizing or transition countries will have decided to which degree they would want to limit the reach of political parties. Some authors suggest that for transition democracies a shift to a limited number of political parties (2 dominant parties), through the introduction of majority voting system, would be an undesirable evolution, given their lack of democratic experience<sup>86</sup>. It is not only the electoral system as such that determines the concentration or fragmentation of political parties. Societal factors have a demonstrable impact on the fragmentation of political parties. Ethnic, linguistic or religious diversity, as well as the spatial extent<sup>87</sup> all lead to greater fragmentation of political parties<sup>88</sup>.

Mixed systems can have very different effects on political structure of parties. System with independent components (nominal majority and proportional) may lead to the emergence of a greater number of political parties and further contribute to the fragmentation of political structures<sup>89</sup>. Systems with dependent components (most often the proportional component is the function of election results in nominal majority constituencies), depending on the allocation of seats for the proportional component, strengthens political parties under the prevalent nominal majority component.

As a rule, there is a tendency for Centre-left parties to be elected to Government under proportional systems and the center-right parties under majority system. Most of the time this rule holds<sup>90</sup>, even though the trends depend on the demographic structure of society and on the value system and dominant traditions in society, and can in and of itself explain why proportional systems are more expensive to administer. In the same vein, conservative parties gain pre-eminence under predominantly majority systems and progressive and socialist parties rule under predominantly proportional systems.

The functioning of semi-presidential governmental systems depends on endogenous factors; in the case under review it depends on the political configuration in Parliament.<sup>91, 92</sup>

*Table 3.6 Possible outcomes after elections in semi-presidential system or the PM-presidential system with direct election of the president*

<b>Outcome 1: Consolidated parliamentary majority</b>	<b>Outcome 2: Divided parliamentary majority</b>	<b>Outcome 3: Divided parliamentary minority</b>
The president and prime minister represent the same political majority	The prime minister has the majority and the president does not	Neither the president nor the prime minister has the majority

<sup>86</sup> A.Hoffman, Political parties, Electoral Systems and Democracy: A cross national study, 2005, European Journal of Political research,

A.Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 countries, NH, 1999

<sup>87</sup> L.Curini, P.Martelli, Electoral Systems and Government Stability, Czech Economic Review, 2009

<sup>88</sup> L.Mosley, A.Reynolds, The Consequences of Electoral Systems: A Global Study, 2002, Duke University Study,

<sup>89</sup> M.Clark, Party System Fragmentation and Mixed Electoral Systems: Design Matters, 2006,

<sup>90</sup>D.Ticchi, A.Vindigi, Endogeneous Constitutions, IIES U.Stockholm, 2003

<sup>91</sup> C.Skach, The Newest separation of powers: Semipresidentialism, Oxford University press, 2007, v.5, n.1, pp.93-121

<sup>92</sup>CReDO: The importance of consolidation of parliamentary system in the Republic of Moldova, 2016, <http://www.credo.md/pageview?id=523>, [http://www.credo.md/site-doc/SistemParlamMD\\_CReDO\\_final0.pdf](http://www.credo.md/site-doc/SistemParlamMD_CReDO_final0.pdf)

Outcome 1 minimizes conflict potential, and conflict could eventually emerge only from personal issues. *Outcomes 2 has a potential conflict between the president and the opposition parliamentary majority - the so-called cohabitation, and even a clear division of powers and areas of responsibility cannot prevent conflicts.* Outcome 3 is the most conflict-prone. The Parliament has too many parties with competing interests. Absent the capacity to consolidate the parliamentary majority, the President may be tempted to use exceptional measures and force the establishment of a government controlled by him, even if it is a minority government. On the other hand, the Parliament, by virtue of certain circumstances and possible actions on the part of the President, could initiate an impeachment procedure, which is another scenario for escalation. *Therefore, the task of the electoral system is to configure outcome 1 as the most conducive for a stable government. Under direct election of the President in a two-round election, two models are possible for parliamentary election: a single constituency based on flexible party lists or STV with representatives elected in relatively large constituencies. Consolidating a good and responsible political party system with adequate legitimacy is an important goal; therefore, excessive fragmentation of parties characteristic of proportionate systems can be a disadvantage<sup>93</sup>.*

The proper functioning of semi-presidential or PM-presidential system depends on factors such as<sup>94</sup>: a) *availability of the relative majority for a party that supports a government with the President who is neutral or belong to another party*, b) *a stable coalition government with a President who is neutral, or is from a collation or an opposition party*, c) *absolute majority for a party with a president who is neutral or is from an opposition party*. Poor functioning of the system is usually caused by: i) *the president and parliamentary majority are from the same party, through which the President dominates the political environment*, ii) *the same conditions apply with a Prime Minister being the leader of the majority party which holds political power, even if the president is from a small opposition party*, iii) *the majority is based on a stable coalition with a dominant president who prefers a presidential system*. Semi-presidential government systems in post-communist countries face enormous difficulties in accommodating the interests of the popularly elected president and parliamentary political parties<sup>95</sup>. Whenever political experience and political culture are lacking, only the PM-presidential system can accommodate two institutions with equal legitimacy. Due to inherent difficulties, presidential-parliamentary systems do not lead to balance and are transformed into de jure or de facto presidential regimes. Therefore, the creation of strong political parties is a vital task.

#### *Partial conclusions 3.2 (impact on parties):*

*3.1 Factors that need to be taken into account are the system of government, the method of electing the president and the country's legal tradition.*

#### 3.3 Confidence in institutions and elections

The impact on voter behavior is an important consideration in terms of cultivating both participation in the electoral process and trust in it. Majority systems may have the effect of

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<sup>93</sup> C.Skach, *The Newest separation of powers: Semipresidentialism*, Oxford University press, 2007, v.5, n.1, pp.93-121

<sup>94</sup> Democracy Reporting International, *Systems of Government: Semi-presidential models*, briefing paper n. 27, 2012

<sup>95</sup> R.Eglie, P.Schieter, *Durability of Semipresidential Democracies, Semiparliamentarism and Democracy*, Palgrave, 2014, pp. 105-16

discouraging voting by minority or less represented groups<sup>96</sup>. Party list PR systems with a very low threshold could stimulate voter turnout. Therefore, voter turnout under party list PR system is higher than under FPTP systems<sup>97</sup>.

Studies reveal positive correlation between some electoral systems and voter turnout. Proportional (including STV) and mixed election systems have at least a 5-6% higher voter turnout in elections<sup>98</sup> (a conclusion valid for 61 countries in 151 elections). Voters see proportional and mixed systems as more equitable compared with pure majority systems because they provide a higher degree of representation. This is likely due to the fact that at the level of perceptions, voters value representation more than accountability<sup>99</sup>. At the same time, voter satisfaction and trust in democratic institutions and the functioning of democracy strongly correlates with majority electoral systems. Trust in democratic institutions that are based on proportional systems is lower than trust in democratic institutions that are based on majority electoral systems.

At the same time, a comparison between proportional electoral systems and preferential majority electoral systems favors preferential systems<sup>100</sup>. Preferential voting systems (majority systems), which are centered on individual candidates, create a perception of greater equity in the outcome of elections. A more nuanced analysis of the correlation between the Government's perception of efficiency and the number of parties in the parliament and in governing coalition leads to the conclusion that a larger number of parties in the parliament contributes to raising the efficiency of the Government and promoting the trust of the citizens<sup>101</sup>. At the same time, large number of parties in ruling coalition lessens the perception of efficiency and discourages citizens' participation in elections. Thus, the proportional system can have an ambivalent impact.

*Partial conclusions 3.3 (trust in institutions, elections):*

- 3.2 Proportional electoral systems (including STVs) and mixed systems ensure at least 5-6% higher voter turnout in elections. A large number of parties within governing coalitions lessens the perception of efficiency and discourages citizens' participation in elections.*
- 3.3 Preferential (majority) systems centered on individual candidates lead to a perception of greater equity in the outcome of elections.*
- 3.4 Satisfaction and trust in democratic institutions and the functioning of democracy strongly correlates with majority election systems, so the level of trust in democratic institutions under proportionate electoral systems is lower.*

### 3.4 Economic performance, efficiency of reforms

The economic performance as measured the Gross Domestic Product (including GDP per capita), the level of private investment, the growth of human capital, government expenditures to stimulate economic growth (infrastructure) and export volumes all correlate with the functioning of the electoral system. The correlation is definitive and strong with several aspects of the electoral system: 1) the choice of the electoral system, 2) the structure of voting (single vote or preferential)

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<sup>96</sup> A.Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and party Systems: A study of 27 Democracies, 1945-1990*, NY, OUP, 1999, and A. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, NH, YUP, 1999

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid*, p.284

<sup>98</sup> Elections Canada, *Why is turnout Higher in Some Countries than in Others?* [www.elections.ca](http://www.elections.ca), 2003

<sup>99</sup> K.Aarts, J.Thomassen, *Satisfaction with Democracy: Do Institutions Matter?*, *Electoral Studies*, 2008,

<sup>100</sup> D.Farrel, I.McAllister, *Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Sstems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centered Systems make Difference*, Center for the Study of Democracy, 2004,

<sup>101</sup> J.Karp, S.Banducci, *Political Efficacy and Participation in 27 Democracies: How Electoral Systems Shape Political Behavior*, *B.J.Pol.S.*, 38, 2008

and 3) the size of the constituency (single or multiple, single member or multiple members). Majority electoral systems strengthen responsibility and accountability, and therefore narrow opportunities for clientelistic relations while strengthening the link to smaller constituencies during the respective electoral cycle.

Research over the past 2 decades in this regard in developed democracies, as well as developing democracies, provide important answers<sup>102</sup>. Governments elected through majority electoral systems tend to cut taxes by 0.5% during their term of office (or 1-3% of the country's budget). More nuanced studies show that public spending by governments elected through proportional systems is by 3-5% higher in GDP terms due to the fact that the government is composed of a broader coalition. Majority governments focus on the implementation of economic policies under more stable conditions and deliver more robust economic growth while governments elected through proportional representation are usually better able to boost economic growth through higher infrastructure spending<sup>103</sup>. At the same time, recent studies show that mixed electoral systems, with appropriate design, lead to the emergence of stable Governments (majority component) and a reasonable degree of representation (proportional component), produce better economic growth compared with pure electoral systems<sup>104</sup>. This finding is corroborated through economic growth under mixed governments as opposed to exclusively proportional or majority governments<sup>105</sup>.

The following graph demonstrates the dependency between GDP growth and the proportionality index (Gallagher index<sup>106</sup>) of the electoral system and how it directly affects economic indicators. Economic growth reaches the highest levels if the proportionality index is around 26, while the slowest increase is observed when proportionality is around 7. The degree of proportionality on the extreme left correlates with a purely proportional electoral system, while the index on the extreme right on the horizontal axis matches the pure majority system. Therefore, the data show that a certain degree of proportionality leads to economic growth. The chart shows a clear correlation between political stability of the government and certain features of the majority system, which enable the Government to pursue sound economic policies. Most importantly, if additional variables are introduced (such as GDP, including GDP per capita), private investment levels, growth in human capital, Government spending for economic growth (infrastructure), exports levels), this correlation still remains valid.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> T.Persson, G.Tabellini, Electoral systems and economic policies, 2004, R.Alfano, L.Baraldi, Electoral Systems and Economic Growth: What is the Importance of the Proportionality Degree, 2014, EERI Research paper, M.Pagano, P.Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 2012, R.Alfano, L.Baraldi, The Design of Electoral Rules and Their Impact on Economic Growth: The Italian Case, 2008, wp.3.2008, A.Menocal, Why Electoral Systems Matter: An Analysis of their incentives and Effects on Key Areas of Governance, ODI, 2010, C.Knutsen, The Economic Growth Effect of Constitutions, 2009, T.Persson G. Tabellini Constitutions and Economic Policy, JEP, v.18, n.1, 2004, D.Ontiveros V. Verardi, Electoral Systems, Poverty and Income Inequality, 2012

<sup>103</sup> B. Powell, Elections as Instruments of Democracy, NH & London, Yale UP, 2000

<sup>104</sup> R.Alfano, L.Baraldi, Electoral Systems and Economic Growth: What is the Importance of the proportionality Degree, EERI Research paper, 2014, Cercetarea a inclus 91 de țări (cu democrații consolidate și în curs de consolidare și nici o țară cu sistem dictatorial) pentru perioada de 32 de ani (1979-2010)


<sup>105</sup> E.Abelman, A.Pesevento, A Regression Analysis of Electoral Systems and Economic Growth, Emory UP, 2007,

<sup>106</sup> The Gallagher index is calculated by the formula that calculates the number of elected members as a function of the votes cast. The index is higher if the difference is higher, while lower values (below 5 show a system that shows perfect correlation between the number of voters for a party candidate and the number of seats won, a pure proportional system), and values over 27 indicate the majority system with a correspondingly large degree of difference. Mixed systems deliver results in-between these extremes. Favoring large political parties (votes won) based on the allocation of votes lost in the redistribution formula (the difference being determined by the divisors): Imperiali highest averages, LR-Imperiali, D-Hondt, STV, Largest remainders-Hare / Sainte-Lague, Equal proportions, Danish, Adams. M.Gallagher, Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems, Electoral Studies, 1991, K.Vakmann, Mechanical Effects of Electoral Systems on Proportionality and Parliament Fragmentation, U Tartu, 2014,

<sup>107</sup> A comprehensive study on Italy demonstrates conclusively that a mixed electoral system where majority elements are dominant provides fertile ground for economic growth and leaves less room for corruption. Under such a system, economic growth is more



Chart 3.7 Correlation between GDP growth (vertical) and the degree of proportionality GI (Gallagher index, horizontal) for mixed electoral systems



Governments elected under proportional systems tend to maintain or raise taxes and fees, while the reduction in public spending is very unlikely. These conclusions, based on empirical studies, confirm the hypothesis that voters penalize tax increases by officials elected through majority systems, while proportional systems do not lead to that effect, so that governments elected in majority systems prefer to search for efficient solutions rather than redistribute wealth or generate public revenue by raising taxes and fees.

Finally, governments elected through proportional system tend to lead to a budget deficit at least 1-2% of GDP higher than governments elected under the majority system. Governments elected under proportional systems expand public spending in times of economic downturn and do not cut them during periods of economic growth, maintaining them at the same level, which is not the case with governments elected under majority systems.

Elections in multi-member constituencies and the proportional electoral system enjoy broader voter support, contribute to the development of redistributive programs (pensions, poverty alleviation programs, etc.). At the same time, elections in single-member constituencies and majority systems tend to concentrate the attention of elected members' on specific groups, favoring constituencies and key regions which return the Government to power. In the latter case, parties and its candidates are led strongly to win strategically those constituencies that change their electoral preferences.

The presence and the degree of proportionality in the electoral system directly impacts inequality and poverty. Higher proportionality of electoral systems reduces inequality and poverty<sup>108</sup>. This conclusion was initially put forward based on the logic of the electoral system itself. This is so because the majority system returns members who seek to provide benefits to a relative or active majority in concrete constituencies with a single elected member and therefore on a large scale benefit one of the winning parties, in conditions in which the number of parties is limited. At the same time, proportional systems produce larger number of parties and broader representation, often in a coalition, therefore benefiting a larger range of constituencies. These logical assumptions have been corroborated by many pieces of empirical research. Majority systems have a greater correlation with higher inequality than the proportional system.

*pronounced if the degree of proportionality within the mixed election system is smaller.* See also R. Alfano, L.Baraldi, The Design of Electoral Rules and their Impact on Economic Growth: The Italian Case, 2008, U Napoli. Another research confirms the rule that an excessively small degree of proportionality (ie the pure majority system) is not superior to the purely proportional system. This research compares FPTP (majority, unitary) and PR-list, and PR-list prevails. D.Aboal, Electoral Systems and Economic Growth, U Essex, 2008

<sup>108</sup> D.Ontiveros V. Verardi, Ellectoral Systems, Poverty and Income Inequality, 2012



Research conducted into investment climate and electoral systems shows correlation with investor and shareholder/employee behavior<sup>109</sup>. Majority systems tend to favor investors and employers, while proportionate systems favor employees. Research into the correlation of these factors leads to a clear conclusion that proportional systems generate yield a less attractive investment and taxation climate with fewer guarantees than majority voting systems (in 45 countries, including 21 OECD countries, also taking into account the employment rate).

It is certain that presidential systems, especially a Presidential system coupled with a majority voting system, contribute the most to increasing inequality. Parliamentary governance systems have better mechanisms for redistributing societal benefits to wider categories of society.

*Partial conclusions 3.4 (economic performance):*

- 3.5 Majority systems tend to reduce the tax burden by 0.5% during their term of office (i.e. 1-3% of the country's public budget).*
- 3.6 Governments elected through proportional system spend 3-5% of GDP more because they govern within larger coalitions.*
- 3.7 Governments elected under majority systems focus on implementing economic policies under more stable governments and deliver more pronounced economic growth.*
- 3.8 Governments elected under proportional systems are, as a rule, better positioned to stimulate economic growth through higher infrastructure spending.*
- 3.9 Stable governments (the majority component) and a reasonable degree of representation (proportional component) produce better economic growth compared to pure electoral systems.*
- 3.10 Elections in multi-member constituencies and proportional electoral systems enjoy broader voter support and contribute to the development of redistributive programs.*
- 3.11 The higher degree of proportionality of an electoral system reduces inequality and poverty. A presidential ruling system coupled with a majority electoral system contributes the most to growth in inequality.*
- 3.12 As a result of government policies, majority systems tend to favor investors and employers, while proportionate systems favor employees.*

### 3.5 Impact on corruption

The correlation between the electoral system and corruption is an important dimension, especially when corruption is systemic due to the structure of the economy, the weaknesses of public institutions, undeveloped governance mechanisms and persistence of clientele relations<sup>110</sup>. Corruption stifles economic growth, leads to inefficiencies in resource allocation, distorts the labor market, encourages political rent seeking, strangles free competition, and hurts private and foreign investments.

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<sup>109</sup> M.Pagano, P.Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 2010

<sup>110</sup> Roger Meyerson was the first to investigate this correlation, assuming that voters admit the undesirable character of corruption, have different opinions about other problems raised during the election, have access to information about the degree of corruption of candidates and are aware that their vote can make a difference. The conclusion is that a clean party can win against a corrupt party if corruption is more important than ideological differences, because the costs of a corrupt party are greater than the loss of its voice and identity.

Many pieces of research demonstrate correlation between the electoral system and corruption<sup>111</sup>. A strong link exists between lowering electoral threshold and reducing corruption and the personalization (candidates rather than lists) of political competition (personalization is more important than the size of electoral districts)<sup>112</sup>. Another definitive conclusion is that a PR blocked or closed party list system combined with a presidential system is the worst electoral system to diminish corruption. At the same time, correlation is yet to be established between concrete electoral rules and corruption. Changing only the electoral system can weaken corruption, but it cannot cut it.<sup>113</sup>

A number of studies show that corruption is more present in countries with proportional electoral systems than in countries with majority electoral systems; however, fewer studies show that this link is not stable. In general, proportionality seems to be a factor contributing to the increase in corruption levels. Another conclusion is that a correlation exists between the form of political competition (direct or indirect) and its impact on corruption. The conclusion in this respect is that the more proportional and indirect the level of corruption, the higher the level of corruption. The main explanation is that electoral rules directly impact party behavior options and its incentives to monitor this phenomenon.

The main hypotheses are that political rent within the party list system is larger, while collective responsibility is lower than individual responsibility in majority systems where people vote for individual candidates. In the same vein, closed/open lists, compared with blocked lists, reduce political rent seeking behaviors. Empirical data show a fall in corruption perception by 20% if the electoral system shifts from proportional PR party list to the majority system, and the decrease in corruption perception is more pronounced if the majority system is based on the plurinominal MMD system, i.e. the election of several members from the same broad constituency (and is therefore much more pronounced than under the proportional system). A comparison between closed and open lists proportional systems and plurality majority systems shows that the latter are more effective in reducing corruption perceptions<sup>114</sup>.

More in-depth studies of systems with 2 dominant parties competing in single member constituencies under majority electoral systems show lower corruption levels than in countries with many political parties<sup>115</sup>. At the same time, these conclusions, i.e. the variance in corruption levels depending on the number of political parties, are not valid for proportional electoral systems, because competition between several parties yields better corruption indices.

Another study shows that corruption is lower in countries which use larger electoral constituencies with lower election thresholds<sup>116</sup>. In general, open lists are associated with a lower degree of corruption<sup>117</sup>. Parliamentary governance systems are associated with less corruption. The explanations lie in the realm of rent-seeking, measuring the perception of corruption in service delivery and Government inefficiency in proportional systems.

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<sup>111</sup>M.R.Alfano, A.L.Baraldi, The Role of Political Competition in the link between electoral systems and corruption, 2015 European Journal of Government and Economics, v.4,n.1, S.Rose-Ackerman Political Corruption an Reform Democracies, Comparing Political Corruption and Clienteles, Ashgate, 2005, T.Persson, etc The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2003, Kunicova and Rose-ckermn, Electoral Rules as Constraints on Corruption, British Journal of Political Science, 35, p.573-606, 2005

<sup>112</sup>J.Dzionek-Kozłowska, Political Corruption and Electoral Systems seen with Economic Lenses, 2014

<sup>113</sup> Most studies operate with the Corruption Perception Index compiled by TI, Control of Corruption Index compiled by the WB and International Country Risk Guide by Political Risk Services.

<sup>114</sup> T.Persson, G.Tabellini, Electoral Systems and Economic Policy, 2016


<sup>115</sup> Party Systems, Electoral Systems and Constraints on Corruption, Electoral Studies, 2015

<sup>116</sup> T.Persson, etc Electoral Rules and Corruption, European Economic Association, 2003

<sup>117</sup> V.Verardi, Electoral Systems and Corruption

Party list systems weaken responsibility to citizens and stimulate free-rider behavior. Changing the proportional party list system to a majority system has a marginal impact on cutting corruption, and other measures are needed<sup>118</sup>. One study<sup>119</sup> explores the link between blocked or closed/open party list system and the number of members returned from the constituency (size-magnitude). In general, the rule is that a blocked party list system is associated with higher level of corruption, but this inference is only valid for small constituencies.

The following chart shows the dependence of corruption incidence in party list systems on constituency size (number of elected members). If the system is a flexible / closed party list system and candidates compete in multi-member constituencies (with a large size of 15 members elected from the same party<sup>120</sup>), the resources required for intra-party competition are rising, and the incidence of corruption increases accordingly<sup>121</sup>. Thus, for large multi-member constituencies, a closed party list is preferred to reduce financial competition, and therefore the prevalence of corruption (green line in the chart). For smaller constituencies, an open list (blue line in the chart) is preferred, because only one winner is possible. A blocked party list in small constituencies is susceptible to higher levels of corruption.



A similar conclusion holds under the mixed system. Corruption is more associated with the proportional, indirect component, i.e. vote for the party list. Another conclusion is that corruption is more pronounced if there are fewer competitors in each constituency, especially in smaller constituencies. *Electoral systems with less corruption have wider competition within the constituency, larger size of constituencies and the election of several members from the same constituency.*

For mixed systems, the proportional component is critical to understanding the impact on corruption. The increase in the majority component in mixed systems (the contamination of

<sup>118</sup> T.Persson, etc Electoral Rules and Corruption, European Economic Association, 2003

<sup>119</sup> E.Chang, Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption, British Journal of Political Science, 2005

<sup>120</sup>

If the has the chance to elect around 15 members, the intraparty competition places them as competitors within the same constituency, not just puts them in competition with the opposing party. This increases the need for financial resources. If the constituency is smaller - 10 or less, an open / flexible party list is preferable.

<sup>121</sup> Rational reasoning explains the desire of candidates from the same party to cultivate positive relationships and images and engage in internal, inter-party competition, along with competition with other parties. This requires additional financial resources.

proportional system with majority elements) leads to more strict government monitoring and control over corruption, but there is a boundary of positive correlation of the majority component<sup>122</sup>. Reducing the majority component in the proportional party list system has no positive effects on reducing corruption. Proportionality

*Partial conclusions 3.5 (anti-corruption):*

- 3.13 *A change only in election system can weaken corruption, but it cannot cut it down to size.*
- 3.14 *There is a strong link between lowering the electoral threshold and reducing corruption and personalization of political competition (candidates rather than party lists).*
- 3.15 *Blocked PR-list is associated with higher level of corruption than closed/open (flexible) party list system. Blocked party list system combined with a presidential system is the system most susceptible to corruption. **The higher the proportional and indirect component, the higher the level of corruption.***
- 3.16 *The general rule laid out above is valid only for small constituencies. Large constituencies, of about 15 members and more, have an inverse relationship. Political corruption increases with open/flexible party list system. **Therefore, an open/flexible PR list system is not recommended for constituencies with around 15 and more members, it is only recommended for constituencies with less than 10 members. Blocked party list systems are not recommended for small districts (less than 10 members) because it breeds irresponsibility.***
- 3.17 *In majority systems, collective responsibility is lower than individual responsibility. The majority system and the decrease of corruption perception are more pronounced if the majority system is based on plurinomial multiple-member districts (MMD).*
- 3.18 *Corruption levels are lower in countries which use larger electoral districts (more voters / electors) and with a lower participation threshold.*
- 3.19 *The majority element in mixed systems leads to stricter government monitoring and control over corruption.*

### 3.6 Reduction of cleavages in society

Party list systems reproduce societal cleavages in the parliament. In societies with very many cleavages and differences, the lines of societal separation within the proportional electoral system transfer to the parliament societal cleavages and representative fragmentation. The emergence of many parties around isolated and specific identities can multiply and amplify in parliamentary representation, which will impede efficient functioning of the Government. Polarizing pluralism could even ensue, facilitated by party lists as an electoral system, because parties care only about their followers and do not offer compromises solutions. Electoral systems may even have the effect of creating and exacerbating cleavages in society, while the party list system can heighten differences and even cultivate them<sup>123</sup>. PR lists can return candidates who promote extreme and polarizing approaches, although this does not necessarily occur in every election.

Majority systems which encourage the winner with the transferable vote (STV) moderate extremisms and polarizations. An electoral system that requires 50% + 1 to win in a constituency will promote greater moderation in representation, so the alternative vote system (AV) or the

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<sup>122</sup> M.R.Alfano, A.L.Baraldi, E.Papagni, Electoral Systems and Corruption: the Effect of the Proportionality Degree, 2014 MPRA paper, UTC

<sup>123</sup> G.Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes, NYU Press, 1997

popular victory system will moderate the winner. The Lebanese system or its modifications have the potential to flatten the differences. FPTP can fuel the differences because it counts on a well-organized majority which wins elections in the first round.

In general, proportionality and moderation cannot be reconciled within the same electoral system. These are two very different goals<sup>124</sup>. In the case of highly polarized and divided societies, the PR-list, STV or FPTP tend to heighten the differences<sup>125</sup> in electoral campaigns. In the struggle for different identities, these will stimulate multiple political parties and a degree of fragmentation. After the election, parties will most likely have to form coalition governments, but these coalitions are more like pragmatic solutions, while differences and loyal followers will be maintained and cultivated in the expectation of a new election.

Electoral outcomes depend on a number of additional endogenous factors such as the complexity of societal differences. If there is a single societal polarization line or if there are multiple dividing lines in society, do these dividing lines overlap (linguistic, ideological, identity, geographic, etc.) or not? Proportional systems are not suitable if there is a large number of dividing lines within society, because it cultivates excessive fragmentation and perpetuates polarization.

Electoral systems have a large impact on democratic stability<sup>126</sup>. Empirical studies confirm this, even though specialized literature advocates a proportional political representation approach as an instrument to negotiate the differences<sup>127</sup>. Another trend advocates the use of electoral systems to moderate the behavior of elected officials by selecting them as a result of electoral negotiations and accommodating representatives with electoral support rather than transferring cleavages to representative institutions<sup>128</sup>. As a result, the proportional system is a fair system as a result, but it does not promote moderation and the leveling of societal cleavages<sup>129, 130</sup>. The STV system is quite neutral in this respect.

The AV system is better than STV, but it can preclude certain members from being returned. Therefore, the AV system needs to be improved through an additional requirement that candidates winning in socially different regions prone to divisions must be returned (the requirement being at least 15% representation from these regions, otherwise known as *constituency pooling*). This approach can facilitate reunification and moderation of national politics. The delineation of the territorial boundary of the constituency may favor homogeneity or heterogeneity.

Heterogeneous constituencies (in terms of identity, language, ethnic or religious affiliation) promote moderation of elected members, uniform constituencies achieve the opposite. Research shows that STV and AV systems, which are majority preferential systems, can have positive effects because they center on concrete people, rather than parties and groups. As a result, they shift the focus away from ethnic conflicts and excessive politicization of problems, especially in emerging democracies<sup>131</sup>. Preference for STV or AV is caused by specific parameters of societal

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<sup>124</sup> D.Horowitz, *Electoral Systems and Their Goals: A Primer for Decision-Makers*, 2003

<sup>125</sup> A.Hitler was propelled into the Chancellor's office with over 35% of the vote in 1928 parliamentary elections based on PR party lists.

<sup>126</sup> B.Reilly, *Electoral Systems for Divided Societies*, *Journal of Democracy*, v.13, nr.2, 2002

<sup>127</sup> The approach comes from the experience of advanced democracies such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, and has been conceptualized by A.Lijphart.

<sup>128</sup> **An approach developed in democratizing countries and practiced in many Asian and African countries (Nigeria, Fiji, Papua Noua Ghinee) but also recently experimented in some advanced democracies such as Northern Ireland, Estonia.**

<sup>129</sup> M.Bogaards, *Electoral choices for divided societies: Moderation through constituency pooling and vote pooling*, Grenoble, France workshop on Parties, Part System and Democratic Consolidation, 2001

<sup>130</sup> A.Torres, *Electoral Systems and Ethnic Identify-A Constructivist Approach*, 2007, New York University

<sup>131</sup> R.Taagepera, *STV in Transitional Estonia*, *Electoral Systems for Divided Societies*, *Journal of Democracy*, v.13, nr.2, 2002

cleavages. In the case of bipolar societies, the AV system (Estonia) is preferable, whereas in societies with more dividing lines the STV system is preferred (Northern Ireland and Estonia). Another critical aspect is the concentration of differences in the case of clear geographical divisions, the requirement for specific support in the other community is necessary, while in mixed and very heterogeneous regions the promotion of moderate candidates is the key to success.

*Partial conclusions 3.6 (societal cleavages):*

- 3.20 *In societies with many cleavages and differences, the lines of societal separation within proportional electoral systems lead to the transfer of societal cleavages and representative fragmentation to the legislature.*
- 3.21 *Majority systems that promote the winner of the transferable vote (STV) moderate extremes and polarization.*
- 3.22 *In general, proportionality and moderation of representation cannot be reconciled within the same electoral system. A large number of dividing lines within society disadvantages proportional systems because it cultivates excessive fragmentation and perpetuation of polarization.*
- 3.23 *As a result, the proportional system is a fair system, but it does not promote moderation and the leveling of societal cleavages.*
- 3.24 *The STV or AV system, the majority preferential systems, can have positive effects because they center on concrete people rather than parties and groups, thus preventing the emergence of ethnic conflicts and the politicization of problems, especially in emerging democracies.*

*Some examples of electoral systems*

Mixed system

Ukraine, 2015:

- 225 constituencies and 450 seats in a unicameral parliament,
- 225 FPTP seats in each constituency,
- 225 seats in the national constituency on blocked PR party list with a 4% electoral threshold.

Romania, 2012:

- 452 constituencies, of which 315 are for deputies and 137 for senators,
- 315 SMD in round 1 by 50% (Constitutional Court invalidated the first FPTP component<sup>132</sup>), if not elected, transfers to the proportional component,
- The rest of the seats (including no results) redistributed in the national constituency on the blocked PR party list with a 5% electoral threshold

Lithuania:

- 71 constituencies and 141 seats in the unicameral parliament,
- 71 FPTP seats in each constituency and
- 70 seats in the national constituency on the blocked PR party list with a 5% election threshold (7% for electoral blocks),

Germany:

- 328 constituencies in the Bundestag, 328 FPTP seats in each constituency, and
- 228 seats in the national constituency on the blocked PR party list with a 5% electoral threshold or 3 FPTP seats,

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<sup>132</sup> [https://www.ccr.ro/files/products/D0682\\_12.pdf](https://www.ccr.ro/files/products/D0682_12.pdf)

Italy (2016 Chamber of representatives):

- 100 constituencies in which 3 to 9 candidates are selected (MMD, plurinominal),
- For each constituency, parties submit lists (party heads can submit to 10 constituencies), blocked lists,
- The electoral list, the first party to reach 40% gets 340 seats out of 630, (if no party gets 40%, then the first two parties compete and the winner gets 340 seats), gender balance on party lists is 40%.

Italy (Senate 2016)

- Proportional system in one national constituency, blocked PR list, threshold of 3%.

### Majority system

The Parliament of France:

- PFPT for candidates<sup>133</sup>.

Ireland<sup>134</sup>:

- PR-STV in 42 constituencies indicating first preference and if desired the second preference (from 3 to 5 elected members).

### Proportional system

Estonia<sup>135</sup>:

- 12 MMD constituencies in Parliament, depending on population the number of mandates is different (6-13 mandates), candidates are independent or nominated by parties.

The Netherlands:

- Proportional system in the national constituency,
- Blocked PR list, 0.67% threshold.

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<sup>133</sup> Preliminary use of primaries for party candidates

<sup>134</sup> <http://www.housing.gov.ie/sites/default/files/migrated-files/en/Publications/LocalGovernment/Voting/FileDownload%2C1895%2Cen.pdf>

<sup>135</sup> <http://vm.ee/en/electoral-system>, [http://www.electoralsystemchanges.eu/Files/media/MEDIA\\_133/FILE/Estonia\\_summary.pdf](http://www.electoralsystemchanges.eu/Files/media/MEDIA_133/FILE/Estonia_summary.pdf)



## 4 Analysis of non-coercive contextual factors

In this chapter we analyze the context in which an electoral system is placed and the influence of these factors on the implementation of electoral rules.

In Section 1.1 we substantiate the critical importance of understanding the context in which electoral rules will be implemented. On the one hand, the design of electoral rules depends on societal context in which they operate; on the other hand, electoral rules impact political structures. The theoretical perspective includes a number of non-coercive factors:

- set of factors A: democratic experience, societal differences (ethnic, religious, linguistic), trust in institutions, income and poverty levels in society, which influence the structure of political parties,
- set B: interinstitutional relations between the parliament-executive-presidency, geographical distribution of voting preferences, which influence political structures and parties in the legislatures,
- set C: the organizational structure of parties, personal doctrinal preferences of coalition making, inter-party relations, the ideological configuration of parties, which impact stability and the operation of government,
- set D: fragmentation and polarization of party structures, which impact policy solutions and their quality.

From among the non-coercive contextual factors in this study, we will reflect on the most consequential ones:

1. the doctrinal structure of evolving politics and the actors that populate these segments, including political tactics,
2. the movements of political persons along the evolution of political parties, positional relations between these groups and respective parties,
3. societal differences and tensions, including geopolitical, linguistic, geographic,
4. the key challenges in the functioning of public authorities and institutions and the state.

### 4.1 Parties, political tactics

The structure of political parties has been critically assessed many times, but a coherent response has not been found to the domination of a single personality over the party, excessive centralization, development of tools for overseeing party leadership, and the dependence of territorial offices on the central headquarters and the leader of the party.<sup>136</sup>

Sartori offers several classifications of political parties.<sup>137</sup> These classifications provide the so-called party's operational spaces:

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<sup>136</sup> The parties dominate the political space and set the country's agenda. They lack internal democracy and are highly centralized, dominated by their leaders, and lack a clearly articulated ideology. This results in a fragmented political spectrum and opportunist parties, thereby weakening the checks and balances that would normally occur. Moldovan parties have traditionally been weak internally, functioning as a loose coalition of relatively autonomous high-level politicians or a single leader. P.19-20 <http://democracyinternational.com/media/Moldova%20Democracy%20and%20Governance%20Assessment.pdf>

<sup>137</sup> G.Sartori, Parties and Party System: A framework for analysis, p.291, ECPR

- i) observing parties *not interested in maximizing votes* (compete on the basis of quality political products),
- ii) *ideological parties interested in maximizing votes* (promote doctrinal policies and policies that increase voter satisfaction even though they are not necessarily doctrinal),
- iii) *responsible parties which do not promote policies solely to maximize votes* (calculate and support only those policies that bring added value at the expense of voting visibility or doctrinal positioning)
- iv) *refractory parties for which winning elections or maximizing voters are the key priorities* (promotes only policies that achieve these results, not taking into account other factors that maximize votes),
- v) *demagogic parties, irresponsible parties, which have the sole purpose of maximizing vote* (parties focusing on selling their image as the first priority).

Another classification of political parties is based on positioning and importance on concrete aspects:

- a) Problems / situations / challenges (parties which propose policies to respond to situations and problems, appealing to reasoning votes to resolve the problem)
- b) identification / recognition (parties that build their position in relation to some categories of voters and appeal to them to obtain their vote, positive or negative),
- c) image / reputation (parties that promote themselves by cultivating perceptions about themselves and their candidates, positive or negative).

Finally, an interesting classification gives parties a role in mutual competition<sup>138</sup>, and in this case the number and importance of anti-systemic parties determines government instability:

- 1) *Systemic parties*, their goal is to model policies, ideology and challenges to maximize votes through formal or ad-hoc competition or coalitions (parties from the entire political spectrum)
- 2) *Anti-system parties* (the purpose of which is to reformat the governing system, the political system, in some cases reformat society and the country in their entirety, where revolution is the goal in and of itself, using populist approaches and methods, virulent and aggressive messaging are the key elements of this strategy, often capitalizing on the existence of real problems in society)<sup>139</sup>.

As calculated in this study on the basis of fragmentation indices, multiparty competition under polarizing political systems correlates with several wings of competition: extreme left competes with the left wing for influence on the left, the left competes with centrist parties for influence in the center, and similarly the competition unfolds on the right pole. Anti-systemic parties seek entry points into the conventionally sliced political system with the aim of reformatting the existing structure of political parties and conventional competition poles<sup>140</sup>. The following chart explains the multipolar political system of competition in which the left wing is currently represented by 2 parties (PCRM-decrease and PSRM-growth) which is confronted with

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
<sup>138</sup> G.Sartori, Parties and Party System: A framework for analysis,P.283, ECPR

<sup>139</sup> Fenomenul partidelor antisistem capată o influență tot mai mare nu doar în Europa parlamentară (Le Pen, Front National (Franța), Five-Stars (Italy), UKIP (Anglia), etc dar și în SUA cu alegerea președintelui Trump)

<sup>140</sup> A similar situation exists in Spain: PP (right-wing party) and PSOE (Left Party) and the efforts, following the 2008 financial crisis, of the extreme-right party Podemos, and later by the Liberal populist Ciudadanos respective to compete segmentally for the left and the right. The difference is that these two parties do not intend to replace the entire political class and do not define their goals as restarting political systems or undermining elected institutions but attempting to penetrate directly into the conventional doctrinal segments <http://www.europetoday.ml/the-current-radical-changes-in-the-main-spanish-parties/>

a self-declared<sup>141</sup> anti-system party (PN), which also attacks the party positioned in the center (PDM). The declared goal is to completely overhaul ideological competition, the re-focusing of competition on elite/rich-poor/the people divide, the establishment of the new republic, the introduction of an authoritarian system with partial abolition of the rule of law, the enhancement of personalized relationships and confrontations.

*Chart 4.1 Graphic representation of the multi-party competition of systemic parties and anti-system parties*



*Legend: red triangles show conventional left, blue is the center, green is right and light blue is openly unionist, grey triangles show the overlapping of votes between doctrinal currents, other figures show the positioning of populist parties (PN and PDA)*

On the right-hand side there are several better known parties (PLDM, PAS, PPEM), including a unionist (PL) segment. The strategy of the PDA anti-system party (their rhetoric against all captured and illegitimate public institutions) was the overhaul of the political system by triggering snap elections, but also by gaining an entry points on the right-hand side vacated by PLDM. From 2016, PDA has maintained its goal of early elections, but is accommodating on right-wing political competition, the competition based on protest vote and less on ideological differences, political positioning, and institutional reform agenda. Their strategy is to substitute competition for antisystem messages and masses against political elite's rhetoric. Anti-system parties, as a rule, coordinate their efforts to de-legitimize public institutions represented by political groups in the center and the right wing. The strategy of anti-system parties is clear: virulent attack, cultivation of the feeling of dissatisfaction, denying legitimacy of institutions, forcing early elections, considering other actions with provocations and confrontations. As a rule, antisystem parties do not reform the system using democratic instruments, policy issues, and the key challenges, but they cultivate dissatisfaction as the ultimate goal.

<sup>141</sup> I.Cașu – multiple public statements, the party platform implies the suspension of the rule of law, imposing a Lukashenko-style presidential regime, supposedly populist objectives: the review of all privatizations

Table 4.2 Positioning of political parties (trends in October 2016-Mar. 2017)<sup>142, 143</sup>

	<b>Left conservative prorusian opposition</b> (approval, favorable/nonfavourable)	<b>Center-left proeuropean</b> (approval, favoravle/nonfavouravle)	<b>Protest against government</b> <b>Anti-government, anti-elites, populist</b> (approval, favorable/nonfavourable) <b>Self-declared anti-sytem parties, positioned as populist</b>		<b>Center-right (proeuropean), opposition</b> (approval, favorable/non-favorable)	<b>Center-right proeurpean, opposition</b> (approval, favorable/nofavourable)	<b>Right, proromanian unionist, government</b> (approval, favorable/nofavourable)
<b>Parliamentary factions</b>	<u>Ig.Dodon, PSRM/president</u> (30%->41%, 45/47->56/41) <u>Z.Greceani, PSRM</u> (2%->7%...->39/55), opposition Predominantly ideological party (the Eurasian Union, cultivation of Putinist identity, paternalistic, authoritarian, ideological, refractory)	<u>V.Plahotniuc, PDM</u> (1%->2%, 7/81->11/82) <u>P.Filip, PM, PDM</u> (3%->4%, ...->33/59), <u>A.Candu, PDM, even Parliament</u> (1%, 19/66) <u>M.Lupu, PDM</u> (12%-1%, 21/70->...) A predominantly ideological, refractory party in some respects and responsible in other respects.			<u>V.Ciubotaru, PLDM</u> (... ->16/47) Parliamentary opposition A predominantly ideological, refractory party in some respects and responsible in other respects.	<u>Iu.Leancă, PPEM</u> (3%->1%, 23/64->30/62), constructive opposition A predominantly ideological, refractory party in some respects and responsible in other respects.	<u>M.Ghimpu, PL</u> (1%->... 7/83->8/87) <u>D.Chirtoaca, PL</u> (1%,27/60->24/66), government A predominantly ideological, refractory party in some respects and responsible in other respects..
	<u>V.Voronin, PCRM</u> (6%->5%, ...->31/65), opposition Predominantly ideological party (equilibrium between the Eurasian and European union, the cultivation of the state-like ideology (moldovenism), ideological, refractory party)						
Organizational resources	PSRM: 2 rayon chairman (32), 52 mayors, PCRM-1 (32) rayon chairman, 77 mayors (8.6%)	PDM: 19 rayon chairman (32), 287 mayors following the 2015 local elections Developed media resources, developed organizational resources, developed administrative and financial resources.			PLDM: 8 rayon chairman (32), 286 mayors following 2015 local elections	PPEM: 1 rayon chairman (32), following 2015 local elections	PL: 51 mayors, Some media resources, some organizational and administrative resources.
			<u>R.Usatii, PN</u> (12%->7%, 34/56->35/59), <u>A.Năstase, PPDA</u> (13%->12%, 32/48-	<u>M.Sandu, PAS</u> (13%->23%, 38/47->42/52),		<u>A.Guțu, Dreapta</u> (1%->...)	

<sup>142</sup> [www.IRI.org](http://www.IRI.org) dynamics is shown Oct.2016-Mar.2017

<sup>143</sup> Integrated by author

<b><u>Non parl iam ent ary fact ions</u></b>			<u>D.Ciubașenco, PN</u> , (3%->...), anti-govmnt, anti-elite populist,  Partly developed financial and media resources	>37/52) anti-govmnt, anti-elite populist,  Media resources – one television station, organizational representation in at least 15 districts.	anti-governmental, although it has its origins in PLDM, is undergoing ideological construction, refractory-responsible, limited territorial organizational resources, only support teams in 15 rayons		Anatol Salaru (?->...)
Org aniz atio nal reso urce s			PN: 43 mayors, following 2015 local elections  Organizational resources in these regions				
Elec tora l base s – qual itati ve	Prorussians, and mostly elderly, families of Russian migrants to Russia	Public sector employees, big businesses,	Prorussian anarchists, anti-elitists, north/south part of Moldova	Disadvantaged and poor, pensioners, groups aggressively opposing government	Former PLDM voters that cut across proeuropeans and intellectuals, mostly in central parts, Chisinau	Some proeuropean elites, businesses, public sector	Unionists, union core nationalists and some young people
pro Eur ope an, %		~10%		~7-8%  (downward trend)	~25%		~10%
pro Rus sian , %	~40%	~5%	~7-8% (downward trend)  Election data shows gains in the regions where the PCRМ had a good score and is a direct competitor to PSRM	Election data show the gain in the regions where PLDM had a good score and is a direct competitor to PAS, PPEM, PLDM			

Legend: first number is the voting poll, 2<sup>nd</sup> - trust/favorable, 3<sup>rd</sup> – unfavorable, [www.iri.org](http://www.iri.org)

The intentions of the parties in competition are specified in the following table. All extra-parliamentary parties enjoy more solid support compared to parliamentary parties and their preference is clearly for parliamentary elections on the basis of the current PR party list electoral system. The agenda of extra-parliamentary parties is clear, it is short-term - elections. Extra-parliamentary political parties position themselves as intransigent opposition parties, who are

against ruling parties. 2 extra-parliamentary parties PN and PDA position themselves as anti-system parties.

Table 4.3 Intentions of political parties<sup>144</sup>

Parliamentary parties <sup>145</sup>		Non-parliamentary parties	
Party (number of deputies)	Voting intention, tendency, party policy	Party (number of deputies)	Voting intention, tendency, party policy
<b>PDM (40)</b> , Plahotniuc/Filip, <b>government</b> (20 joined fugitives PLDM, PCRM), (10%→4%, 4+2%)	<b>10%, stable, no early elections, status-quo</b>	<b>PAS (0)</b> , Sandu, (9%→>29%, 27+6%)	<b>30%, rise, early elections, change, against government</b>
<b>PL (11)</b> , Ghimpu, <b>government</b> , (1%→1%, 1+1%)	<b>1%, decrease, no early elections, status-quo</b>	<b>PPDA (0)</b> , Nastase, (10%→>5%, 5+15%)	<b>5%, decrease, early elections, change, against government</b>
2 fugitives from PL, supporting government	No electoral base, no early elections, status-quo	PN (0), Usatyi/Ciubasenco, (6%→>6%, 6+11%)	6%, decrease, early elections, change, against government
<b>PSRM (24)</b> , Dodon/Greceani, <b>opposition</b> (24%→>36%, 33+4%)	<b>30%, rise, early elections, change</b>	Dreapta (0), Gutu	<1%, stable, change, opposition
PCRM (7, initially 20), Voronin, constructive opposition, (3%→>4%, 4+8%)	4%, decrease, no early elections, status-quo	PUN (0), A.Salaru,	None, extend right wing
PLDM (7, initially 24), Deliu opposition, (1%, 1+1%)	1%, stable no early elections if absorbed by PAS, undecided		
European Platform=PPEM, (2) + fugitives PLDM (6), Leanca (PPEM), constructive opposition, (2%→>1%, 1+3%)	1%, decrease, no early elections, status-quo		


Legend: (number of deputies), polls standings (%), 1<sup>st</sup>+2<sup>nd</sup> option Mar.2017, [www.iri.org](http://www.iri.org))

In the chart below, we show the differences between the parties and their potential for cooperation. It is obvious that the most influential party is PDM. Being the main party in government, it has the potential of building coalitions with many parties and is currently in the slightly positive upward trend. The next influential non-governing party is PSRM, however, it in a steady growth trend in polls. The PSRM's coalition potential is, in principle, with the PCRM, despite the personal differences between the leaders of these two parties. The potential for coalitions between PSRM and PDM would exist in some very concrete situations, while other coalition will not be possible for PCRM, especially with the pro-European pole.

<sup>144</sup> Integrated by the author

<sup>145</sup> <http://www.parlament.md/StructuraParlamentului/Fractiuniparlamentare/tabid/83/language/ro-RO/Default.aspx>

Diagram 4.4: Competitiveness, rivalry co-operation of parties according to their coalition potential (vertical axis), influence in society and governance (horizontal axis) and trends of societal preferences (size of the figure)



Two parties with coalition potential are also in the same quadrant: PL and PPEM, although the influence of these parties is smaller, only PL retains part of Government influence, as well as Chisinau. In the bottom quadrant there are 3 parties: PAS, PDA and PN. Coalition against government is predictable between PAS and PDA, while PAS or PDA coalition with PDM and PL is less likely due to personalized hostile perceptions. PDA is positioned as an anti-systemic party, therefore coalition with any government party in light of political developments is unlikely.

A coalition of PAS with PDM has no ideological, geopolitical or policy contradictions, the differences stem from the implementation of these policies and the cultivation of perception of confrontation with PDM leadership. This is explained by the fact that PAS leadership stems from PLDM, as well as through latent competition with PDA which has more financial, media and organizational resources. Reduced organizational capabilities of PAS expose its vulnerability, which explains PAS cooperation with PLDM that has organizational resources.

The potential for coalition between PSRM and PN was possible in principle, but at the same time unlikely, because the tendency persists in the medium term of heavy mutual mud-slinging within the same segment. Therefore, competition between PSRM and PN is most likely based on positioning and image, but also on concrete policies.


From the viewpoint of the maturing of political relations on the pro-European segment, an increase in organizational capacities of parties, increase in citizens' trust in public institutions as a



result of reforms, further decline of the influence of anti-system parties, the support provided by development partners, there is a principled potential for coalition between pro-European parties after 2018. A pragmatic coalition is possible over key transformational challenges for society: demonopolization and competitiveness of the energy sector, demonopolization and competition in the financial-banking sector, justice sector reforms.

Vote intention for parties is presented below. It is obvious that the parties that formed the ruling arch of government have very low public trust (5-6%). Between September 2016 and April 2017, polls showed that the perception of the country going in the wrong direction has diminished by 20% (from 82% to 62%) and the perception of the right direction increased from 10% to 32%.


Table 4.5 Vote intentions for main parties and the perception of the situation in the country



Legend: polls standings (%), 1<sup>st</sup>+2<sup>nd</sup> option Mar.2017, [www.iri.org](http://www.iri.org), [www.ipp.md](http://www.ipp.md)

The chart below presents the traditional doctrinal polling potential in retrospect. The ideological left has always been represented at a rate of 40-50% depending on the weakness of right-wing ideological currents and especially the center which can be easily captured by the ideological left. In fact, a representative center of 10-15% is a necessary and vital pole to prevent the expansion of the ideological left, and this is also a critical goal for the ideological right to ensure coalition governance.

Chart 4.6: Voting potential - main doctrines based on election results: 1994-2016<sup>146</sup>




The ideological right is divided over principles, of which the unionist right has a traditional 10% base, while the rest, the most important part of 20-30% belongs to right-wing parties. The

<sup>146</sup>Calculated, integrated by the author (stinga=left, centru=center, dreapta=right, unionisti=unionists)

chart shows evolving competition patterns between the parties within ideological doctrines and their mutual incursions. In principle, parties representing clear ideological trends have hazy voter base that is not transferable, is positioned in terms of identity and image with a party on that segment, and only a smaller segment can be absorbed by the parties that position themselves from the other segment.

The following chart is interesting because it shows the evolution of parties over time according to voter preferences based on the surveys. PSRM’s expansion is in the direction of PCRM and PN, and the extension of PAS is in the direction of PLDM and partly PL, but also towards PDA.


Chart 4.7: Evolution of vote based on poll results: 2014-17<sup>147</sup>



The following 2 charts provide a more vivid explanation of ideological differences and party positioning. The actual expansion or contraction of doctrinal parties in reality is limited to 5-15% depending on the weight of the party and the size of the ideological segment through votes lost, which fluctuate from 20 to 30%. These voting losses, due to design flaws of the proportional system already discussed, reduce the weight of one of the ideological currents by means of two tactics: raising the electoral threshold (which will benefit the dominant party on the respective segment) and promoting competitors which fragment the electorate of the dominant party (tactics of the parties from the competing doctrinal segment). A more detailed analysis of electoral polls clearly highlights these practices.


<sup>147</sup> Calculated, integrated by author

Chart 4.8: Doctrinal voting potential based on election results: 1994-98<sup>148</sup>, <sup>149</sup>



The following chart shows the decreasing popularity trends of anti-systemic parties (PN and PDA), with voters' preferences flowing in favor of two opposition parties, PSRM and PAS, which partially attract voters from anti-system parties. At the same time, another trend is evident, namely the growth of undecided voters from among the voters of anti-system parties. These votes can turn towards conventional doctrinal parties: to government as a result of effective governance policies or to opposition parties. The tendency for voter migration from anti-systemic parties to undecided voters (a growing trend) towards parties from the governing party or opposition parties is clearly visible. At the first stage the voter migration is observed towards opposition parties (PSRM and PAS), at the next stage, if there is a changing perception of positive direction for the country, the undecided segment can be capitalized by governing parties.

Figure 4.9: Voting preferences based on polls: 2014-2017<sup>150</sup>



<sup>148</sup> Calculated, integrated by author

<sup>149</sup> Votul pierdut= lost votes, (stinga=left, centru=center, dreapta=right, unionisti=unionists)

<sup>150</sup> Calculated, integrated by author

This chart shows how the dependence of the party on one person can irreversibly damage the party in a proportional electoral system<sup>151</sup>. Losing the leader of the party (for various reasons) produces irreparable effects over a period of 6 to 9 months, manifested through declining voter preferences for this party (PLDM within 9 to 12 months in 2015, PN within nine months in 2016). In the current electoral system based on PR party list, attention is on party leader, so the party becomes extremely vulnerable because it is a one-pillar construct.

*Partial conclusions 4.1 (parties, tactics):*

- 4.1 Competition between parties is fierce, which was caused by the financial and banking crises and corruption, against the backdrop of which the confidence in Government has declined substantially. Against the backdrop of the crisis, two anti-systemic parties were formed, which in 2015 and 2016 managed to capitalize on people's dissatisfaction. However, their influence is diminishing, and their protest voters are absorbed by conventional doctrinal parties from opposition (PSRM and PAS).*
- 4.2 All systemic and anti-systemic parties are vulnerable to the attack on their leadership, as it appears that the fall of the leader may result in the party's fall within 9 to 12 months.*
- 4.3 In principle, the interests of medium- and long-term system parties are doctrinal cooperation with the adjacent segments for the purpose of recreating a stable government. This is hampered by difficult personal relationships caused by the personalization of hostile relations cultivated by the outside press and the polarizing influence of domestic media, to the detriment of the coalition scenarios based on ideological proximity and development priorities.*
- 4.4 In principle, the doctrinal parties cannot absorb the streams of different ideological voters, although limited expansion is possible, so infighting is only possible within the same doctrinal segment (left, right and center). Mutual expansion into the voter sub-segment from adjacent ideological trends is limited.*

#### 4.2 Poles of geopolitical differences


The Moldovan society is forcibly divided along geopolitical preferences. Differences in the interpretation of retrospective realities, current challenges and implications for the future have become the features of division within society between two fundamental options: European and Eurasian integration. These options have been cultivated by political forces through geopolitical realities, political messaging and especially through deeply penetrated informational flows from abroad, which exceeds the capacity of local media environment to generate an alternative that would not radicalize society.

The following chart demonstrates this deep 50%-50% polarization. Finding the polarizing difference has implications for the design of the electoral system because ideological visions are a strong identity factor and frequently dominate other policy preferences.

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
<sup>151</sup> With Moldova's highly personalistic party system, the leader decides who can run for elections, their relative placement on the party list (which determines the likelihood of getting elected), and who will get what political office after the election. <http://democracyinternational.com/media/Moldova%20Democracy%20and%20Governance%20Assessment.pdf>

Chart 4.10: Geopolitical preferences



In a graphical diagram of the divisions along the geopolitical preferences, we observe the relative approximation of the results of the parliamentary and presidential elections in which highlights a declining tendency for pro-European voters. This trend is more clear in relation to parliamentary and presidential elections. In the local elections, the preferences for the European option are more pronounced. Probably, this is due to concrete examples of European support, the quality of concrete candidates and personified choice, while in the parliamentary elections there is the leadership of the parties and their created images correlated with the performances of the governments at that time.

Charts 4.11 Polling trends from a geopolitical perspective<sup>152, 153</sup>



<sup>152</sup> CRDO: Analysis of Political Developments in Moldova 2017-19 – (confidential)

<sup>153</sup> Calculated, integrated by author

The explanations for the presidential elections are unclear. It is obvious that the personality of candidates and their performance matters, as does candidates' ability to attract the support of voters from other parties and not turn them away. Therefore, the candidate's ability to integrate a wider spectrum of voters is important to score a higher score in the second round of voting.

The axis of geopolitical differences<sup>154</sup> is determined by the intervention of the Eurasian Center (Kremlin) and EU instruments with reference to Moldova: 1) access to the markets for products and services, 2) access for labor migrants to the respective markets, 3) opening of information markets for products imported from these centers 4) development and infrastructure investments, 5) transformational and technical assistance programs, 6) the use of influence networks including business, 7) direct and indirect financing. All these are closely correlated with political competition and are recognized as contextual factors in the decision making, design and application of electoral rules. The Kremlin traditionally projects Russia's reputation in the elections and effectively shapes its favorite candidate.

Political competitors behave and position themselves in relation to geopolitical doctrines. Strategic direct or indirect cooperation, including through opportunism which pursues short-term goals of political actors, and perhaps personal preferences for or against, can trigger tactical coalitions.

*Partial conclusions 4.2 (geopolitical differences):*

*4.5 Voting preferences flow along the geopolitical preferences, the division is the result of long polarization campaigns that have deeply penetrated society. Fragmentation and political polarization is complemented by geopolitical divisions at the parliament which add an additional impediment to integration of society.*

*4.6 Integrating voters into a geopolitical segment requires adequate integration into parliamentary elections. In local elections, the integration performance of local leaders is shaped by local solutions.*

*4.7 The contextual factor of external influence, the declared or undeclared strategic support are important for the operation of electoral rules.*

#### 4.3 The axes of ethnic and linguistic differences

Society faces critical divisions on several issues. Ethnic diversity and generational differences within society, efforts to change the rules of the game by ruling parties or coalitions once in power can undermine social cohesion—an issue that the AIE needs to consider as it pursues its pro-European political, linguistic, and foreign policy objectives.<sup>155</sup>

In this subsection we examine which political parties have the strongest preferences with the Ukrainians and Bulgarians. If there is a correlation between the political preferences and the ethnic groups, namely Ukrainians and Bulgarians vote preferentially for some political parties, then another question appears to what extent these political parties reflect the options and choices for the minorities regarding their education. In this case political parties do not reflect the choices and options of the minorities, namely, minorities prefer certain language educational options and

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<sup>154</sup> CReDO: Hybrid Threats Developments for Moldova 2014 (public), 2017 (confidential)


<sup>155</sup> <http://democracyinternational.com/media/Moldova%20Democracy%20and%20Governance%20Assessment.pdf>



respective political parties do not, one has to establish the reasons and perhaps strategies for greater accountability of the political parties towards its constituencies<sup>156</sup>.

The research approach selected clusters of the ethnically homogeneous regions and establishing these regions political preferences. To this end we produce two detailed commune based maps: ethnic commune based maps and political parties voting preferences. In the regions, in different rayons of Moldova, where Ukrainians and Bulgarians reside, we select randomly areas of homogeneous Bulgarian or Ukrainian compact population and compare with the political parties voting preferences, compare this with the regions with no Bulgarian or Ukrainian component and draw the conclusion on the existence of the correlation. For simplicity, parliamentary elections results in 2005 and 2010 are chosen, yet, similarly analysis performed for local elections in 2007 and other local elections show a similar pattern.

Chart 4.12 Parliamentary elections voting in 2005 per rayons and ethnic distributions per rayons<sup>157</sup>



The research chose 12 different rayons (in the North and in the South). In each rayon two types of areas are selected, type A is areas and communes with 60% and up representation of either Ukrainians or Bulgarians and type B is areas and communes with no or very small (less than 5%) representation of Ukrainians and Bulgarians. While comparing political parties voting preferences for type A and type B areas and communes within the same rayons, across rayons and regions: North-South, we make conclusions.


The determination of territorial boundaries of constituencies is complex in the case of SMD, depending on: the population, the homogeneity of the population, the administrative traditions, the continuity of the interests of the communities.

<sup>156</sup> This section is based on the research conducted by Resource Center for Human Rights in 2008

<sup>157</sup> Calculat, integrat de autor



Graph 4.16 Ethnic distribution at the level of localities<sup>158</sup>



Legend: green: Romanian Moldovans, yellow – Ukrainians, black – the Gagauz, blue – Bulgarians, red – Russians

In the areas where no Ukrainians present, there are two possible patterns. The first pattern is with Communists obtaining more than 30% of votes, with the presence of Our Moldova Block, Popular Christian Democratic Party and Democratic Party as well as Social Democratic Party. The second pattern is that Communist Party receives around 60% of votes with Our Moldova Block, Popular Christian Democratic Party, Democratic Party and the others.

*Partial conclusions 4.3 (ethnic differences):*

- 4.8 *There is a strong correlation between ethnic vote and political parties opting for the Eurasian geopolitical orientation in the parliamentary elections but also to a certain extent in local elections, especially where the presence of national minorities is higher than 60-70%.*
- 4.9 *There is a correlation between 40-50% minority presence and the voting pattern, which shows a preference for moderate centered parties according to geopolitical preferences. Promoting candidates who integrate the bivalent presence of ethnic groups is essential.*
- 4.10 *The establishment of constituencies in the local elections or elections in small regional constituencies can be accomplished by: a) harmonizing the constituencies; or b) heterogeneity of districts. In the case of a) relations between elected members become extreme, and this polarizing relations is transferred to elected body, while under b) we promote candidates who prefer centrist options and integrate voters' options.*

<sup>158</sup> Calculat, integrat de autor

#### 4.4 Institutional stability

Changing electoral rules and the stability of public and state institutions are the factors to be taken into consideration. Moldova is at a certain stage of development. The model presented below analyses the stability of public institutions and the viability of the state, which matters for national security. The analysis of 4 factors of the state's viability allows us to strengthen the possible contribution of the electoral system to strengthening state capacities, which is the objective of any state. These four factors are: internal legitimacy (the factor that requires consolidation), external legitimacy (the existing factor, which in many cases determines the state's existence), external financial support (existing), internal resources of the state (a poorly developed factor). The goal of any state is to develop all four factors.

There is a lack of direct research into state consolidation and electoral systems. It is obvious, though, that proportional systems emphasize representation, while majority systems emphasize the capacity for action and change (let's only recall the example of the 4-th French republic). The analysis of the evolution of state capacity is presented below.

Table 4.17 Evolution of the stability of the political regime based on the 4 factors model: 1990-2017<sup>159, 160, 161</sup>

Periods, prime-ministers	1990-1997	1997-2001	2001-9	2010-14	2015-2016 (6-9 months)	2016	2017-18
	Snegur: (Sangheli, Ciubuc)	Lucinschi: (Ciubuc, Sturza, Braghis)	Voronin: (Tarlev, Greceani)	European Alliance  (Filat, Leanca)	European Coalition  (Gaburici, Strelet)	ProEuropean platform  (Filip)	ProEuropean Platform  (Filip) (expectations)
Type of political regime	Controlled instability	Controlled instability	<b>Political stability</b>	<b>Political stability</b>	Uncontrolled instability	Controlled instability	<b>Political stability or controlled instability ?</b>
Four factors model							
1a. External legitimacy	+	-	-	+	-	- +	+
1b. Internal legitimacy	+ -	+ -	+	+ -	-	-	- +
2. Resources	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3. External aid	-	+ -	- +	+	-	- +	+

Legend: "+" means positive, "-" means negative, "+ -" means transition from positive to negative and just limited positive indicator and "- +" means transition from negative to positive negative and just limited positive indicator. E stands for "+" option, while e stands for "-" option and correspondingly I or i, R or r and A or a.

One can see the descending internal path of the political regime from 2013 to 2015<sup>162</sup>, with regime sliding from stable (2012-13) to controlled instability (2014) to uncontrolled instability (2015). In 2015, none of the factors have been present.


<sup>159</sup> This table partly correlates with another definition of the political stability [http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Moldova/wb\\_political\\_stability/](http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Moldova/wb_political_stability/) where Moldova situates at 109 place out of 191, yet this indicator does not take into the consideration the stability of the regime dimension.

<sup>160</sup> CRDO: Analysis of Political Developments in Moldova 2017-19 – (confidential)

<sup>161</sup> Calculat, integrat de autor

<sup>162</sup> CRDO: Analysis of Political Developments Options in Moldova 2014-16 (confidential)

Chart 4.18 Political regime evolution scenarios<sup>163</sup>



2013 (AIE) 2014 (AIE) 2015(AE) 2016(PD+PL) 2017(PD+PL) 2018(PD+PL) 2019(PD+PL)

Legend: **four-factor model of political regime stability** provides degree of political stability: External legitimacy (E), Internal legitimacy (I), internal Resources (R) and External Aid (A), CAPITAL LETTER (E, I, R, A) stands for high value or existence of the factor and minor letter of its inexistence (e, I, r, a), whereas CAPITAL LETTER in brackets ((E), (I), (R), (A)) means low level of the factor.

The graph shows also explains possible future paths in terms of the political stability of the regime. The current state of the political regime is estimated as somewhat below the controlled instability regime with 2 factors present: A – external aid and assistance and some level of (E) – external legitimacy, whereas (i) – internal legitimacy is low and (r) internal resources are low as well.

The most desired path is path A-Ideal path (shown in green). This path paves the way to 2019 aimed at stable political stability regime with at least 3 factors firmly present including I – internal legitimacy and cultivated farther E- external legitimacy. For this path, there is an intermediate state in 2017-18 that provides for the improved controlled instability level moving more to the state of stability.

The most realistic path is the one depicted by B.Realistic path in blue. This path shows that the target in 2019 is most likely will not be able to improve considerably the internal legitimacy to the extent to reach the stable political regime status and therefore, it reaches just the level of the controlled instability status.

<sup>163</sup> Calculat, integrat de autor

The least desired path – C. Pessimistic path – is depicted in red and shows descending path similar to the point in 2015 or so. Should Moldova pursue this path, the uncontrolled instability can provoke major political earthquakes.

The most likely path is probably going to be a mixture of A+B or B+C. We will discuss in the following chapter on the possible actions and determinants that make either of these scenarios take place. Below, we are providing a description of how each of the political regime scenario could look like.

*Partial conclusions 4.4 (institutional stability):*

4.11 *Strengthening the state is a legitimate objective, which needs to be seen also from the perspective of adopting an appropriate electoral system that would facilitate the achievement of this goal. Proportional PR party list systems result in excessive fragmentation and government instability which reduces the government’s capacity to implement reforms.*

4.5 Competition, challenges, politics

The picture of understanding of the possible evolutions is not complete if the key areas of battles and the structure of the key country resources and assets are not explained. In reality the core battles are given by the various country groups and most importantly by the external actors to control these sectors and assets. *The scope of the control is the control per se, yet some small groups could have these objective just for the sake of enrichment, the key actors add at least another reason – control of the country for political and geopolitical reasons.*

The key areas of confrontation are summarized in the table below.

Table 4.19 Areas for political-economic confrontation<sup>164</sup>

	Confrontation areas	Government aim	Prorussian Aim	Opposition 1 aim	Opposition 2 aim
1 <sup>st</sup> level finance flow	1.1 Energy (scope 1-1,5 bln USD (annual pay to Gazprom) lost opportunity to Gazprom ~0,15-2 <sup>165</sup> bln USD annual political rent)  <b>Core battle in 2017-18 prior to Parliamentary elections 2018/19</b>	Demonopolisation of imports & distribution, share in distribution, external legitimacy investors from the West	Import, distribution to Gazprom (get rent)	Protect former deals with Gazprom, keep parts of rent, get share in distribution	Keep Gazprom influence for future rent and courtesy to Russian interests
	1.2 Financial-banking (scope 2-3 bln USD <sup>166, 167</sup> 0.2-0,3 bln USD annual political rent)	De-oligopolisation, Western players invite to dissolve 2-3 players (50% Russian), also provide legitimacy with West	Keep the current status-quo where banks rip large shares from migrants remits	Keep some interests and links to ensure pay for electoral processes	Keep some interests and links to ensure pay for electoral processes

<sup>164</sup> Calculat, integrat de autor

<sup>165</sup> Combined Russian control of import market is 100% (Gazprom via 50+1% in Moldovagaz), distribution market is 80% (same).

<sup>166</sup> Page 9, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr1674.pdf>

<sup>167</sup> Combined Russian interests for the last 2 decades mounted to 50% of the market

	<b>Core battle in 2017-18 prior to Parliamentary elections 2018/19</b>				
	1.3 Fiscal-customs (1-2 bln USD, 0,2-0,3 bln political rent)  Some battles 2017-18 on closing the irregularities	Close some (IMF-fiscal administration) to generate additional revenue for pensions and social programs	Preferences for some businesses to ensure revenue for electoral processes	Preferences for some businesses to ensure revenue for electoral processes	Preferences for some businesses to ensure revenue for electoral processes
2 <sup>nd</sup> level finance flow	2.1 Judiciary (protecting interests, ensure properties)				
	2.2 Public tenders and privatization of state assets (0,5-0,7 bln USD, 0,1 bln political rent)				
	2.3 Railway, transportation (strategic investment EBRD and BEI) closed for negotiations				
Controversial issues	3.1 Public administration	Efficient, capable to deliver	Dependent, weak and clientele run		
	3.2 Administrative-territorial reform	Efficient and non-burdensome	Protect regionalism of prorussian regions		
	3.3 Political pluralism, democratic institutions	Develops that favors political development	Autocratic Russian model dependent or pluralism that controlled by Russian interests		
	3.4 Media pluralism and ads market	Controlled pluralism based on national interests	Russian controlled media market		

This table clarifies critical challenges of the country ahead of 2-3 years and possible political parties' behavior against these challenges. The issues that are classified under the 1st level financial flow are determinant for Moldova dependence on Russian influence via the monopolistic domination for the last two decades and now given DCFTA/AA between EU and Moldova agreement (market liberalization, access to western markets) have for the first time a chance to break through to transform these key industries into more competitive ones and therefore less dependent on Russian influence that invest and capture some part of the political elites and political parties. The economic scope of the 1st level economic flow is not less than 0.5 bln USD per annum in rents that monopolist holders would use resources to influence the political representation via political parties on both conventional doctrinal ends in Moldova. Failure to act decisively in the coming 2-3 years, would make Moldova incapable to break through with the past and prevent the

ability of the state to produce economic competitive industries and subsequently more authentic political competition accountable for the results.

The 2nd level financial flow areas have mostly been subject of the internal dominant political and economic groups influence.

*Partial conclusions 4.5 (competition, challenges):*

*4.12 Political parties in the Republic of Moldova express economic interests. Access to resources is the goal of political competition. Some parties' express interests and are coupled strongly with outside interests, and their objectives it to control strategic areas.*

*4.13 Some parties do not openly state their position with regard to major reforms in strategic policy areas, reform and demonopolization of the energy, financial and banking sectors, justice, rail transport, etc., focusing on the promotion of their image and speculations without offering any solutions.*

## 5. Analysis of coercive contextual factors

In this chapter we analyze the context in which an electoral system operates, as well as the influence that these factors have on the implementation of electoral rules.

The methodology of analysis of coercive contextual factors refers to<sup>168</sup>:

- Set E: electoral frauds,
- Set F: electoral corruption,
- Set G: the rule of law as it relates to electoral aspects.

These coercive factors have been analyzed in detail by the OSCE / ODIHR Election Observation Missions, which defined common positions with the EU Election Observation Mission<sup>169</sup> and the observation of elections mission from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe<sup>170</sup>.

All of these observations show that the elections were free. They point out that elections were partially correct. No conclusions have so far been made on systematic issues that could affect the outcome of the elections. The following remarks were made: 1) the polarizing and equivocal character of media coverage, 2) partial deficiencies in access of Moldovan workers in other countries, 3) insufficient representation of minorities and women in the political competition, 4) under-developed capacity of some local polling stations.

### 5.1 Electoral frauds

Electoral frauds may be isolated or systematic. Only systematic cases, of certain magnitude, may have an impact on the election. The main deficiencies include:

- A) Quality of voter lists (exclusion of deceased voters, correlation of lists in the register and from civil status - impact of up to 10 thousand votes annually),
- B) The practice of temporary registration during the voting period in selected strategic constituencies in the case of local elections; in majority constituency elections there is no time limit),
- C) Deficient ballot counting in some constituencies.

### 5.2 Electoral Corruption

Electoral corruption in the narrow sense refers to several situations:

- 1) vote buying by the electoral competitors (offering and accepting money or property in exchange for votes),
- 2) the use by electoral competitors of financial resources of illegal origin,
- 3) use of administrative resources for election purposes (use of public money (close to the elections) or official positions for lobby of political interests).

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<sup>168</sup> OSCE/ODIHR elections in Moldova, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova>

<sup>169</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/water-diplomacy/421/election-observation-missions-eucoms\\_en#Observation+missions](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/water-diplomacy/421/election-observation-missions-eucoms_en#Observation+missions)

<sup>170</sup> <http://website-pace.net/web/apce/election-observations>



The state needs to take a number of measures to prevent and fight these challenging situations by adopting appropriate legislation as a necessary precondition. At the same time, the state must ensure the investigation of these cases and the accountability of perpetrators and participants.

There is a fundamental difference between the incidents of electoral corruption and systematic electoral corruption. In the first case, that of incidents, they do not have a significant influence on the results of the elections. In case of systematic electoral corruption, adequate evidence and justification may jeopardize the results of the election. The assessment of legislation in this chapter shows compliance to some extent of the requirements.<sup>171</sup>

### 5.3 The rule of law

Some aspects are considered in this chapter:

- Prompt and fair hearing of complaints by the CEC,
- Prompt and impartial examination of cases by courts,
- Investigation and non-selective accountability of cases referred by the OUP

These monitoring reports retain the good capacity of CEC to manage complaints and appeals of electoral competitors, including the publication of final legal decisions on the CEC website.

The trust in courts is small, around 6-8%, comparable to the trust in political parties.

Confidence in **investigative authorities'** work is higher than that of courts, for example, police –is on the rise, as well as NACs and anti-corruption Prosecutors, but trust is less than 30%.

*Partial conclusions 5.3 (coercive factors):*

*5.1 The elections are free and partly correct. Deficiencies are not systematic to affect the outcome of the election.*

*5.2 The deficiencies that determine the partial correctness of the elections are similar and characteristic to the democracies in transition but also to the consolidated democracies<sup>172</sup>: i) the polarization of the media, the influence of the Russian propaganda, the concentration of the media<sup>173</sup>, ii) some deficiencies in the transparency of the political finances including the use of administrative resources, Increasing CEC in managing electoral processes, iii) quality of electoral lists, electoral circumscriptions / voting<sup>174</sup>.*

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<sup>171</sup> Art. 181, 181-1, 182 a CP, <http://lex.justice.md/md/347655/>, [http://www.gov.md/sites/default/files/document/attachments/intr05\\_80.pdf](http://www.gov.md/sites/default/files/document/attachments/intr05_80.pdf), art.47-53 from Contravention Code, art. 10 cu privire la statutul persoanelor cu funcții de demnitate publică, <http://lex.justice.md/md/336193/>

<sup>172</sup> Comparative analysis of the findings of the observation missions from the countries of Central, South-Eastern and Eastern European countries reflect similar situations.

<sup>173</sup> Analiza comparată a constatărilor Misiunilor de observare menționate atestă un progres semnificativ în R.Moldova la capitolul transparența finanțelor politice, consolidarea capacităților CEC dar insufențe în insularea resurselor administrative – situația comparabilă cu alegerile din europa cetrală.

<sup>174</sup> Comparative analysis of the findings of observation missions in the countries of central and central European countries reflect similar level of the situation

## 6. Analysis of policy options and electoral solutions

### 6.1 Intermediary conclusions

#### Role of electoral systems (1)

*Partial conclusions 1.1 (electoral system in wide context):*

- 1.1 *The electoral system should be chosen when it is clear what is **the objective of policies needing application**. The chosen electoral system does not produce the outcome directly; it creates conditions to gain the intended effect in time.*
- 1.2 *The concrete rules of the electoral system chosen should be **consistent with the chosen electoral system**, otherwise the accumulating drawbacks can annihilate the expected objective. **The contextual factors** have important effects over the functioning of the electoral system.*

*Partial conclusions 1.2 (objective electoral policies):*

- 1.3 *Selecting **the electoral system** is secondary to the object of determining the policy objective (accountability/responsibility, government stability, proportional representation, clear outcome, etc),*
- 1.4 *As a rule, 1-2 policy objectives are set (**primary and complementary**) given concrete situation and provisions and depending on them, later electoral system is chosen.*
- 1.5 *The concrete design of the electoral system depends on: a) contextual factors (coercive and non-coercive), b) capacity of implementing institutions, c) support and electoral tradition, etc.*

*Partial conclusions 1.2.1 (objective proportionality):*

- 1.6 *Insuring **the proportional representativity** is one of the objectives that may be achieved through **proportional vote (PR-list) or through majority electoral system (STV)**,*
- 1.7 *The design of the electoral system much depends on particular settings, which must be provided to be compatible with the chosen electoral system, otherwise the drawbacks of the chosen electoral system will appear, which produce adverse effects and impact hindering the achievement of the policy objective.*

*Partial conclusions 1.2.2 (objective accountability):*

- 1.8 *The electoral system alone cannot produce the achievement of the expected policy objective, the electoral rules contribute to the creation of the respective conditions. In Romania's case, the 2014 electoral system should have produced a clearer responsibility that it also has a significant majority component, probably the 2 governments within four years serve as a partial conclusion in backing this approach, but as Romania, in the 2016 elections, returned to the PR-list proportional system, it produced a clearer and more stable majority. Thus, the influence of contextual factors is proven.*

*Partial conclusions 1.2.3 (objective Government stability):*

*1.9 Modifying the electoral system is not a simple procedure, there are series of impediments of legal blocking, of implementation capacity or of political support.*

*Partial conclusions 1.2.5 (objective special groups representativity):*

*1.10 The proportional and majority systems can be adjusted to insure the representativity of special groups, and to insure the principle of gender equality.*

### **Here**

#### **Impact of the current electoral system (2)**

Partial conclusions 2.1 (Proportional representation):

**2.1 The blocked Party list representation system**, in conjunction with other context factors, has created a number of parties, **whereas 2-3 parties compete on the same program segment, ideological segment, but in essence the competition is reduced to the confrontation of groups of people** present on the lists of political parties, especially the first places.

2.2 The migration of groups of people from a political party of the same ideological category is being attested, as well as the grouping of electoral blocs from different categories, as well as the reproduction of **the presence in the political parties on very different ideological segments, even contradictory**, in the **proportion of 20-30%** (the top 20 positions) of the lists of parliamentary parties.

2.3 Comparing other studies on electoral campaign funding, we note the inadequate progress of internal democracies within the parties, with the 5% dependence on dominant groups over of the party's funding and party strategy, thus the PR-list electoral system has very little effect on consolidation of political parties in the sense of their democratization and presence.

#### **Concluzii parțiale 2.2 (sistem majoritar local, regional):**

- **Încrederea în competiții politice și în instituțiile publice este peste 50%. Candidații independenți în Adunarea Regională sunt cei mai electibili, asocierea cu partidele politice în procesul de alegeri este percepută ca dezavantaj, odată ce sunt aleși, membrii independenți se asociază în fracțiuni politice pentru ași maximaliza accesul la resursele financiare oferite din centru.**

Partial conclusions 2.3 (Trust in Political Parties):

**2.4 Confidence in political parties in very low (8%), as is confidence in the parliament and the operation of political parties. The key reasons are lack of accountability to the citizens and poor governance record of political parties manifested within coalition governments they have created.**

**2.5 In comparison, confidence in local authorities, especially mayors' office, is at least 3-4 times higher (30-35%). At least 30% of public persons at the top of the party list (the first 20 slots) move there from previous party lists.**

Partial conclusions 2.3 (Government Stability):

**2.6 Proportional party list system contributes to a high degree of fragmentation of political parties, and therefore of political coalitions is needed in support of governments. At their**

- highest level, fragmentation indices become a factor of political instability, not least because the party list electoral system facilitates this process, but also because of contextual factors.*
- 2.7 Government's longevity is very low, and interaction patterns between political parties are highly polarized and unstable.**
- 2.8 A high degree of polarization is explained by pronounced ideological differences, the competition between the centers of economic power through political infighting within these parties, while the lack of genuine accountability in relation to citizens opens the way for contradictory and belligerent positioning between different identity groups.**

### **Electoral systems: policy evidence (3)**

Partial conclusions 3.1 (electoral systems):

**3.1 The assertion that one electoral system is better or more appropriate than another is not based on scientific evidence and does not follow from the practice of other countries; therefore, this assertion is poorly informed and ungrounded.**

**3.2 Electoral systems can be classified from the perspective of their administration, for example party-list PR system, along with FPTP are the easiest to administer and two-round systems are the most difficult to administer.**

Partial conclusions 3.2 (Impact on Parties):

**3.3 The governing system, the way of choosing the president, the legal tradition of the country are the factors to be considered.**

Partial conclusions 3.3 (Institution Confidence, Elections):

**3.2 Proportional electoral systems (including STVs) and mixed ones reveal at least a 5-6% higher degree of participation in elections. The large number of parties within the governing coalition reduces the perception of efficiency and discourages citizen's participation in the voting process.**

**3.3 Preferential voting focused on candidates give the perception of a greater equity for the elections outcome to citizens.**

**3.4 The satisfaction and trust in democratic institutions and the functioning of democracy correlates with majority electoral systems, so the level of trust in democratic institutions resulting from proportionate representation systems is lower.**

Partial conclusions 3.4 (economic performance):

**3.5 The majority voting system tends to reduce taxation by 0.5% during the mandate (i.e. 1-3% of the country's public budget).**

**3.6 Differences of 3-5% of GDP in public spending in favor of governments elected on the basis of the proportional system on the grounds that they govern in larger coalitions.**

**3.7 Majority governments focus on implementing economic policies under more stable governments and deliver clearer economic growth.**

**3.8 Proportional representation governments are, as a rule, better in stimulating economic growth through higher infrastructure spending.**

**3.9 Stable governments (majority component) and a reasonable degree of representation (proportional representation component) produce better economic growth than pure electoral systems.**

**3.10 Elections on multi-constituency constituencies and proportional representation system stimulate broader voter support; contribute to the development of redistributive programs.**

**3.11** The higher **proportionality of the electoral system reduces the level of inequality** and reduces poverty. A **presidential ruling system coupled with the majority electoral system** has the capacity to contribute most to **increasing inequality**.

**3.12** Most systems tend to favor investors and employers, while proportionate representation - employees as a result of policy.

Partial conclusions 3.5 (Anti-Corruption):

**3.13** The change of the electoral system by itself can contribute to weakening of the corruption phenomenon, but it cannot reduce it.

**3.14** There is a strong link between lowering the threshold for accession and lowering the level of corruption and personalization (candidates rather than party lists) to political competition.

**3.15** The closed Party – List representation is associated with a higher level of corruption than the closed / open (flexible) Party list. A closed PR-list system combined with a presidential system is the most susceptible to corruption electoral system. The more proportional and indirect the representation is the higher the degree of corruption.

**3.16** The general rule set out above is valid only for low-size constituencies. Districts with large dimensions, i.e. around 15 and above provide a reverse dependence. Political corruption increases with open / flexible Party list. Thus, an open / flexible Party list representation is not recommended for constituencies with around 15 and more elected, it is only recommended for constituencies with less than 10 elected. The blocked Party list is not recommended in small districts (less than 10) because the irresponsibility is being cultivated.

**3.17** Collective responsibility is lower than individual responsibility in a majority system. The majority system and perception are decreasing more rapidly if the majority system is based on plurinomial multiple-member district system.

**3.18** The phenomenon of corruption is lower in countries using larger electoral districts (more voters / voters) and lower threshold for participation.

**3.19** The majority element in the mixed system implies clearer forms of monitoring the Government and proper control over corruption.

Partial conclusions 3.6 (social cleavages):

**3.20** In societies with many cleavages and differences, the lines of societal separation within the proportional representation electoral system stimulate the transfer of societal cleavages and fragmentation into legislative.

**3.21** Majority systems that emphasize the single transferable vote winner (STV) have the property of controlling extremes and polarizations.

**3.22** Generally, the proportionality and moderation of representations cannot be reconciled within an electoral system. A greater number of divisions of society disadvantage proportional representation systems because it cultivates excessive fragmentation and spread of polarization.

**3.23** The proportional representation system is a fair system as a result, but does not promote the moderation and leveling of societal cleavages.

**3.24** The STV or AV system, being the preferential majority systems, can have positive effects because it focuses on concrete people rather than parties and groups, thus preventing the rise of ethnic conflicts and the politicization of problems, especially in emerging democracies.

**Analysis of noncoercitive factors (4) and non-coercive factors (5)**

Partial conclusions 4.1 (parties, tactics):

**4.1 The competition between the parties is fierce, which was caused by the financial and banking crises and corruption,** thus the trust in the Government has suffered strongly. On the background of the crisis, two anti-system parties were formed, which in 2015 and 2016 managed to take advantage of people's dissatisfaction; their influence is decreasing, and their protesters were absorbed by the parties in the opposition (PSRM and PAS).

**4.2** All system and anti-system parties are **vulnerable to the attack on their leadership,** as the leader's fall may result in the party's fall within 9-12 months.

**4.3** In principle, **the interest of medium- and long-term system parties is doctrinal cooperation with the contiguous segments** for a stable government recreation. This is hampered by the difficult mutual relationships caused by the personalization of the hostile relations cultivated by the foreign and local polarizing press at the expense of the coalition possibilities based on ideological approximation and development priorities.

**4.4** In principle, doctrinal parties cannot absorb the streams of different ideological voters, although limited expansion is possible, **so cannibalization is only possible within the same doctrinal segment** (left, right and center). Mutual expansion in the sub segment of the voters from the adjoining ideological trends is only partial.

Partial conclusions 4.2 (geopolitical differences):

**4.5** The voting preferences are **diverted along the geopolitical preferences; division is the result of long polarization campaigns** that have deeply penetrated the society. Fragmentation and parliamentary extremism is complemented by parliamentary geopolitical divisions that add a further impediment to integration into society.

**4.6** Integrating voters into a geopolitical segment needs adequate integration into parliamentary elections. In local elections, the **integration performance of local leaders is shaped by local solutions.**

**4.7** The external influence context factor, the declared or undeclared strategic support is important in the functioning of electoral rules.

Partial conclusions 4.3 (Ethnic Differences):

**4.8** There is a close correlation between **ethnic vote and political parties opting for the Eurasian geopolitical orientation** in the parliamentary elections but also to a certain extent in the local elections, especially where the presence of **national minorities is higher than 60-70%.**

**4.9** There is a correlation **between 40-50% minority presence** and the voting pattern, which reveals a preference for **moderate centered parties according to the geopolitical classification. Promoting candidates integrating the bivalent presence of ethnic groups is essential.**

**4.10** The establishment of polling districts in local elections or eventually in elections in small regional constituencies can be achieved by: a) homogenizing the districts; or b) heterogenic districts. In situation a) we get the transfer of polarizing relations to the elective body, in situation b) promote the candidates **who prefer the center options and integrate the voters' options.**

Partial conclusions 4.4 (institutional stability):

**4.11 Strengthening the state is a legitimate objective** and must also be seen from the perspective of **adopting an appropriate electoral system to achieve this goal.** Promiscuous PR-list systems result in excessive fragmentation and instability of the Government, which **contributes to reducing the capacity to promote reforms.**

Partial conclusions 4.5 (Competition, challenges):

**4.12** Political parties in the Republic of Moldova are the expression of economic interests, access to resources is the object of competition, and some parties are the expression of interests and strongly engage with outside interests, **so the objectives of their policy are objectives of control of strategic areas.**

**4.13** Some of the parties do not state their prompt position with regard to major reforms in the strategic policy areas, reform and demonopolization of the energy sector, financial and banking sectors, justice, railroad transportation, etc., thus forcing on image positioning and speculation on topics without promoting solutions.

Partial conclusions 5 (coercive factors):

**5.1 The elections are free and partly correct.** Deficiencies are not systematic to affect the outcome of the election.

**5.2** The deficiencies that determine the partial fairness of the elections are similar and characteristic to the democracies in transition but also to the consolidated democracies: i) the polarization of the media, the influence of the Russian propaganda, the media concentration, ii) some issues in the transparency of the political finances, including the use of administrative resources, The increase of the CEC in the management of electoral processes, iii) the quality of electoral lists, electoral constituencies / voting.

## 6.2 Policy Purpose

Determining the policy objective is the main task. The policy objective will determine the electoral system best suited to contributing to its achievement. Only by itself, the electoral system will not achieve the goal of electoral politics.

Partial conclusions 2.1 and 2.2 demonstrate the understanding of the process of electoral policy development. The electoral policy and the objective of electoral politics are secondary to the policy objective of developing the democratic system. If the starting point is just the analysis of the electoral system, we come to the situation of a narrow understanding of the situation. Often, external advice is the result of this limited view of the situation and context of the policy and the objectives of electoral politics. Another partial approach is through the exclusive prism of the political interest in maximizing the electoral result, which is counterproductive for the interest of consolidating democratic institutions Finally, the purely legal approach reflects a tunnel vision on the concrete bill and overlooks the real impact assessment.

Intermediary conclusions 2.3-2.5 give the logic of designing an electoral system. Designing begins from the formulation of the policy objective, follows the understanding of the context of several options, largely prescribed by electoral systems, which can achieve this goal. The specific characteristics of the chosen electoral system must be adjusted to the specific situation in the society in terms of: i) the constituency (homogeneous-heterogeneous, the size, the number of voters, plurinomial or uninominal), ii) voting formulas (list or person), iv) the threshold for accession, etc. These specific can represent the chosen electoral system or be counterproductive to the genuine election system.

As demonstrated by the partial conclusions 3.1-3.8, the current PR-list system has multiple deficiencies that are not consistent with the purpose of the chosen electoral system and therefore have adverse effects on the policy objective. At the same time, the chosen electoral



system has a series of imperfections that mitigate the disadvantages of the electoral system. The current electoral system, due to inappropriate settings, in the absence of complementary policies to strengthen democracy and political parties has helped de-legitimize the institution of political party, has facilitated the transformation of political parties into protections for interest groups and entrepreneurs of «economic rent» under the rule of the political party. In the context of polarization in society, maintaining the current electoral system accentuates the shortcomings of democracy.

Partial conclusions 2.8-2.10 and 3.1-3.26 provide a strong set of policy records from other authorities that can serve as lessons learned, transferable policy records or recommendations for: i) clarifying the need to choose the policy objective, ii) selecting the option of appropriate electoral system, iii) the recommended setting of the particularities of the chosen electoral system. Specifically, the correlation of electoral systems with the phenomenon of corruption, economic performance, poverty level, etc. is determined. These conclusions are used in the context of the analysis of the available options and the formulation of the concrete settings in the proposed recommendations.

Partial conclusions 4.1-4.13 and 5.1-5.2 provide lessons from the context of party functioning.

**Basically, there is only one challenge, namely the choice of the policy objective:**

- 1) Achieving the objective of proportionate representation of all social segments - a policy that has been in place for the past 25 years, or**
- 2) Achieving the accountability objective of elected and Government in front of voters, or**
- 3) The sustainability / stability of the Government.**

Below are some policy objectives.

**1. (Proportional Representation Objective)** In order to achieve a more adequate, qualitative and consistent proportionate representation of the proportional electoral system, the closed PR list must be substantially changed. First of all, the issue with the opening of the party list can be examined, but conclusion 3.18 demonstrates the unwillingness of open lists for large constituencies (over 15 - in a single national constituency this is contradicted). Ensuring democratic character is better achieved through genuine domestic inter-party democracy (e.g. primaries, active internal democracy).

Next, the proven imperfections must be eliminated, namely, the list should be opened in the context of the use of regional jurisdictions (which will coincide with the borders of other counties with the size of the constituency of up to 10-12 elected). Also, the deficiencies of the system that accumulate disproportionalities, namely lowering the accession threshold to 1-2%, should be eliminated. Only in this case will the representative system be true to its objectives.

*Table 6.1 Improvement of the present system*

Actual (din 1994)	Suggestions for improvement (PR-list +)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Closed PR-list,</li> <li>- accession 6%,</li> <li>- The only national constituency.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Closed PR-list ,the only constituency ,</li> <li>- accession 1%,</li> </ul>

	alternative  - 9-10 electoral districts (with around 10-12 elected from each district) which correspond to regional structure.
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It is obvious that this system will provide access to at least 7-8 parties, in fact possibly up to 10 parties, which will fragment the parliament. Ensuring a stable majority will be difficult; it will be possible to form a government only with the participation of a coalition of 4-5 parties, in which the small parties will hold the veto.

There are a number of major challenges that will aggravate the adverse effects already discussed: the economic and social situation, the domination of economic groups, polarization in society, the personalization of politics, the lack of culture of competition within the political parties.

Of course, there is another proportional representation model, the discussed Irish model. It uses the majority STV system logic to achieve the proportional objective. It is not examined because of the lack of tradition of using it.

**2.(The accountability of elected objective)** In order to achieve the accountability / individual responsibility of the elected and collective government, the uninominal system (SMD) must be introduced with the election of the deputies by the qualified majority of votes in each constituency. This system is contained in the DP proposal through PFPT in 101 constituencies.

*Table 6.2 Improvements to the system proposed by DP*

<b>DP proposed</b>	<b>Improvement +</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PFPT (relative majority),</li> <li>- 101 constituencies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PFPT (majority in case of at least 30% of electorate participation),</li> <li>- 76 electoral districts,</li> <li>- + 25 seats reserved for redistribution according to the percentage of winning parties (not less than 5%) or vote on party lists with the provision of gender equality index</li> </ul>

This improved proposal is highly dependent on the strategy, territorial delineation of constituencies. If one chooses the solution of homogeneous constituencies, there is the danger of a parliament formed more from representatives of ethnic groups, but rather diverse to facilitate the co-operation of the majority of the government. The legislation will incorporate the cleavages and differences in society. If the choice of heterogeneous constituencies is selected, most likely, in mixed regions, minorities will not be represented because they will gain the representation of the relative majority, or in the case of the best moderate representatives, with the exception of very polarized regions where ideological factors will be dominant. In the best case scenario, the majority component will produce a clearer majority.

The proportional component will complement the government's support with a coalition already created. The role of the parties could be to make the majority clearer for the Government.

**3. (Government Stability Objective)** In order to achieve the Government's sustainability / stability goal, the uninominal system must be introduced with the election of the deputies, if necessary in two rounds with the absolute majority in each constituency.

Table 6.3 Electoral system until 1994

Prior to 1994	Improvement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- SMD TRS (absolute majority 50%+1),</li> <li>- 101 constituencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- SMD absolute majority 50%+1 from participants</li> <li>- 76 heterogeneous constituencies,</li> <li>- 25 seats reserved for redistribution after the percentage of winning parties (not less than 5%) for sensitive groups,</li> <li>- Or the vote on party lists with ensuring of quotas for sensitive groups</li> </ul>

This system creates clear stability, if the constituencies are heterogeneous and avoid ethnic, geopolitical polarization. In most cases, however, there will be the necessary vote in round 2, which will polarize the voters on the ideological / geopolitical axis. Under the conditions of geopolitical division, the system will not necessarily produce a stable government, but may have a greater legitimacy than the previous one chosen with the PFPT. Geopolitical division could shake the majority of the political force.

**4. (Political accountability and rational priorities objective)** A mixed compensatory electoral system is recommended for rationalizing policies and ensuring pragmatic solutions. In best case scenario, excluding previously discussed contextual factors, these would be the three electoral systems that need to be discussed in a contradictory way and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of implementation. The PSRP proposal targets a parallel system (formerly the Venice Commission and the ODIHR / OSCE partially had a critical view), we propose the change in a mixed offset system, i.e. the improved formula:

Table 6.4 Compensating mixt system

PSRM proposal (mixt parallel)	Improvement (mixt compensator majority +)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PFPT (relative majority) in 51 constituencies,</li> <li>- 50% on closed PR-list blocked on national consistency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PFPT (relative majority in conditions of at least 25-30% of participants) in 51 constituencies,</li> <li>- 50% on the PR list blocked on the national constituency (if it accrues 5% of the majority component or 3-5 deputies on the majority constituencies),</li> <li>- Ensuring quotas for sensitive groups on party lists</li> </ul>

This system has advanced chances to propel a clearer government supported by the legitimacy offered by direct elected representatives on relatively representative constituencies of at least 50-60 thousand, which would coincide with moderate rayon or a

few districts. The majority elected will have the interest of government formation and co-optation in government, so coalitions with parties with better presence will be formed.

The parties will be interested in finding regional candidates that will promote the legitimacy and responsibility of the outcome. Parties will be legitimized by regional interests and viable party structures in the territory. The government will have real support, but some systemic changes may be difficult because some majorities may exercise the right to veto.

### 6.3 Simulation of Electoral results

Modeling of electoral scores based on the assumptions of the polls in Annex 1 with the formation of electoral constituencies according to the geographical criterion and the territorial organization




The modeling of the results of 5 electoral systems was based on the initial data and trends established on the basis of the local election results of 2015 and the electoral surveys by identifying the trends. The primary data is presented in the Appendix. These dates may change if voting preferences change.

In the following chart we offer 5 different simulations based on election systems based on electoral trends (Annex):

- 1) 1 = PR-list, current electoral system,
- 2) 2 = TRS, the absolute uninominal absolute in 2 rounds (101 constituencies),
- 3) 3 = parallel mix, MMM (similar to the one proposed in the merged project),
- 4) 4 = MMD in 30 plurinominal constituencies, 3-dimensional (the first 3 elected),
- 5) 5 = MMD in 12 constituencies based on 12 party lists.

The data is presented below in graph.



There may be some common features that offer some electoral advantages to parties if there is a proportional PR-list component on the national or mixed constituency, such as PSRM and PAS. Electoral systems on regional candidates and constituencies are advantageous for electoral parties such as PDM, PL and PN. In general, 3 parties dominate the election result in any configuration: PSRM, PAS and PDM. Small parties such as PPEM, PCR and PL are advantaged when there is competition between candidates or smaller-regional constituencies. The number of parties that qualify in parliament is basically the same -7 in all electoral systems.

PR-list electoral systems are more advantageous for left-wing parties (PSRM, PN, and PCR), namely PR list on the national constituency (option 1) and PR list on 12 constituencies (option 5), and otherwise the other options are beneficial to the right, center and pro-European parties (PAS, PDM, PL and PPEM).

In reality these simulations depend very much on the outline of electoral constituencies, the size of the constituency and the number of voters in each district.

## 6.4 Evaluation criteria

Partial conclusions 2.3-2.5 set out the principle approach that justifies a preference recommendation for a solution or other after the ex-ante evaluation, on the basis of rational criteria, of the impact produced by these electoral solutions. Below we present the criteria selected for the further analysis:

In our opinion, the main criteria for the necessary evaluation to which the electoral system will contribute:

- Economic growth and strengthening the investment climate,
- Ensure a clear majority of the Government to promote reforms,
- Combating corruption in politics,
- Promoting citizens' trust in the institution of democratic elections and institutions, including political parties,
- Reducing radicalism and polarization in society.

The evaluation of the impact of the electoral solutions according to the ex-ante evaluation methodology of the public policy is based on the evaluation criteria, as they relate to the planned qualitative and quantitative impact.

From the very beginning it will be determined which policy objective is a priority for the Republic of Moldova. This decision has to be taken on the basis of the lessons learned and impact of the blocked PR proportional system since 1994. The ex-post analysis of the current system will take into account the legal consistency of the current system, the objective pursued by this electoral system, the contextual challenges for this system, and finally the positive transferable practices. The Republic of Moldova, after 25 years, has to decide in favor of one of the primary legitimate objectives, which all fit into the European democratic tradition:

- 1) Proportional representation in the legislative, or
- 2) Ensuring stable government, capable of action, or
- 3) Ensuring the individual accountability of the elected, voted political group, or
- 4) Ensuring a clear political majority in the legislative.

Some complementary objectives need to be included, through specific and concrete settings, into the defined electoral solution:

- D) *Diminishing the effect of political corruption,*
- E) *Gender equality, minority equity,*
- F) *Fostering trust in public institutions.*

The final policy solution will promote a key objective and ensure compliance with the complementary objectives (a), (b) (c)).

A. If the Republic of Moldova chooses, as a policy objective, following its 25 years of experience, **to ensure proportional representativeness**, then the current PR-list electoral system requires a substantial change. The current system, with existing rules, has generated significant distortions in the political structure, the functioning of democratic institutions. The electoral system recommended for this purpose is: blocked PR lists on the national constituency, with a 1% decrease of the threshold for accession to the parliament, allowing the creation of political parties without the requirement to represent at least 50% of the level II local authorities. **The decision-maker must be aware of the predictable effects of the implementation of the proportional electoral system: further radicalization of the political class, further fragmentation of parties, persistence of Parliament instability and frequent government investment through unstable Coalition.** The result of these effects is discussed in detail in this study.

The option of a flexible PR-list on the national constituency is likely to increase the phenomenon of political corruption. Another blocked PR-list in 10-12 jurisdictions with constituency size (number of elected members) of 3-4 does not ensure adequate proportional representation (therefore, it is no longer representative or proportional), while the setting of complementary objectives becomes problematic.

B. If the Republic of Moldova chooses **to ensure the accountability of elected members**, then the electoral system needs to be substantially reformed. The most appropriate system would be the PFPT (majority) in 75 constituencies with a minimum threshold of 35% or in round 2 with the majority of votes, with 26 seats elected from the diaspora, minority groups, gender equality either on party lists or as individual candidates. The decision-maker must be aware of the negative effects of implementing this electoral system: the regional myopia and the priorities of the elected officials over the national priorities, the fragmentation of the government's support by focusing on short-term projects, the behavior of the elected representatives in the interest of co-participation in accrual of political rent.

An alternative to elections in 101 constituencies of which up to 10 seats will be reserved for the Diaspora is viable, but it does not differ from our proposal but has fewer representatives of gender equality and minorities. Another alternative of choice in 101 constituencies with the absolute majority voting, and where appropriate, the organization of the tour 2 gives a good individual responsibility, but it can have similar PR-list fragmentation effects with the very low threshold. Another alternative of organizing 30-35 plurinominal constituencies with the size of the constituency (number of elected constituencies) of 3-4 elected (the first 3-4 ranked with or without the accession threshold) is a system that combines the proportionality and individual accountability of the elected, But with a very high degree of fragmentation and radicalization of parties.

An alternative to this system is the PR-list blocked in 10-12 jurisdictions with the size of the constituency (number of electors) of 3-4 already discussed above.

C. If the Republic of Moldova chooses to **ensure the stable government and political representativeness**, then, in realistic terms, two electoral systems are possible: a variation of the majority system either FPTP or SMD (50% + 1 in 2 rounds) in the average constituencies or the system of closed Proportional PR list with the 1% accession threshold, with left-wing parties winning nearly 50% of the electoral margin (fragmented right-wing parties). In the latter case, the decision-maker must be aware of the negative effects of the electoral system: The left-wing government, in the face of geopolitical vulnerabilities, produces stagnation of market economy reforms and democracy, and as for the first solution, it is difficult to reach complimentary discussed objectives.



	<b>Option 1.</b> Objectives of the Electoral System for the Republic of Moldova. Resource Center for Human Rights (CeReDO) <b>actual (after 1994) +</b>	<b>Option 2.</b> <b>unimodal +</b>	<b>Option 3.</b> <b>variation (until 1994) +</b>	<b>Option 4.</b> <b>majority mixt compensator (MMcM)<sup>175</sup></b>	<b>Option 5.</b> <b>proportional mixt compensator (MMcP)</b>
<b>Evaluation criteria</b>	closed PR, - 1% accreditation,  The only or 9-10 strictures that coincide with the county / regional structure	-PFPT (majority formed of at least 35% of participants),  -76 electoral districts, preferably  + 25 reserved places for distribution based on % of winning (not less than 5%).  Or vote on party list basis ensuring the quotas	-SMD (absolute majority, 50% + 1 of participants), -76 heterogeneous electoral strictures,  + 25 seats reserved for redistribution according to the percentage of winning parties (not less than 5%) for sensitive groups	- PFPT (the relative majority of at least 30% of participants) in 51 constituencies,  -50% on PR-locked on national constituency by majority (if it accrues 5%),  Ensuring quotas for sensitive groups.	PFPT (the relative majority of at least 30% of participants) in 51 constituencies,  -50% on PR-locked on national constituency by majority (if it accrues 5%),  Ensuring quotas for sensitive groups.
<b>1. Economic growth</b>	reforms difficult because the right to veto of small parties	+++  <b>It is the clearest majority that can undertake reforms</b>	+  Advancing the reforms in case of the same vision	++  <b>It is the clearest majority that can undertake reforms</b>	++  <b>It is the clearest majority that can undertake reforms</b>
<b>2. Ensuring clear</b>	--  A large coalition of 3-4 parties, lack of political culture is dangerous (except left wing Government)	++  <b>Ensure a clear majority, incorporate regional elites</b>	++  <b>Ensure a clear majority, incorporate regional elites</b>	++  <b>Ensure a clear majority, incorporate regional elites</b>	++  <b>Ensure a clear majority, incorporate regional elites</b>
<b>3. Fight with corruption</b>	--  Closed PR-list with high threshold is the most corruptible system,  There is a danger of influence on public institutions within the Governmental Arch,  Institutions are still weak  Dependency of small groups of interests without appeal to members of the party	-  The lack of dominance of interest centers on candidates in very small districts,  Behavior of regional elites: a) either rent-seeking / incorporation, b) either alignment with the central government, or c) influence centers	+  <b>The negligence of domination, but the greater legitimacy of the elected.</b>  <b>Behavior of regional elites: a) either rent-seeking / incorporation, b) alignment with the central government, or c) influencing influence centers</b>	+  <b>Possible faults in small constituencies</b>  <b>Behavior of regional elites: a) either rent-seeking / incorporation, b) alignment with the central government, or c) influencing influence centers</b>	+  <b>Possible faults in small constituencies</b>  <b>Behavior of regional elites: a) either rent-seeking / incorporation, b) whether alignment with the central government, or c) influencing influence centers</b>

<b>4. Promoting citizens trust</b>	- Does not contribute, just a leader or narrow circle of the party	+ partial	++ <b>Good because elected by majority of votes</b>	+ <b>can provide greater confidence if policies are effective</b>	+ <b>can provide greater confidence if policies are effective</b>
<b>5. Reduce extremism and polarization</b>	-- It does not contribute, it emphasizes differences and polarizations, ideological identities	++ fewer militant positions in parliament (if the constituencies are not homogenized)	+ It can reduce militant positioning (avoiding homogenization of constituencies)	++ <b>fewer radical militant positions in parliament (avoiding the homogenization of constituencies)</b>	++ <b>fewer radical militant positions in parliament (avoiding the homogenization of constituencies)</b>
<b>6. Capacity and cost of implementation</b>	++ <b>Implementation is simple</b>	- Implementation is more difficult	- Implementation is more difficult (2 rounds)	+ <b>It's simple to implement (single bulletin)</b>	+ <b>It's simple to implement (single bulletin)</b>

*Legend: + exposes the positive correlation, - exposes the negative correlation*

## 6.5 Comparative Analysis

In this section we make it easy to retain the conclusions and findings of this report by systematically comparing 3 governance options

The following conclusions follow:

- 6.1 Economic growth is better supported by stable Governments under Option 2 (PFPT) and Option 4 (Major Compensatory Mix)
- 6.2 The clearer majority is more clearly supported by all options except for option 1 (current), with the exception of the left-wing government (see chapter 4) that is not a reformer in the sense of DCFTA / AA thus contradicting point 6.1,
- 6.3 Ensuring the reduction and prevention of the corruption phenomenon is better achieved in options 3 and 4 (compensatory mixed). Under the conditions explained in section 2.1 (interest groups populate the parties), the findings in sections 2.2-2.3 show that all electoral systems are susceptible to corruptive influences. In the case of the majority component, the behavior of regional elites may outdo alignment with the executive center or economic influxes to maximize financial interests and electoral interests - an exponential phenomenon, but may have rent-seeking behavior or even dependence on influence centers. In systems based on party lists this behavior is present to the same extent.

<sup>175</sup> Sistemul electoral al Germaniei din 1949, p.55 [Eds M.S.Shugart, M.P.Wattenberg, Mixed Member Electoral Sysytes: The Best of Both Works?, Oxford, 2009.](#)

- 6.4 Promoting citizens' trust is better achieved in options 3 and 4 (compensatory mixt) for clear reasons of direct relationship with the elected.
- 6.5 The decrease of polarization and confrontations in society is achieved under Option 2 (PFPT) and Option 4 (Compensatory Mix). This can only be done if the constituencies are set heterogeneously. Party lists cultivate positioning and confrontation. This is demonstrated by the sections in Chapter 4.
- 6.6 Implementation costs are lowest for option 1 and option 4 because it is clear and takes place in one round.
- 6.7 Special considerations are better achieved in option 1 and then in option 4.

**As a result, cumulatively, under the conditions of the Republic of Moldova, option 4 is the most reasonably appropriate of the discussed ones.**

### 6.6 Summary analysis of the merged draft law

After the report was finalized, the draft bill on mixed system passed in Parliament in the first reading became known. It is analyzed by applying the entire toolkit in this study.

The bill No. 123 adopted in the first reading proposes the following electoral solution:

1. Voting on the majority constituencies, 50 PFPTs with majority vote without the validation threshold (the constituencies will be established by the CEC 6 months before the elections, the eastern rayon will be included, the differences between the geographic and demographic criteria may be up to to 15%, criteria for homogeneity or heterogeneity are not stipulated, voting at legal residence)

2. Vote on party lists, 51 deputies, 6% electoral threshold (ensuring gender equality, vote at the legal residence)

The voted project is a classic MMM system, i.e. a mixed parallel electoral system, where each component produces separate effects. In this section we will analyze this draft law by understanding what policy objective it has, what effects it can produce, and compare it to other variations of mixed electoral systems - MMCM and MMCP (MMP). The fundamental difference between MMM and MMP (MMcP) is that the list of deputies based on PR-list depends on the number of deputies on the majority component and the electoral score depending on the percentage accumulated on the PR-list component.

*Table 6.7 Comparative analysis of mixed systems*

	MMM	MMcM	MMcP (MMP)
The link between the majority and the proportional component	Lack parallel	The majority vote determines the proportional component	Voting on lists determines the majority seats

Favoring parties	Separate performance on major candidates and political parties	It favors competitors with good majority (good regional representatives), so the number of deputies on the party list depends on the majority accumulated percentage	It favors competitors with good performance on electoral lists (large parties), so the number of deputies on the list is added to the number of deputies on electoral districts.
Accessibility for voters	There are two ballots: on the uninominal constituency and on the PR list	There is only one bulletin on uninominal constituencies, so the number of deputies on the list depends on the cumulative performance on the uninominal constituencies	There are two ballots: on the uninominal constituency and on the PR list
Example	Armenia, Georgia, Japan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Russia, Ukraine, Thailand, Mongolia	Germany (1949-1953)	Bolivia, Germany, New Zealand, Venezuela, Hungary, Romania, (2012), Italy (2015)

The correlation of the results of the mixed electoral systems discussed is shown in the table below. Essentially the electoral differences are not very high, the differences are in those electoral mechanisms that discipline and form some desirable specific behaviors. The MMP system or MMCM establishes a better correlation between the individual responsibility of elected officials on the majority component with the political parties, whereas the MMM rather have two very different results, still cultivates a rather high degree of fragmentation.


Table 6.8 Hypothetical simulation of election results in MMM, MMCP, MMcM

	party A	party B	party C	party D	Party E	
Distribution votes						
v, %votes on PR-list	42%	28%	18%	7%	5%	100%
n, PFPT won (out of 50)	17	17	12	3	1	50
m, % majority won(n/50)	34%	34%	24%	6%	2%	100%
<b>A. Mixed parallel MMM system, vote on lists and constituencies</b>						
l, deputies PR-list (l=v*51)	21	14	9	4	3	51
n, PFPT won (out of 50)	17	17	12	3	1	50
<b>s, total deputies (n+l)</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>101</b>
% deputies, s/100	38%	31%	21%	7%	4%	101%
<b>B. MMcP Proportional Mixed Compensation System, vote on lists and constituencies</b>						
S1, expected PR-list (v * 101)						
	<b>42</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>101</b>
n, PFPT won (out of 50)	17	17	12	3	1	50
l1, deputies in parliament on lists=s1-n	25	11	6	4	4	51
% seats, s1/100	42%	28%	18%	7%	5%	101%

C. MMcM, vote in constituencies						
n2, PFPT won	17	17	12	3	1	50
%, seats	34%	34%	24%	6%	2%	100%
l2, compensated lists	17	17	12	3	1	51
<b>total deputies MMcM</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	101
MMM	38	31	21	7	4	101
MMcP (MMP)	42	28	18	7	5	101
MMcM	34	34	24	6	2	101

It is obvious that MMcM favors the parties with the better incorporation of regional elites, the results on the majority component. MMP accentuates the party's goodwill with good performance on lists of parties, but also builds a good link between the majority and the proportional component. The MMM system as the electoral outcome is the closest to the MMP, but rather creates an unlinked framework.

Chart 6.9 Simulation of electoral results in MMM, MMcP, MMcM without the accession threshold and the 6% accession threshold (right graph)



Of these, 3 variations of the mixed system, we recommend using the MMcM system that is the easiest and more accountable for change, the incorporation and culture of regional elites and stable government.

### 6.7 Recommendations

In the author's view, **the policy objective, under the current challenges, must ensure the stable, sustainable government in implementing reforms and the party's compensatory**

**representativeness.** As a complementary objective, the conditions for compensating for the loss of gender and minorities can be achieved. The electoral system should prevent the division of society (geopolitical, linguistic, and ethnic), foster the trust of the institution of choice and of public institutions, adequate management of the risks of political corruption - all through the concrete settings of the electoral system.

The justification for this policy objective results from a series of findings in this report. Section 4.5 present the main challenges that a society in transition to market economy is facing; building a demonopolized economy, dominance of the main industries. These challenges require a firm approach through an unwavering, result-oriented government and at the same time a pro-European reformist based on DCFTA/AA implementation. Section 2.4 demonstrates the instability of governments, in particular, after 2009, which had a total of productive periods of no more than 2-3 years out of a total of 8 years of governance; during the periods of political instability there is evidence of reforms holdup.

Regarding the key reforms in the mentioned areas, the reforms have not made any progress: the 3<sup>rd</sup> energy package ratified in 2012 was suspended until 2020, the financial and banking sector was the victim of the external attack and became the trigger of the economic crisis, and the reforms in the key fields were partial. It is obvious that the partial implementation of reforms without tangible results legitimizes the process of democratization in the Republic of Moldova.

**The proposed objective is associated with several solutions of electoral systems. To achieve a stable government, a majority component of the system is needed as a primary element that will favor the most popular politician in the constituency. In order to consolidate democracy based on responsible political parties, the majority component should be linked to proportionate component, which will also have the role of ensuring political presence.**

In order to reduce the influence of coercive factors, the constituencies should be set on the heterogeneous principle (to combat radicalism), on the other hand they are representative of the large population and region (from the perspective of regional development but also to minimize the domination of regional myopia, probably 40 thousand). The winner should have accumulated at least 30% of the participating voters to ensure the necessary legitimacy. The two components of the electoral system will be a proportionally representative party that redistributes the remaining seats if at least 5% of the elected majority is provided, provided that the list includes gender, minority.

The recommended system is similar to the mixt majority system (MMcM):

- **Majority component: a) PFPT (51 constituencies, 30%), or b) MMD (17 constituencies, 3 each, at least 10% winners)**
- **Proportional component: blocked PR list (50 elected based on earned percentages on the majority component with redistribution for parties that reached 5-6% of voters or 5 elected majorities), gender equality requirements, and minorities on party lists.**

This proposed system is simple to administer, cultivates the responsibility of regional elected representatives and the responsibility of political parties, forms moderate relations and good opportunities for a steadfast government in the case of heterogeneous circumstances. The party list component will ensure national interests.

From the perspective of the electoral system evolution, the proposed system can be upgraded to classic MM(c)P in 1-2 election cycles.

### 3 Annexes

Annexes show charts on citizens' voting options

Table 7.1 Electoral tendencies






Table 7.2 The result of local elections 2015

locale 2015nr of votes per region	PL	PLDM, PAS, PDA	PPEM	PDM	PCRM	PSRM	PN
Anenii Noi	3,013	<b>7,935</b>	2,280	<b>5,990</b>	4,500	4,418	2,860
Basarabasca	157	<b>1,994</b>	55	1,615	691	<b>2,039</b>	1,960
Briceni	918	5,077	0	<b>7,133</b>	2,855	<b>7,641</b>	4,770
Cahul	3,366	<b>10,021</b>	5,465	<b>7,967</b>	5,115	5,519	5,249
Calarasi	3,107	<b>7,416</b>	3,024	<b>6,641</b>	1,857	2,866	0
Cantemir	2,152	<b>6,431</b>	1,848	<b>5,249</b>	2,825	1,946	0
Causeni	2,107	<b>9,206</b>	2,596	<b>6,358</b>	5,458	3,624	0
Cimislia	1,217	3,860	<b>5,683</b>	<b>4,163</b>	2,292	2,152	1,267
Criuleni	4,630	<b>11,052</b>	2,186	<b>5,648</b>	4,852	1,899	865
Donduseni	866	<b>3,751</b>	0	<b>4,601</b>	3,013	3,326	3,275
Drochia	1,290	4,844	1,584	<b>6,019</b>	4,415	5,485	<b>7,873</b>
Dubasari	482	1,872	691	<b>2,097</b>	<b>5,389</b>	1,608	524
Edineti	1,202	<b>6,791</b>	0	<b>8,814</b>	3,557	5,292	6,042
Falesti	1,991	5,354	1,027	<b>6,026</b>	4,098	6,414	<b>10,207</b>
Floresti	1,557	<b>8,160</b>	1,506	<b>7,524</b>	7,323	4,557	4,298
Glodeni	1,374	3,803	909	<b>7,547</b>	2,198	3,518	<b>4,894</b>
Hincesti	3,626	<b>15,071</b>	3,263	<b>11,215</b>	3,855	3,927	1,495
Ialoveni	5,681	<b>13,745</b>	3,924	<b>10,869</b>	3,025	1,474	1,203
Leova	1,405	<b>5,450</b>	996	<b>6,946</b>	2,192	1,728	1,296
Nisporeni	3,211	<b>6,021</b>	1,758	<b>9,806</b>	1,688	1,260	0
Ocnita	281	3,272	525	3,619	<b>5,241</b>	<b>5,987</b>	3,680
Orhei	7,558	<b>12,204</b>	4,041	<b>12,472</b>	3,101	4,703	2,873
Rezina	2,225	<b>4,378</b>	515	<b>7,839</b>	2,828	1,981	721
Riscani	977	<b>6,697</b>	469	5,811	1,991	5,036	<b>6,008</b>
Singerei	1,475	<b>7,515</b>	2,877	<b>7,686</b>	4,424	4,587	3,446
Soldanesti	1,417	<b>4,540</b>	1,146	<b>6,047</b>	1,992	1,626	0
Soroca	1,944	<b>9,354</b>	0	6,029	4,215	<b>6,564</b>	0
Stefan Voda	1,180	<b>7,448</b>	1,782	<b>7,807</b>	3,543	3,740	1,433
Straseni	6,670	<b>7,504</b>	5,068	<b>8,920</b>	3,902	2,317	1,178
Taraclia	0	803	0	1,754	<b>3,094</b>	<b>4,637</b>	3,157
Telenesti	4,240	<b>11,042</b>	1,649	<b>8,042</b>	1,704	872	781
Ungheni	3,857	<b>10,389</b>	1,658	<b>8,185</b>	5,560	4,896	3,130
Balti	1,244	1,889	2,407	2,013	<b>4,565</b>	2,993	<b>32,540</b>
Chisinau	<b>85,693</b>	10,487	33,511	7,941	14,901	<b>91,983</b>	18,358
Gagauzia	74	1,173	0	3,896	<b>10,493</b>	<b>17,853</b>	0
<b>total</b>	<b>162,113</b>	<b>236,549</b>	<b>94,443</b>	<b>230,289</b>	<b>142,752</b>	<b>230,468</b>	<b>135,383</b>
<b>Rezultatul PFPT</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>

Legendă: cu șrift accentuat sunt cîte 2 partide cu cele mai bune șanse

Table 7.3 Local and parliamentary election results in 2010-2015

2010-15 media, nr de voturi pe regiune	PL	PLDM, PAS, PDA	PPEM	PDM	PCRM	PSRM	PN
Anenii Noi	3,429	<b>9,891</b>	2,280	5,233	<b>11,221</b>	5,443	2,860
Basarabasca	262	2,200	55	1,712	<b>3,282</b>	2,793	1,960
Briceni	1,310	6,293	0	6,574	<b>9,397</b>	8,384	4,770
Cahul	4,347	<b>13,706</b>	5,465	7,780	<b>13,216</b>	5,902	5,249
Calarasi	4,200	<b>9,654</b>	3,024	<b>5,830</b>	5,355	3,097	0
Cantemir	2,556	<b>7,582</b>	1,848	4,034	<b>6,258</b>	1,622	0
Causeni	2,151	<b>9,009</b>	2,596	5,861	<b>10,482</b>	4,137	0
Cimislia	1,800	<b>7,905</b>	5,683	4,175	<b>6,053</b>	2,207	1,267
Criuleni	4,382	<b>11,464</b>	2,186	6,133	<b>7,814</b>	1,976	865
Donduseni	951	3,780	0	3,407	<b>7,028</b>	4,329	3,275
Drochia	1,564	7,970	1,584	5,994	<b>11,347</b>	<b>8,219</b>	7,873
Dubasari	664	<b>2,382</b>	691	1,897	<b>7,428</b>	1,665	524
Edineti	1,422	5,833	0	<b>8,393</b>	<b>12,031</b>	7,249	6,042
Falesti	1,775	7,677	1,027	6,377	<b>11,178</b>	9,670	<b>10,207</b>
Floresti	1,937	<b>8,814</b>	1,506	7,765	<b>13,386</b>	5,657	4,298
Glodeni	1,403	5,194	909	<b>5,600</b>	<b>6,726</b>	4,822	4,894
Hincesti	3,972	<b>19,277</b>	3,263	<b>9,643</b>	8,026	4,221	1,495
Ialoveni	7,142	<b>16,656</b>	3,924	<b>8,256</b>	7,463	1,882	1,203
Leova	1,397	<b>5,663</b>	996	<b>5,674</b>	5,334	1,934	1,296
Nisporeni	3,401	<b>7,729</b>	1,758	<b>9,064</b>	3,494	1,144	0
Ocnita	583	3,530	525	3,758	<b>10,049</b>	<b>6,415</b>	3,680
Orhei	7,096	<b>16,404</b>	4,041	<b>12,097</b>	8,608	4,895	2,873
Rezina	1,880	<b>5,958</b>	515	5,382	<b>6,001</b>	2,192	721
Riscani	1,497	6,185	469	4,716	<b>8,239</b>	<b>7,646</b>	6,008
Singerei	1,963	<b>7,763</b>	2,877	<b>6,426</b>	<b>9,502</b>	5,697	3,446
Soldanesti	1,500	<b>5,390</b>	1,146	4,230	<b>5,210</b>	1,727	0
Soroca	2,551	<b>9,416</b>	0	6,420	<b>12,374</b>	7,464	0
Stefan Voda	2,237	<b>8,622</b>	1,782	5,796	<b>7,229</b>	3,748	1,433
Straseni	6,425	<b>12,923</b>	5,068	6,942	<b>7,967</b>	2,383	1,178
Taraclia	78	1,222	0	1,903	<b>7,552</b>	5,714	3,157
Telenesti	2,755	<b>12,520</b>	1,649	<b>7,151</b>	4,603	1,305	781
Ungheni	3,777	<b>11,845</b>	1,658	7,657	<b>13,699</b>	6,983	3,130
Balti	2,557	6,911	2,407	4,813	<b>19,460</b>	13,805	<b>32,540</b>
Chisinau	<b>91,839</b>	86,067	33,511	26,195	<b>101,100</b>	96,091	18,358
Gagauzia	74	1,173	0	3,896	<b>10,493</b>	<b>17,853</b>	0
total	<b>176,872</b>	<b>364,603</b>	<b>94,443</b>	<b>226,780</b>	<b>398,600</b>	<b>270,264</b>	<b>135,383</b>

Legendă: cu șrift accentuat sunt cîte 2 partide cu cele mai bune șanse

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