



Confidential, not for public distribution

# **EVALUATION OF LINGUISTIC EDUCATION POLICY OPTIONS FOR BULGARIANS AND UKRAINIANS IN MOLDOVA**

Resource Center for Human Rights  
Centrul de Resurse pentru Drepturile Omului (CReDO)  
Al. Hajdeu 95 "A", CHISINAU, MD 2005, Moldova  
(373 22) 212 816, fax (373 22) 225 257  
[CReDO@CReDO.md](mailto:CReDO@CReDO.md), [www.CReDO.md](http://www.CReDO.md)

### About CReDO

CReDO is a democracy and human rights nongovernmental organization that provides lobby and consultancy in the implementation of the democratic reform oriented policies. It provides knowledge and solutions in the framework of policy evaluation and assessment, policy management and implementation, developing relevant policy capacities needed to govern efficiently and effectively.

CReDO consultants provide:

- Lobby and advocacy of policies,
- Cost-benefit analysis,
- Analysis of current policies,
- Analysis of public policy processes,
- Budgetary analysis,
- Institutional Analysis,
- Legislative analysis, regulatory impact analysis,
- Functional Analysis.

Among CReDO beneficiaries are international institutions, Moldovan Government and various beneficiary groups.

CReDO aims at the *development of democratic leadership and promotion of democratic policies and human rights.*

Contents:

1. Introduction .....	4
1.1 Multilingual education.....	4
1.2 Objectives .....	4
1.3 Recommendations .....	5
2. Situation and concerns regarding national minorities .....	6
2.1 Evolution of country's ethnic composition .....	6
2.2 Types of Ukrainian and Bulgarian settlements.....	9
2.3 Perception of Languages by Ukrainians and Bulgarians.....	10
2.4 National and international legal obligations on education .....	15
3. Evaluation of language educational policy.....	19
3.1 Current language educational policy .....	19
3.2 Perception of linguistic educational policies .....	21
3.4 Correlation of political parties preferences with ethnic groups.....	27
3.5 Policy actors positions on language educational policy .....	30
4. Policy options .....	34
4.1 Framework for policy analysis .....	34
4.2 Outlining policy options .....	37
4.3 Discussions of policy options .....	40
5. Policy recommendation .....	41
6. References .....	42

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Multilingual education

Bilingual education is the education that is carried out in two (generically more than two languages), in other words when the instruction or medium of instruction is carried out in two languages. Bilingual education refers to the whole curricular across the educational cycle or for the part of it, where the proportion of one language against the other differs and can change over the time. The bilingual education is not when bilingual pupils study in a monolingual education schools.

For bilingual education the content of the educational program and the curriculum should be composed of the disciplines present in two languages. Bilingual education starts when more languages are used simultaneously for the content of the educational plans and of the curriculum (sciences, maths, social disciplines) rather than just teaching the language in itself. Another aspect of the bilingual education resides in the scope of it. In short the bilingual education scope is to promote maintain and cultivate the existing bilingual persons and at the same time to promote comprehensive bilingual persons by deep and professional knowledge of several languages. The later is called *additive bilingualism*. Additive bilingualism provides for the active addition of the command of another language through the educational programs. Additive bilingualism is opposed to the so called *subtractive bilingualism* that aims at the substitution of one language with the other one, preponderantly the language of the dominant group. In the light of these definitions only the additive bilingualism could be truly classified as the bilingual (multilingual) education.

*Bilingual models.* Given the clear distinction between the additive bilingualism and subtractive bilingualism, further on, one can classify the bilingual education based on the objectives. Bilingual models could aim at the linguistic planning of some role of the language; it can have an ideological orientation to have a linguistic or cultural diversity in the society. The scientific literature devises three major groups of bilingual education: *transitional models*, *maintenance models* and *enrichment models*.

### 1.2 Objectives

The paper presents the policy research on the opportunity and practical means of the introduction of the policy of multilingual education for the national minorities in Moldova with specific reference to Bulgarians and Ukrainians has been put forward in order to address the problems of the integration of the national minorities. The Ukrainians is the largest national minority with 12% of population and Bulgarians is a compact living minority of 2% of population.

The current problems perceived include the growing assimilation of the Ukrainians and Bulgarians into Russian speaking group, composed of the Russians, important part of Ukrainians, important part of Bulgarians and Gagauz. Assimilation tendencies go along with the loss of the native language proficiency and non-integration of the minorities into the mainstream society. The current educational policies have been preserved from the soviet times.

Moldova has been challenged by the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on National Minorities (Committee of Ministers conclusions in 2002, 2005), UN CERD (conclusions and

recommendations in 2008), OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, UE-Moldova Action Plan (2006-08) conclusions regarding the rights and integration of national minorities, a hypothesis is being advanced that the current policies seem to be producing unsatisfactory results with regard to the protection as well as integration of the national minorities.

Policy research objectives:

- evaluation of the effectiveness of the current linguistic component of the educational policies from the perspective of their impact on the integration, inclusion of national minorities into the society;
- elaboration of viable policy alternative of the educational policy that produce national minority capacity to linguistically integrate into the society;
- outline policy implementation instruments under current financial and institutional arrangements.

The research has used a number of methods to collect relevant data and information. First hand research methods included:

- quantitative sociological studies of the perception of the Bulgarians and Ukrainians on the language and on the education,
- documentation of the best practices available in the country regarding the organization of the education for the national minorities,
- interviews with the representatives of the business community and the relevant political and minority groups representatives,
- review of the relevant secondary sources and researches (both academic and various reports),
- review of available secondary data and information on the conducted sociological studies in the past, reviewed sources on the international practice regarding the linguistic education.

The paper uses several policy analysis approaches:

- structural analysis of the causes (fish-bone analysis) of the current policy failure against the desired objectives,
- policy community and policy network mapping and analysis,
- demand-supply analysis of the problems,
- legal analysis of the existing international and national obligations,
- input-path-policy outcome model,
- social benefits model, etc.

Throughout the text the notion of Romanian-Moldovan-state langue is used interchangeably given the legal, political and sociological realities. Moldovan Constitution uses the term Moldovan language. De facto, the society is divided about this notion. The cultural and intellectual elite lean towards the name of the Romanian language and some important parts of population preferring the notion of Moldovan language. Legal texts and a number of sociological researches have used the neutral term of the state language.

### **1.3 Recommendations**

Based on the collected evidence and available information, the paper constructs several realistic policy options. The policy options are constructed along several independent axes: a) negligent to strong role of the minority language as the medium of instruction (additive against subtractive bilingualism), b) negligent to strong role of the state language as the medium of instruction (additive against subtractive bilingualism) c) top-down against bottom-up approach in the implementation.

The analysis of the options produces the recommendation for the preferred policy option:

- Greater role of the state language as the medium of instruction in the minority schools. This element is being supported by the most of the political parties and there will be an increased political support for the more important role of the state language in the schooling of the minorities.
- Growing role of the minority language, primarily as a separate subject in as much as possible schools with the minority children, given there is a strong demand in the minorities' community. A consideration should be given for the piloting of the minority language as the medium of instruction through technical assistance and governmental funds.
- Preserving the policy largely centralized. This option is dictated by the fact that the decentralization of the educational policy requires substantial institutional and structural adjustments.

This policy recommendation is seen in the mid-term perspective (3 year period of time) with a longer term perspective (5 year period of time) of the greater role of the minority language as the medium of instruction.


## 2. Situation and concerns regarding national minorities

This section contains an overview of the ethnic composition evolution in the country, analysis of the types of the Ukrainian and Bulgarian settlements, discussion on how Ukrainians and Bulgarians perceive languages in education and analysis of the relevant national and international legal obligations regarding education.

### 2.1 Evolution of country's ethnic composition

Ethnic composition of Moldova has changed over the period of the last 15 years. In 1989, with 4,5 mln, ethnic break down was: Moldovans (Romanians) made up 64% of the total population, followed by Ukrainians with 14%, Russians with 13%, Gagauz with 4% and Bulgarians with 2% of the total population. In 2004, 15 years later, with only, 4.2 mln, the ethnic breakdown has changed: Moldovans (Romanians) make up 72%, followed by Ukrainians with 11%, Russians with 9%, Gagauz with 4%, and Bulgarians with 2%.


Graph 2.1, 2.2



Source: Census 1989, 2004, National Bureau of Statistics

Ethnic map of Moldova in 1989 shows the geographical coverage of the minorities across the country. The map shows important pockets of Ukrainian minorities across the country, specifically in the north and in the South nearing the border with Ukraine. In the South, one can see compact population of the Gagauz and of the Bulgarians. In both cases, with just few exceptions, Russians is concentrated in the cities and urban areas<sup>1</sup>.


Graph 2.3



Source: Census 1989, 2004, National Bureau of Statistics, plus author calculations

The graph above shows that Ukrainian and Russian population has decreased in comparative terms the most, followed only by the Bulgarians.

Graph 2.4




Ethnic map of the North-western part of Moldova<sup>2</sup>, where the size represents the dimension of the locality. Northern part of the country has a clear presence of the Ukrainians. The following rayons: Briceni, Ocnita, Edineti, Donduseni, Riscani, Drochia, Soroca, Floresti, Ialoveni, Glodeni as well as the Balti municipality make the Northern Moldova. Rural areas have villages where Ukrainians coexist with Moldovans in various proportions from 20 to 50 and 80%. The Ukrainian population is not concentrated in one or two administrative districts, up to a dozen villages could be found in almost each administrative district of 2<sup>nd</sup> level – rayon. The rural

<sup>1</sup> A similar analysis of the evolution of the population of ethnic groups in Transnistria region shows the following situation: in 1989, with 0.7 mln populations, Moldovans (Romanians) make up the largest group of 40%, followed by Ukrainians with 23%, Gagauz with 2% and Bulgarians with 4%. In 2004, with 0,5 mln, Moldovans (Romanians) still make up the largest group with 32%, followed by Ukrainians with 29%, Russians with 30%, Gagauz with 2% and Bulgarians with 2%.

<sup>2</sup> Executed in GIS, green color is representative for the Moldovans/Romanians, yellow color is representative for Ukrainians, pink color stands for Russians, red is for Roma.

population of the Ukrainians does not reach 15%. In the principal rayon towns, the proportion of the Ukrainians is bigger, reaching up to 25%.


Graph 2.5 North of Moldova (except Transnistria)



Source: Census 1989, 2004, National Bureau of Statistics, author GIS representation of data

The central part of Moldova ethnic pattern is very different from the northern one. There are just few Ukrainian villages in the east and an important presence in the municipality of Chisinau<sup>3</sup>. The Ethnic Map of Southern Moldova<sup>4</sup>, is quite different from the other two. Apart from the Gagauz (that live in the Gagauz autonomy), one can find Bulgarians living compactly in Taraclia rayon (more than 70% are Bulgarians) and a number of villages in Cahul, Cantemir and Leova rayons. Overall, there are 3-5 villages in the preponderantly Moldovan rayons. There are just few Ukrainian villages in the South.

Graph 2.6 South of Moldova (exception of Transnistria)



Source: Census 1989, 2004, National Bureau of Statistics, author GIS representation of data

<sup>3</sup> The map of central Moldova is reproduced in the Annex.


<sup>4</sup> Executed in GIS, Green color is representative for the Moldovans/Romanians, blue is representative for Bulgarian, yellow color is representative for Ukrainians, black is for Gagauz, pink color stands for Russians



## 2.2 Types of Ukrainian and Bulgarian settlements

A detailed analysis of the rural settings where the Ukrainians and Bulgarians located is necessary in order to understand the size of the Ukrainian component within the 1<sup>st</sup> level local authorities – communes - as well as possible legal requirement to be applied for the introduction of the Ukrainian or Bulgarian education for the communes with certain percentage of the minority population. One has two relevant variables: 1) the absolute size of the Ukrainian or Bulgarian population that can make perhaps possible enough pupil population for the school classes and 2) a possible threshold of 10% or 20% of the minority population.

Graph 2.7, 2.8




Source: Census 1989, 2004, National Bureau of Statistics, author calculations, systematization and classification of data

The graphs above show that there are 31 villages with the Ukrainian population of more than 1 000 persons and where they make up 50% and more of the population. There are 36 villages with the Ukrainian population of more than 500 persons and where they make up 50% and more of the population. Finally, there are 54 villages with the Ukrainian population of more than 200 persons and where they make up 50% and more of the population. In total, there are 120 villages where the Ukrainian population makes up 50% and more. There are 25 more villages where the Ukrainian population is between 20-40% of the population and there are only 30 villages where the Ukrainian population is less than 15% of the population. The analysis of the urban settings shows that there are a dozen of towns where Ukrainians make up around and more than 10% of the population.

In case the threshold is set up at 20%, 29 villages do not qualify, of which 6 villages with the population of 500 persons. In the case the threshold set at 10%, none of the villages are left outside. At the same time, there are 91 villages, where the population is less than 200 inhabitants.

The situation with the Bulgarian villages is somewhat different. There are only 8 villages where the Bulgarian population is less than 15% and these villages are with the absolute size of the Bulgarians of less than 200 persons. There are 11 villages with the population of Bulgarians between 20-40% and 20 villages with more than 50% of the population. The analysis of the urban settings shows that there are three towns where Bulgarians make up around and more than 10% of the population.

Graph 2.9, 2.10



Source: Census 1989, 2004, National Bureau of Statistics, author calculations, systematization and classification of data

In case the threshold is set up at 20%, 8 villages do not qualify with the Bulgarian population of less than 200 inhabitants.

Graph 2.11 Bulgarian and Ukrainian settlements according to the qualification thresh-hold

	Bulgarians	Ukrainians	conclusions
Total villages/settlements	40 villages/settlements	175 villages/settlements where Ukrainians are from 20% and more	
threshold at 10%	All settlements qualify	170 settlements qualify	Almost universal coverage of whole Ukrainian and Ukrainian settlements
threshold at 20%	32 settlements qualify	145 settlements qualify	Most (80%) of the settlements are covered

*Conclusion: The analysis of the Bulgarian and Ukrainian settlements shows that the threshold of 10% makes almost universal coverage of all Ukrainian and Bulgarian villages/settlements and the threshold of 20% provides the coverage of about 80%.*

### 2.3 Perception of Languages by Ukrainians and Bulgarians

This section will analyze how Ukrainians and Bulgarians in rural areas perceive the use and the meaning of their native, state and Russian languages.

#### - Perception by Bulgarians


Data from 2003 shows<sup>5</sup> that knowledge of the state language differs according to the age structure of the respondents. In the population segment of 70 and older, more than 55% speak state language. A similar pattern is almost matched for the segment 14-18 years, where almost 40% speak state language. The lowest knowledge of the state language is registered for the segment of 19-25 years (20%), followed by 41-55 years, 56-70 years (22-24 %).

The use of the Bulgarian language among spouses is substantial reaching 58% and together with the use of mixture of Bulgarian and Russian reaches 86%, less than 12% speak among

<sup>5</sup> Research conducted by Center for Minority Rights and Resource Center for Human Rights in 2003 [3].

themselves only Russian. The use of languages among parents-children, shows a rather similar pattern, where Bulgarian is used in 56% and plus a mixture of Bulgarian and Russian reaches 87%, significantly, the use of only Russian is only 8%. Among the children, the use of Bulgarian decreases almost twofold, to 29% and together with the use of mixture of Bulgarian and Russian to 60%. The use of only Russian registers increase to 24%. *One can see that the place of Bulgarian is being taken over by Russian and partly by mixture of Russian/Bulgarian/Romanian languages (increase to 12%).*

Graph 2.12, 2.13




Source: Sociological investigation by the author's team, 2008

The graphs that follow are very informative. 77% consider state language important, 23% somewhat important, while children in 46% consider state language very important and 39% consider it important and 16% somewhat important. *One can see that children give a higher value to the state language than their parents.* The situation with Russian language almost mirrors the described situation with the state language. There is a significant difference in children appreciation of the Bulgarian language as compared to the value that is given by their parents.

The pattern of importance of the Bulgarian language in children perception is somewhat similar to the responses given to the state and Russian languages, yet the importance for Bulgarian languages is higher than of Russian and less important than state language. The value of the parents for Bulgarian language is considerable smaller than those of the children.

Graph 2.14




Source: Sociological investigation by the author's team, 2008

The graph below shows the state language and the Bulgarian languages proficiency in understanding, speaking and writing by children. 14.7% of children state that they understand very well and 57% well with preferences in some areas, overall, more than 71% say they understand very well and well. Speaking pattern differs, only 13% said they can speak very well and only 21% say they can speak well with preference in some areas, overall only 35% (twice less) can speak state language. A substantial rate of 32% say they can speak only in some areas and 13% speak with difficulty. The writing pattern is very similar to the understanding one. A conclusion draws that understanding and writing skills are present in good extend with 70% of the children and speaking with 35%.

The relevant skills favor Bulgarian language substantially. 84% (73 and 11%) of children say they understand very well and well Bulgarian. Speaking skills differ slightly, overall 80% (65% and 25%) speak very well and well Bulgarian language. Writing skills pattern is very close to the understanding one, with overall 71% (44% and 27%) writing very well and well in Bulgarian language. A conclusion draws that Bulgarian children have substantial present skills in Bulgarian language.

Graph 2.15




Source: Sociological investigation by the author's team, 2008

The following graphs show the importance of the languages in material well-being and in income-generation activities. Parents score somewhat equally the contribution of the state and Bulgarian languages for the material well-being, overall 68% (34% yes and 34 sometimes) for state language and 62% (30% yes and 32 sometimes) for Bulgarian language. Russian language has higher score for the material well-being, up to 78% (60% yes and 18% sometimes). In conclusion, parents consider that state and Bulgarian languages are considered by 2/3 as the skill that contributes to the material well-being, while Russian skill is considered by more than 2/3 as an important skill.

The overwhelming majority of parents consider state and Russian languages important in order to integrate into the labor market, 2/3 consider Bulgarian an important asset as well. 94% (74% yes and 19% sometimes) and 92% (76% yes and 14% sometimes) of parents consider that correspondingly state language and Russian language are important for the labor market integration. Only 66% (31% yes and 37 sometimes) consider that Bulgarian is important for the integration into labor market.


Graph 2.16, 2.17



Source: Sociological investigation by the author’s team, 2008

The overwhelming majority of parents consider state and Russian languages important for the professional development, more than 2/3 consider Bulgarian an important asset as well. 96% (67% yes and 19% sometimes) and 92% (77% yes and 15% sometimes) of parents consider that correspondingly state language and Russian language are important for the professional development. Only 73% (38% yes and 35% sometimes) consider that Bulgarian is important for the professional development.

Graph 2.18, 2.19




Source: Sociological investigation by the author’s team, 2008

Citizenship and language relationship has been explored, so that 2/3 considers that all three languages: *state, Bulgarian and Russian have equal value*. Indeed, only 10-15% does not know whether languages represent the importance for the citizenship, and 10-15% consider that the languages are irrelevant for the citizenship determination. Around 70% consider all and separately languages determinative for the citizenship.

- Perception by Ukrainians

The use of the Ukrainian language among spouses is substantial reaching 58% and together with the use of mixture of Bulgarian and Russian reaches 86%, less than 12% speak among themselves only Russian. The use of languages among parents-children, shows a rather similar pattern, where Ukrainian is used in 56% and plus a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian reaches 87%, the use of only Russian is only 8%. Among the children, the use of Ukrainian decreases more than twofold, to 25% and together with the use of mixture of Ukrainian and Russian to only 48%. The use of only Russian registers increase to 44%. *One can see that Russian language has been taking over the place of the Ukrainian.*

Graph 2.20




Source: Sociological investigation by the author’s team, 2008

Graphs that follow show the importance of the languages in material well-being and in income-generation activities. Parents score somewhat equally the contribution of the state and Ukrainian languages for the material well-being, overall 78% (53% yes and 23 sometimes) for state language and only 59% (28% yes and 31 sometimes) for Ukrainian language. Russian language has higher score for the material well-being, up to 90% (72% yes and 17% sometimes). *In conclusion, parents consider by more than 2/3 that state and Russian languages as skill contributes to the material well-being, while Ukrainian skill is considered by only half as an important skill.*

*The overwhelming majority of parents consider state and Russian languages important in order to integrate into the labor market, only 50% consider Ukrainian an important asset as well. 86% (74% yes and 12% sometimes) and 90% (81% yes and 9% sometimes) of parents consider that correspondingly state language and Russian language are important for the labor market integration. Only 55% (32% yes and 24% sometimes) consider that Ukrainian is important for the integration into labor market.*


Graph 2.21, 2.22



Source: Sociological investigation by the author’s team, 2008

*The overwhelming majority of parents consider state and Russian languages important for the professional development, more then 2/3 consider Ukrainian an important asset as well. 87% (69% yes and 17% sometimes) and 89% (78% yes and 11% sometimes) of parents consider that correspondingly state language and Russian language are important for the professional development. Only 55% (27% yes and 28% sometimes) consider that Ukrainian is important for the professional development.*

Graph 2.23, 2.24



Source: Sociological investigation by the author's team, 2008

Citizenship and language relationship has been explored, so that 2/3 considers that all three languages: *state, Ukrainian and Russian* have almost equal value. Indeed, only 10% does not know whether languages represent the importance for the citizenship, and 10% consider that the languages are irrelevant for the citizenship determination, note that already 24% consider that state language knowledge is not linked to citizenship. Around 70% consider all and separately languages determinative for the citizenship.

*Section conclusion:*

- *Russian language gradually takes over<sup>6</sup> Bulgarian and Ukrainian,*
- *understanding and writing skills are present in good extend with 70% of the children and speaking with 35%,*
- *Bulgarian and Ukrainians children have substantial present skills in their native language principally drawn from the communication with their older relatives,*
- *2/3 of parents consider that state and Ukrainian or Bulgarian languages is a contributive skill to the material well-being,*
- *more than 2/3 consider Russian language skill as an important contributive skill to the well-being,*
- *overwhelming majority of parents consider state and Russian languages are important in order to integrate into the labor market,*
- *2/3 of parents consider Bulgarian (only half Ukrainian) an important asset in integration into society,*
- *overwhelming majority of parents consider state and Russian languages important for the professional development,*
- *2/3 of respondents consider that all three languages: the state, Bulgarian or Ukrainian and Russian have equal value and represent the citizenship foundation of the society.*

## 2.4 National and international legal obligations on education

This section discusses the existing national and international legal framework.

*- National legislation standards*

The Constitution declares “that the state recognizes and guarantees the right of every citizen to maintain, development and expression of ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural identity”<sup>7</sup>. The Law on National minorities provides that “any person belonging to a national minority has the right to freely choose to belong to respective minority or not. The choice or the exercise of the

<sup>6</sup> partly by mixture of Russian/Bulgarian/Romanian language

<sup>7</sup> Art. 10(2) of the Constitution of Moldova

related right should not put the person in an unfavorable situation.”<sup>8</sup> The law “guarantees persons belonging to national minority’s right to equality before the law and equal protection by law, forbidding any discrimination on the basis of belonging to national minority,”<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, the “State is obliged to contribute to the creation of necessary conditions for *preserving, development and expression* of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of persons belonging to national minority...”<sup>10</sup> and “refrain from the modification of ethno-demographic composition of the territories”<sup>11</sup>.

The law on the protection of national minorities is more specific on the education, it guarantees for the preschool, primary, general, university and post university study in Moldovan/Romanian and Russian languages and create conditions for the education in other minority languages<sup>12</sup>; contribute to minority language education by providing didactical materials and specialists<sup>13</sup>, persons have the right for education in their kin-states (historical motherland)<sup>14</sup>; right to private educational establishment of all levels with obligatory study of history and language of Moldova<sup>15</sup>. Law on education reiterates the previously mentioned provisions of the law on protection of national minorities. Linguistic rights guarantees are poorly elaborated and provide generally only basic guarantee for the use of language of choice. They are silent with regard to specific areas of communication with public administration (including various forms of compact presence), use of language in private sphere (business, etc), etc.

The Law on national minorities uses the phrase “*where the minority constitute a considerable part*” that a minority language, other than Moldovan or Russian can be used in relation with the public authorities. It remains unclear and no precedents known in that respect. It seems that the phrase “minority constitutes a considerable part” can be interpreted critically against the international standard formula “minorities residing traditionally in substantial numbers”. The Law on protection of national minorities imposes in practice the minorities to use alternatively Russian and not their minority language violating the international obligations<sup>16</sup>. The legal arrangements disadvantage the minority creating the linguistic criterion in terms of the level of enjoyment of services and opportunities for employment. To date none of kin-minorities (Ukrainian, Bulgarian), except the Russian minority, enjoyed the implementation of this international obligation<sup>17</sup>.

Article 6 of the Law on Education equal access of pupils of various ethnic and linguistic backgrounds to education. Article 8 states that the language of education is provided based on the articles 18, 19, 20 of the law on functioning of languages. The right of the citizens to education in mother tongue is ensured by the creation of the educational establishments, classes, groups. The study of the state language is obligatory.

<sup>8</sup> Art. 2 of the law on persons belonging to national minorities and juridical status of their organizations

<sup>9</sup> Art. 4 of the law on persons belonging to national minorities and juridical status of their organizations

<sup>10</sup> Art. 5 of the law on persons belonging to national minorities and juridical status of their organizations

<sup>11</sup> Art. 9 of the law on persons belonging to national minorities and juridical status of their organizations: “State guarantees that modification of territorial-demographic composition of the regions will not be perused. If they will be undertaken, the state will take into consideration the opinion of the local population, including the opinion of persons belonging to national minorities”

<sup>12</sup> Art. 6(1) of the Law on protection of national minorities: State guarantees the realization of rights of persons belonging to national minorities to preschool education, primary education, general (including professional) education, high and post university education in Moldovan and *Russian languages*, create conditions for the realization of their right to education in minority mother tongue (Ukrainian, Gagauz, Ivrit, Hebrew, etc...)

<sup>13</sup> Art. 6(2) of the Law on protection of national minorities: For the assurance of the educational process in educational establishments in minority language with partial or complete degree, the state contributes to the elaboration of programs and didactical materials, education of didactical professionalisms, cooperating with other states with this respect.

<sup>14</sup> Art. 6(3) of the Law on protection of national minorities: Persons belonging to national minorities have the right to obtain the high and post university education in their kin-states and in other countries on the basis of agreements and international treaties.

<sup>15</sup> Art. 6(4) of the Law on protection of national minorities: Persons belonging to national minorities and their organizations, in accordance with the law, have the right to establish preschool education and private educational institutions of all levels. Study of Moldovan history and language in all educational establishments is obligatory.

<sup>16</sup> See for detailed discussions in Fernand De Varennes, *Language, Minorities and Human Rights*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London, *International Studies in Human Rights*, volume 45, 1996, pp. 174-188.

<sup>17</sup> Art. 10 European Framework Convention on National Minorities, art. 10 European Minority and Regional Language Charter.



Law on functioning of languages<sup>18</sup> in article 18 states that preschool, school education, professional and high is guaranteed in state and Russian languages and creates conditions for Gagauz, Ukrainians, and Bulgarians to education in their mother tongue. Article 19 states that preschool and school education is only monolingual, yet in those areas where conditions do not allow creation of the monolingual schools, there created schools with classes taught separately and in parallel in two languages. Article 20 states that professional education is realized in the state and Russian languages and in order to satisfy the economic, social and cultural needs, there could be created groups and classes in Gagauz, Ukrainian and Bulgarian. Article 21 states that in all schools state language is studied.

- *international intergovernmental obligations*

The bilateral agreements with Ukraine impose more obligations on Moldova as compared to the Law on national minorities since former obliges creating favorable conditions for functioning of educational establishments and their establishment in the regions with compact population. The later goes further guaranteeing the creating of the conditions for functioning of the educational establishments. Bilateral agreements with Bulgaria are not elaborated well on this topic, stipulating only the establishment of two schools in Taraclia and Chisinau.

*Bilateral agreements with Ukraine*, provides for that “high parties will support the development” of the originality of the national minorities by creation of *favorable* conditions for the *functioning of the educational institutions* in the language of minorities<sup>19</sup>. The Governmental agreement proscribes that high contracting parties “will *open in localities compactly populated* by Ukrainian (Moldovan) nationalities, upon the request of citizens, *institutions, schools* including musical and artistic with Ukrainian (and consequently Romanian) languages in the Republic of Moldova (and Ukraine correspondingly) ensuring for them programs, manuals, etc.”<sup>20</sup>. Ministerial protocol on the reciprocal collaboration states the “*functioning of the schools* in Ukrainian (Moldovan) languages respectively in Moldova (Ukraine)”, including “...obligatory study of Ukrainian (Moldovan) as a studying discipline in schools *compactly populated* by Ukrainians (Moldovans) in Moldova (Ukraine).<sup>21</sup> Also, High Contracting Parties”... as possibilities allow and upon the request of the other state...will provide pre-school and school establishments with manuals and methodical literature on free of charge basis”<sup>22</sup>. Further it proscribes the access of citizens of Ukraine (Moldova) of Moldovan (Ukrainian) origin “...rights and *possibilities to study in high education institutions* of their kin-states as provided by the law of the countries<sup>23</sup>. That is supplemented by a specific number of scholarships for high education<sup>24</sup>.

*Bilateral agreements with Bulgaria* sates no specific provisions on the educational rights.

Moldova concluded a number of the agreements with Russia that create preferential legal framework in the disadvantage of the disadvantaged national minorities. *In the bilateral agreements with Russia*, the Treaty states that “Considering the significance of Russian language, Moldovan party in accordance with national law, will provide respective *conditions for satisfaction of the needs in education in Russian language in the Educational system of Moldova*”<sup>25</sup>. Further the provisions stipulate the cooperation of the High Contracting Parties in

<sup>18</sup> <http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=312813>

<sup>19</sup> Art. 8 (1) of the treaty with Ukraine

<sup>20</sup> Art. 12(2) of the Governmental agreement with Ukraine

<sup>21</sup> Art. 2 of the Ministerial/Departmental Protocol

<sup>22</sup> Art. 3 of the Ministerial Departmental Protocol

<sup>23</sup> Art. 1 of the Ministerial/Departmental Protocol

<sup>24</sup> Art. 5 of the Ministerial/Departmental Protocol

<sup>25</sup> Art. 20 (2) of the Treaty with Russia

*elaboration of methodical and educational materials*<sup>26</sup>, preparation of specialists<sup>27</sup>, establishment of educational partnerships<sup>28</sup> and "...will satisfy the requirements of general education of population than belong to respective minority by creating conditions for education in their mother tongue..."<sup>29</sup>.

*- international organizations assessment of minority language education situation*

The situation of the educational rights of the national minorities has been under the attention of several international intergovernmental organizations: 1) Advisory Committee and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe under the Framework Convention on National Minorities<sup>30</sup>, 2) European Commission under the EU-Moldova Action Plan, and 3) UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UN CERD). The findings of these international bodies strongly question the existing arrangement and practice of providing the educational rights in minority languages.

Advisory Committee and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe<sup>31</sup> conclude that measures are needed, particularly concerning teacher training, textbooks and other teaching aids, in order to consolidate and develop the teaching of minority languages, and notably teaching in minority languages, at the various levels of education to the quality of the teaching provided for national minorities, including teaching of the State language. It recommends taking measures to improve the quality of the teaching, including by seeking possibilities to allocate increased resources to offer persons belonging to national minorities' adequate opportunities to learn their languages or study in those languages. The very high numerical fresh-hold for Ukrainian and Bulgarian children study their mother tongue (four to five pupils). Particular attention should also be paid to the development of methodologies pertaining to multilingual education in order to enable teachers and pupils to deal successfully with the specific situation they face in Moldova.

The European Commission<sup>32</sup> negotiated EU-Moldova Action Plan provided the insurance of the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, in line with international and European standards through the appropriate response to conclusions and recommendations of relevant Council of Europe structures and experts on state of compliance with the Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities.

UN CERD<sup>33</sup> notes with concern that the Ukrainian and Bulgarian languages and cultures are taught as subjects only in a limited number of schools where the language of instruction is Russian, that Ukrainian or Bulgarian are the language of instruction only in certain classes in a few experimental schools. The Committee recommends that the State party intensify its efforts to provide adequate opportunities for minority children to receive instruction in their native language, as well as in Moldovan, and/or study their language and culture throughout the entire cycle of education, including by (a) extending the teaching of Ukrainian and Bulgarian to schools where the language of instruction is Moldovan; (b) increasing the number of schools where these languages are the language of instruction; and (c) introducing languages of numerically smaller minorities as school subjects whenever there is sufficient demand. UN

<sup>26</sup> Art. 15 of the Governmental Agreement with Russia

<sup>27</sup> Art. 16 of the Governmental Agreement with Russia

<sup>28</sup> Art. 18 of the Governmental Agreement with Russia

<sup>29</sup> Art. 14 (2) of the Governmental Agreement with Russia

<sup>30</sup> [http://www.coe.int/t/e/human\\_rights/minorities/Country\\_specific\\_eng.asp#P582\\_32338](http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/minorities/Country_specific_eng.asp#P582_32338)

<sup>31</sup>

[http://www.coe.int/t/e/human\\_rights/minorities/2.FRAMEWORK\\_CONVENTION\\_\(MONITORING\)/2.Monitoring\\_mechanism/4.Opinions\\_of\\_the\\_Advisory\\_Committee/1.Country\\_specific\\_opinions/2.Second\\_cycle/PDF\\_2nd\\_OP\\_Moldova\\_en.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/minorities/2.FRAMEWORK_CONVENTION_(MONITORING)/2.Monitoring_mechanism/4.Opinions_of_the_Advisory_Committee/1.Country_specific_opinions/2.Second_cycle/PDF_2nd_OP_Moldova_en.pdf)

<sup>32</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action\\_plans/moldova\\_enp\\_ap\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf)

<sup>33</sup> <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/419/07/PDF/G0841907.pdf?OpenElement>

CERD recommends intensifying the efforts to improve the quality of Moldovan language education for minority children.

*Section conclusion:*

- *Moldovan legislation stipulates monolingual education as status quo option (either in state or in Russian language), study of minority language is supported upon the request of the parents, use of minority language as the medium of instruction is not excluded but not provided in the law,*
- *Bilateral agreements with Ukraine provide for the study of and facilitating the instruction in the Ukrainian language in the settlements populated by the ethnic Ukrainians,*
- *Bilateral agreements with Bulgaria have no specific provisions regarding the education,*
- *Council of Europe and United Nations specialized bodies, European Commission find the minority education policies as unsatisfactory, failing to provide adequate minority language education policy.*

### **3. Evaluation of language educational policy**

This chapter contains review of the current situation on the minority education, perception of beneficiaries of the minority language education policy, correlation of between political choices and minority groups, positioning of various political groups and individuals regarding minority education policies.

#### **3.1 Current language educational policy**

Education system in Moldova stands on the monolingual education principle. School language education for minorities is carried out in Russian language. Only 374 children study in Ukrainian as language of instruction, which is 0,06% of all Ukrainian children. 171 children study partially in Bulgarian, which is 0,02% of total. Ukrainian language as a separate subject is studied in 37 schools (5 984 children) and Bulgarian in 30 schools (7 925 children).


The provisions of Law on protection of national minorities use the condition for public school. It fails to conform to international standards to provide public pre-school, school and other education where there is a “sufficient demand” of a substantial number of minorities<sup>34</sup>. The situation of Ukrainians and Bulgarians are a clear example for that.

Pupils belonging to ethnic minority and who study mother tongue

Graph 3.1, 3.2

---


<sup>34</sup> Art. 14 of the European Framework Convention on Protection of National Minorities, art. 16 of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages



Nonofficial data from MET, 2005-6

The curriculum for the national minorities (Ukrainians and Bulgarians) is a generic one. All the subjects are taught in Russian, the Russian is considered the language of instruction from the kindergarten to high education (Universities). Ministry of Education and Youth (MET) passed the decision that in the areas where national minorities desire so, a national minority language could be studied as a discipline for 2-3 hours per week. Moreover, additional disciplines of national history and the culture of national minority could be studied having up to 2-3 hours per week. MET has drafted the respective educational plans for this subjects and elaborated methodological support books for the teachers.

Graph 3.3



Nonofficial data from MET, 2005-6

Educational policies are very much centralized; the role of the local authorities is limited. MET sets out 95% of the content of the educational program content. Local authorities together with the school administration can decide on the rest 5% of the educational curriculum in terms of the disciplines. The curriculum is very much centralized and is subject of rigorous inspection from the rayon educational inspectorates and the MET. Local authorities, namely rayon council's educational administration can provide for the educational variations within 5% limit. This means effectively, 2-3 hours of the educational curricular per week only.

*Section conclusion:*

- *Ukrainians and Bulgarians study in schools with Russian language as the medium of instruction,*
- *less than 1% of Ukrainians and Bulgarians study in their native language as the medium of instruction,*
- *less than 10% of Ukrainians and around 50% of Bulgarians study their own language,*

- *95% of the content of the educational curricular, including language of instruction component is decided by the central authorities.*

### **3.2 Perception of linguistic educational policies**

In this subsection we bring the results of the two sociological researches on the subject of education. In 2003, a joint effort of two organizations polled respondents in Ukrainian and Bulgarian communities and in 2008 the research covered only and specifically the aspects of language education perception of the target group.

#### *- Perception of educational policies by Bulgarian community in 2003<sup>35</sup>*

The overwhelming majority of respondents (90% and more) choose the Bulgarian language as an academic subject practically at all educational stages, while more than 30% of respondents assume that Bulgarian language should be a language of instruction at the level of preschool and primary school education. An absolute majority of the polled (about 70%) express clear desire that students of the Bulgarian nationality in universities and colleges should have special courses in the Bulgarian language. In the sphere of communication with local administrations, not less than 50 % respondents of the Bulgarian nationality choose their native language (30% - in the villages with mixed population).

#### *- Bulgarian communities' perception in 2008*


*Bulgarian community opt for the shift from monolingual education towards bi or even multilingual education for their children with the much stronger presence of the state language as a medium of instruction.* The two graphs presented below shows that teachers of Bulgarian schools see the presence of state language as a medium of instruction as a very important change in the linguistic educational policy. 70% of the teachers consider that state language should be present as one of the languages of instruction. 25-50% considers that the state language should play the leading role as the language of instruction and 15-40% considers it should play this role along with the Bulgarian and Russian languages. Bulgarians parents' choice is slightly different; up to 50% of the parents see the considerable improved role of the state language as the medium of instruction. Those parents that opted for the state language as the language of instruction, mostly prefer to have state language along Russian language as the medium of instruction while studying Bulgarian as a subject.

*This shift in the preference has been taking place in virtually absence of any public debate and widely disseminated relevant information.* Indeed, teachers represent a more informed group in the society, there were some activities discussing the linguistic educational options for the children related to European Charter for Regional and Minority languages and the European Framework Convention where some of them have participated, therefore their preference could be more informed and educated than of the parents. Half of the parents prefer a shift towards multilingual education with a much stronger presence of the state language as the medium of instruction. The discrepancy between the teachers and parents' choice of about 20% could be explained by the lack of the relevant information for the parents. Another difference consists in the parents preferred choice of the state and Russian playing the leading role as the language of instruction, while teachers opt for a far stronger role of the state language of instruction, sees Bulgarian as one of the languages of instruction.

---

<sup>35</sup> Based on the common research project Center for Minority Issues and Resource Center for Human Rights (2002-03)

Graph 3.4, 3.5




Source: Sociological investigation by the author’s team, 2008

The results also depict the trend for the stronger role of the Bulgarian language in the education. 10-20% of teachers consider that Bulgarian should play alongside state language the role of the language of instruction. 5-10% of the parents see Bulgarian alongside state language as the medium of instruction. In both cases, the greater role of the Bulgarian language is seen at the expense of the Russian language as the medium of instruction and along Russian as the 3<sup>rd</sup> language of instruction.

The trend for a stronger role of the state language in the process education is matched with the children strong support for the role of the state language in the school. 82% of the Bulgarian children consider that they, given what they have now, want to improve or study more state language. Only 10% consider it negatively. This overwhelming support for the increase of the state language is coherent with the above preferences of the teachers and parents. Children consider that the state should play an important role in promoting the study of the state and Bulgarian languages. This is a signal, that this objective should not be left out to the private actors only, and that governmental programs should be in place to achieve this objective.


Graph 3.6, 3.7



Source: Sociological investigation by the author’s team, 2008

Bulgarian community overwhelmingly sees importance of the state language in the future of their children. The importance of the state language is matched with the traditionally strong role of the Russian language in the minority community. State language role and place has even slightly outpaced the role of the Russian language. At the same time, one can see from the graph below that only 40% consider Bulgarian language as important one in the future of their children.

Graph 3.8




Source: Sociological investigation by the author's team, 2008

The following two graphs support in detail the above statements. Support for the universal knowledge of the state language ranges from 70% (children) to 100% (teachers) with parents at 88%. This strong support differentiates along the three studied respondent groups. The difference might lie in the teachers advanced understanding of the realities, their higher knowledge of the state language and more educated choice.

The knowledge of Bulgarian language by others than Bulgarians in the compact areas where Bulgarians live has some sizable support as well. 30% of teachers and even parents consider it so and 10% of children. Teachers are again the most linguistically conscious group.


Graph 3.9, 3.10



Source: Sociological investigation by the author's team, 2008

The study has also explored learning of state language by adults. 50% of Bulgarian parents want and consider improving and studying state language themselves. This is an important sign if considering their commitment to the role of the state language in the educational process of their children. The most preferred mode of study is combination of group and individual study.

Graph 3.11, 3.12



Source: Sociological investigation by the author's team, 2008

Study also shows that almost 25% of the parents' respondents are willing to pay for the state language learning. Amount available for pay varies from 50-200 MDL (3-15 EURO). The largest group is not available to contribute to the payment.

*- Perception of educational policies by Ukrainians in 2003<sup>36</sup>*

The data obtained from the survey disproves the regular opinion spread by some politicians as well as mass media about unwillingness of Ukrainians in the Republic of Moldova to study their native language and culture. 39.8% of respondents put their native language in the first place in the language education system, while 44.8% consider that it needs to be studied only as a subject. As much as 82% of the polled Ukrainians stand up for having special courses in the native language in vocational schools, colleges and universities. The legislatively formulated right of representatives of the Ukrainian nationality, as well as of other national minorities in Moldova to receive education in the native language is not used to the full due to several reasons:

- a) insufficient knowledge, poor knowledge or complete lack of knowledge of the rights regarding the choice of language of instruction;
- b) lack of didactic and methodological materials in the Ukrainian language (except for the native language and literature);
- c) passive thinking, obsolete stereotypes, passivity of the local population;
- d) latent (more often) or open (more rarely) opposition on the part of various political forces as well as local bodies responsible for public education;
- e) practically no prospect to continue education in the native language in the RM vocational schools, colleges and universities and consequently no possibility of successful social adaptation in the modern society.

Results of the survey confirm the given conclusions. Only 15% of the polled consider that training in preschool educational institutions should be done in the native language, 10.4% - at schools and 9% - in vocational schools, colleges and universities. Opinions of the rest of the polled divided approximately by fifty-fifty and namely: 46.3% are in favor of training in the Russian language; 43.4% see prospects in bilingual training (48.86% think it should be done in educational institutions for children) and 5.4% - support training in three languages. 4.5% expressed their opinion in favor of training in the state language.

<sup>36</sup> Ukrainian settlements visited by the project: - Bratuseni, Briceni raion of Edinetti judet, North of Moldova (A2); - Tetcani, Edinetti judet, North of Moldova (A2); - Gaspar, Edinetti judet, North of Moldova (B2); - Marcauteni, Edinetti judet, North of Moldova (B2); - Maximovka, Chisinau judet, Center of Moldova (A3); - Baltata, Chisinau judet, Center of Moldova (A3);



As we see, teachers appear to be the most conservative group as to the place of the native language in system of language training. Speaking about possible prospects in the education for Ukrainian children in Moldova, it is necessary to bear in mind the following:

1. About 40% (39.8%) of the polled put the native language in the first place in the educational system.
2. 46.3% of the polled keeps the desire to receive education in Russian.
3. 10.4 % see the prospect in the instruction in the native and 4.5% - in the state languages. At the same time, 15 % of respondents prefer education in the native language in preschool educational institutions.
4. 43.4% of respondent think that the most perspective is bilingual education (50% of them are in favor of bilingual education at the preschool stage) and 5.4% - are in favor of receiving education in three languages.


*- Ukrainian communities' perception in 2008*

*Ukrainian community opt for the shift from monolingual education towards bi or even multilingual education for their children with the much stronger presence of the state language as a medium of instruction.* Most notable is the fact that the choice of teachers and of the parents does not differ substantially, only in particularities of the realization of the multilingual education. The two graphs presented below shows similarly to Bulgarians that teachers of Ukrainian schools see the presence of state language as a medium of instruction as a very important change in the linguistic educational policy. 70-90% of the teachers consider that state language should be present as one of the languages of instruction. 20-60% considers that the state language should play the leading role as the language of instruction and 20-40% considers it should play this role along with the Ukrainian and Russian languages. Similarly to Bulgarians, Ukrainians parents' choice is only slightly different from the choice of the teachers. Up to 80% of the parents see the considerable improved role of the state language as the medium of instruction. Ukrainian parents equally opted for the state language, alongside Russian as the language of instruction, and for the Russian language, alongside state language as the medium of instruction while studying Ukrainian as a subject.

*This shift in the preference has been taking place in virtually absence of any public debate and widely disseminated relevant information.* Indeed, teachers represent a more informed group in the society, there were some activities discussing the linguistic educational options for the children related to European Charter for Regional and Minority languages and the European Framework Convention where some of them have participated, therefore their preference could be more informed and educated than of the parents. Half of the parents prefer a shift towards multilingual education with a much stronger presence of the state language as the medium of instruction. The discrepancy between the teachers and parents' choice of about 20% could be explained by the lack of the relevant information for the parents. Another difference consists in the parents preferred choice of the state and Russian playing the leading role as the language of instruction, while teachers opt for a far stronger role of the state language of instruction, sees Ukrainian as one of the languages of instruction.

Graph 3.14, 3.15


Evaluation of Linguistic Education Policy Options for Bulgarians and Ukrainians in Moldova



Source: Sociological investigation by the author's team, 2008

Most of the Ukrainian parents see their children future in Moldova. More than 80% of the parents see their children study and work in Moldova. Therefore, integration and the state language importance are easily explained.


Graph 3.16, 3.17



Source: Sociological investigation by the author's team, 2008

The importance of the state language is proven by the following two graphs. Both parents and children preference is more than 75%.

Graph 3.18, 3.19



Source: Sociological investigation by the author's team, 2008

Study also shows that almost 20% of the parents' respondents are willing to pay for the state language learning. Amount available for pay varies from 50-200 MDL (3-15 EURO). The largest group is not available to contribute to the payment.

*Section conclusion:*

- *Bulgarians and Ukrainians opt for the shift from the monolingual education towards bi or even multilingual education for their children with the much stronger presence of the state language as a medium of instruction and the native language, along the use of the Russian language,*
- *¾ of Bulgarian and Ukrainian children want to improve or study more state language.*
- *Bulgarians and Ukrainians overwhelmingly see the importance of the state language in the future of their children.*
- *Study also shows that almost 20-25% of the parents' respondents are willing to pay for the state language learning (50-200 MDL (3-15 EURO)).*

### **3.4 Correlation of political parties preferences with ethnic groups**


In this subsection we examine which political parties have the strongest preferences with the Ukrainians and Bulgarians. If there is a correlation between the political preferences and the ethnic groups, namely Ukrainians and Bulgarians vote preferentially for some political parties, then another question appears to what an extent these political parties reflect the options and choices for the minorities regarding the education. In the case the political parties do not reflect the choices and options of the minorities, namely, minorities prefer certain language educational options and respective political parties do not, one has to establish the reasons and perhaps strategies for greater accountability of the political parties towards its constituencies<sup>37</sup>.

The research approach selected clusters of the ethnically homogeneous regions and establishing these regions political preferences. To this end we produce two detailed commune based maps: ethnic commune based maps and political parties voting preferences. In the regions, in different rayons of Moldova, where Ukrainians and Bulgarians reside, we select randomly areas of homogeneous Bulgarian or Ukrainian compact population and compare with the political parties voting preferences, compare this with the regions with no Bulgarian or Ukrainian component and draw the conclusion on the existence of the correlation. For simplicity, we choose the most recent parliamentary elections results in 2005, yet, similarly analysis performed for local elections in 2007, local elections in 2003 show a similar pattern

*Graph 3.22, 3.23. Parliamentary election voting in 2005 per rayons and ethnic distributions per rayons*

---

<sup>37</sup> This section is based on the research conducted by Resource Center for Human Rights in 2008



The research chose 12 different rayons (in the North and in the South). In each rayon two types of areas are selected, type A is areas and communes with 60% and up representation of either Ukrainians or Bulgarians and type B is areas and communes with no or very small (less than 5%) representation of Ukrainians and Bulgarians. While comparing political parties voting preferences for type A and type B areas and communes within the same rayons, across rayons and regions: North-South, we make conclusions<sup>38</sup>.

In the areas where no Ukrainians present, there are two possible patterns. The first pattern is with Communists obtaining around 30% of votes, with the presence of Our Moldova Block, Popular Christian Democratic Party and Democratic Party as well as Social Democratic Party. The second pattern is that Communist Party receives around 60% of votes with Our Moldova Block, Popular Christian Democratic Party, Democratic Party and the others.

Below we provide the summary of the analysis in Northern rayons of Briceni, Edinet, Falesti, Singerei, Riscani, Glodeni and in the Southern rayons of Taraclia, Leova, Cimislia and for cross region comparison, central rayons of Orhei and Telenesti. For each selection two maps are produced that present ethnical composition of the areas and political parties voting preferences.

Graph 3.24

	Areas of rayons	Areas ethnic patterns	Areas political parties voting patterns	Conclusion
<b>North: Briceni</b>	Briceni A (Halahora, Groznita, Mihaileni, Chirilovca, Trestieni, Marcauti, Balcauti)	More than 65% of Ukrainians, 35% of Moldovans	75% for Communist Party, rest for Our Moldova Block	Ukrainians preponderantly vote for Communists
	Briceni B1 (Caracuteni, Tabani, Colicauti)	100% Moldovans	45% for Communists, rest for Our Moldova Block and Popular Christian Democratic Party	Less than half of Moldovans vote for Communists, majority share votes between Our Moldova, Popular Christian Democratic Party
	Briceni B2 (Cotiujeni, Pavlovca, Larga, Coteala, Hilna)	95% Moldovans, 5% Ukrainians	45% for Communists, rest for Our Moldova Block and Popular Christian Democratic Party	Less than half of Moldovans vote for Communists, majority share votes between Our Moldova, Popular Christian

<sup>38</sup> The detailed findings could be found from the author

				Democratic Party
<b>North: Edinesti</b>	Edinesti A (Chetrotca, Cupcini, Bratuseni, Stolniceni, Sofrancani)	75% of Ukrainians	55% for Communists, 25% for Democratic party, rest Our Moldova Block	Ukrainians preponderantly vote for Communists and some for Democratic party
	Edinesti B (Burlanesti, Brinzeni, Buzduцени, Lopatnic, Badragii,)	100% of Moldovans	35% for Communists, 20%, 25% for Democratic party, 20% for Our Moldova Block, 15% for Popular Christian Democratic party	Less than half of Moldovans vote for Communists, majority share votes between Our Moldova, Popular Christian Democratic Party and Democratic party
<b>North: Riscani</b>	Riscani A (Riscani, Ceparia, Turma, Ramazan, Bultac)	75% of Ukrainians, 25% of Moldovans	55% for Communists, 20% for Our Moldova, 10% for Democratic party, 10% Independents, 5% Popular Cristian Democratic party	Ukrainians preponderantly vote for Communists and some for Democratic party
	Riscani B (Pociumbeni, Zaicani, Horodiste, Druta)	100% of Moldovans	55% for Communists, 15% for Democratic party, 20% for Our Moldova Block, 5% Independents,	Half of Moldovans vote for Communists, majority share votes between Our Moldova, Popular Christian Democratic Party
<b>North: Glodeni</b>	Glodeni A (Danu, Nicolaevca, Iablona, Soroca, Camencuta)	65% of Ukrainians, 35% of Moldovans	70% for Communists 20% for Our Moldova Block, the rest	Ukrainians preponderantly vote for Communists and some for Our Moldova
	Glodeni B (Camenca, Brinzeni, Molesti, Butesti, Cobani)	100% of Moldovans	35% for Communists, 20% for Popular Cristian Democratic Party, 25% for Our Moldova Block	Less than half of Moldovans vote for Communists, majority share votes between Our Moldova, Popular Christian Democratic Party
<b>North: Falesti</b>	Falesti A (Nataltevca, Tambula, Comanovca, Ivanovca, Suvorovca, Pervomaisc, Beteuti)	75% of Ukrainians 20% of Moldovans 5% of Russians	70% for Communists, 20% for Our Moldova Block	Ukrainians preponderantly vote for Communists and some for Our Moldova
	Falesti B (Doltu, Bocani, Pietrosu, Magura, Burgelea)	100% of Moldovans	10% for Communists, 35% for Popular Christian Democratic party, 15% for Our Moldova, 5% for Democratic party	Less than half of Moldovans vote for Communists, majority share votes between Our Moldova, Popular Christian Democratic Party and Democratic Party
<b>North: Singerei</b>	Singerei A (Chiscareni, Taura, Nicolaevca)	50% of Moldovans 50% of Ukrainians	50% for Communists 35% for Our Moldova, 15% for Popular Cristian Democratic Party, 10% for Democratic Party	Ukrainians preponderantly vote for Communists and some for Democratic party
	Singerei B (Bursuceni, Bobletici, Coscodeni, Dumbravita, Bocancea, Cucoaia)	100% of Moldovans	45% for Communists 35% for Our Moldova, 10% for Democratic party	Less than half of Moldovans vote for Communists, majority share votes between Our Moldova, Democratic party
<b>South: Taraclia</b>	Taraclia A (Vinogradovca, Chirsova, Musaitu, Mirnoe, Cainaclia)	40% Ukrainians 25% Bulgarians 40% Moldovans	65% for Communists 20% for Democratic party	Ukrainians preponderantly vote for Communists, Bulgarians for Democratic party
	Taraclia C (Orelovca, Albota, Sofiefca, Hirtop)	55% Bulgarians, 35% Moldovans 10% Gagauz	35% for Communists, 35% for Democratic party, rest	Bulgarians preponderantly vote for Democratic party and for Communists
<b>South</b>	Leova A (Vozneseni, Troita, Troieni)	75% Bulgarians, 25% Moldovans	65% for Communists, 10% for Democratic party, 15% for Our Moldova	Bulgarians outside Taraclia region vote for Communists and Democratic party

<b>h: Leova</b>	Leova B (Cociulia, Hirtop, Bestenac, Pitesti)	100% Moldovans	45% for Communists, 40% for Our Moldova, 5% for Popular Christian Democratic party, etc	Less than half of Moldovans vote for Communists, majority share votes between Our Moldova, Popular Christian Democratic party and others
<b>Center: Telenesti , Orhei</b>	Telenesti B Orhei B	90-100% of Moldovans	There are several patterns: - Moldovans voting for Communists and Democratic Party (2 instances), - Moldovans voting for Popular Christian Democratic party, Social Democratic Party (3 instances), - Moldovans voting for Our Moldova Block (4 instances).	No stable preference

*Section conclusion relevant to Ukrainians and Bulgarians:*

- *strong correlation between Bulgarians and Ukrainians voting pattern and the Communists governing party,*
- *where Ukrainians or Bulgarians make up more than 70% of the population, the political parties voting goes to at least 60% of Communist party and in some cases to Democratic Party,*
- *where Ukrainians make up around or less than 50% of the population, the political parties voting goes to at least 40% of Communist party and in some cases to Democratic Party and Our Moldova Block.*

### **3.5 Policy actors positions on language educational policy**

This subsection brings into the scene the analysis of the political and other actors of the linguistic educational policy.

*- Positions of the political parties on the educational policies for national minorities*

The positions of the political parties have been researched based on the compilation of the political parties' electoral platforma, reading of the public statements and discussions with the representatives of the political parties. Formal individual interviews are available for the review. The outline of the positions of the political parties we draw a chart that shows two variables, the relative influence and strength of the political party, the size of the popularity and the position against the issue of language education policy. There are 3 groups of actors. Group 1 – leaders in language education policy composed of Popular Christian Democratic Party and Democratic Party. Group 2 – actors with the potential, yet they are much undetermined in the language educational policy. Group 3 – leverage - the Communist Party that has two contradicting wings within the party. Group 4 – outsiders – Our Moldova Block, that is indifferent on the policy issue.


Group 1 – leaders. Both parties formulate somewhat clear position regarding language education for national minorities, yet their premises and electorate quite different. Christian Democrats have no electorate basis with the national minorities and they promote state and minority languages as the medium of instruction in order to minimize the influence of the Russian language. Democratic Party has a strong foundation and the electorate, especially with the Bulgarians and the party sometimes successfully competes with the Communist Party with the Ukrainians as the electorate. Cristian Democrats could become more vocal and coherent with the promotion of the integration of national minorities. Democratic Party could tap on the flexible

policy to put in practice opportunities for the national minorities to receive multilingual education if they so desire. Democratic Party can help galvanizing and consolidating the Ukrainians and Bulgarians self-awareness and demand for the Ukrainian and Bulgarian languages role.

Group 2 – actors with the potential to grow and enter the policy issue, composed of two liberal parties and a Social-Democratic Party. The two liberal parties surprisingly have no electoral basis with the Ukrainians and Bulgarians, even though their doctrine resides in economic liberty. Social-Democratic Party has important electoral basis with the Ukrainians as well as with the Moldovans. These groups are not present in the Parliament, yet they are growing and having a good perspective to become more vocal. Both liberal parties could become more active promoters of the integration of the national minorities without fearing of loosing or estranging the electorate. The Social-Democratic Party has also Russian electorate that could sanction the choice for the greater integration of the national minorities through the state language and Bulgarian and Ukrainian languages greater role.


Group 3 - the Communist Party – by all means holds the leverage to the situation. It has important electorate with the Ukrainians as well as with urban Russians and a substantial portion with the Moldovans. The party is not homogeneous, it has a number of fractions, some are very much conservatives and adepts of Moldovan-Russian bilingvism at the expense of the Ukrainian and Bulgarian national development and subsequently integration. There are some fewer representatives, specifically Ukrainians who are more aware of and are sensitive in the Ukrainian, Bulgarian integration and development policies. The Communist Party could play a much more important role in the raising of the state language presence and even as language of instruction for the national minorities.

Graph 3.25 Positioning of the political parties against the state and minority languages education for Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Gagauz.




The following graph presents the evolution of the political parties' performance over a period of almost of a decade for the parliamentary and local elections. If the results for the 2009 will follow the trend, the next parliamentary elections results will have 6-7 political parties present in the Parliament. For the policy issue concerned, group 1 – leaders – will strengthen their position in the parliament and with the support of group 2 – potentials – will present half or more of the votes.

Graph 3.26




If this scenario takes place, there seem to be opening a window of opportunity for the language education for national minorities, specifically Ukrainians and Bulgarians to have education in minority language and state language as the medium of instruction. The below graph presents a possible situation in the future political configuration should the trend stand. In this configuration we could have 4-5 actors of equal power that could drive the process of change as shown on the graph.

Graph 3.27 Positioning of the political parties in the future scenario against the state and minority languages education for Ukrainians, Bulgarians.





Graph 3.28 Positioning of the political leaders against the state and minority languages education for Ukrainians, Bulgarians and Gagauz<sup>39</sup>.



The diagram shows basically the existence of the 3 grouping from the influential figures and actors. The most favorable groups towards the national minority rights and integration is about PPCD and Nicolae Oleinic (PCRM) who have some influence on the policy but not decisive. The group is supported from the progressive civil society organizations with low influence and some marginal opinion making.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> group is for the preservation of the status quo, these politicians are moderately influential as they are several of them and together they make up the stronger influence who team up with the President top adviser. They are supported administratively by the head of the Bureau of Interethnic Relations. The 3<sup>rd</sup> influential group – actually the most influential group – is around the president (Voronin) and the President of the Parliament (Lupu) who is for the state language learning by the minorities.

*Section conclusion:*

- The governing coalition composed of the Communists Party and Popular Cristian Democratic Party have different policy options regarding the minority language education, where Communists opt for monolingual status quo with stronger presence of the state language and the later party for the greater use of minority languages as the medium of instruction therefore adopting a multilingual education approach,

<sup>39</sup> Detailed options are presented in section 9.3

- *Opposition parties have almost no opinion on the linguistic minority education, with liberal marginal parties supporting greater role of the state language and social democratic parties greater minority language identification,*
- *In the perspective of the elections in 2009, more liberal parties can accede to the parliament, therefore the role of the state language could gradually increase, the awareness of the minority languages as medium of instruction will only marginally increase,*
- *There are minority rights conscious political leaders across the political parties, including the Communists party, these individuals do not have the decisive roles, however, this makes these efforts less plausible.*

## **4. Policy options**

This chapter constructs possible policy options, discusses the possible impact of the outlined policy options and ranges the policy options against some criteria for comparison.

### **4.1 Framework for policy analysis**

This section presents the discussions and the analysis of the current situation regarding the minority educational policies. The summary of the problems based on the conclusions in the previous chapters are:

- there is a mismatch between the supply of the educational policies in minority and state languages and the existing demand on behalf of the minorities;
- current educational policies produce low competence of the state language and low command of the minority language;
- low linguistic capacity presents a barrier for the integration of the national minorities into the society, participate in the labor market (private and public), society pays the additional price for the low linguistic competences,
- gradual linguistic assimilation of Ukrainians and Bulgarians into Russian linguistic group.

*- Mismatch between the supply of the educational policies in minority and state languages and the existing demand on behalf of the minorities;*

There is a substantial demand for the supply of the education. The evidence shows that more than 2/3 of the Ukrainian and Bulgarian parents consider that the state language along with the Russian language are critical and important for the professional development and the well-being of their children. Surveys with the Ukrainian and Bulgarian parents show that the overwhelming majority want to improve the mastering of the state language. The most striking evidence produced by the surveys us that around 70% of the Ukrainians and Bulgarians consider that multilingual education arrangements should substitute the current monolingual education arrangement. The multilingual arrangements differ, from stronger emphasis on the state language along with the minority or Russian language to the use of three languages as the medium of instruction (state, Russian and minority languages).

The opinion of all respondents in favor of the greater role of the state language as the medium of instruction is present almost equally with the parents, children and the school teachers. All pooled categories of respondents consider that mastering of the state language increase chances for the better and more effective integration into the society. Therefore, absence of the de facto supply of the educational programs in the format of the multilingual arrangements create

economic inefficiency and makes the potential beneficiaries of the multilingual educational policy less better off<sup>40</sup>.

*- Educational policies produce low competence of the state language and low command of the minority language;*

The input-path-output analysis of the policy impact<sup>41</sup> shows that the current monolingual education policy for the minorities produce low level of skills and competences in mastering state language and native language. Indeed, carried out surveys show that the command of state language is between 30-50% depending of the age. The situation of children is better than of the older generations with the exception of the older population. Yet, the outcome of the skills and knowledge of the state language is quite low. Evidence from section 2.3 shows that less than 15% of children master well understanding, reading and writing in the state language. Around 70% of children understand and write well and good in some preferred areas, while only 30% can speak it well and in some preferred areas.

The same evidence from section 2.3 shows that the command by the children of the minority language is much better around 80% on understanding, writing and reading. This could be explained if correlating the evidence that proves continued communication of the children with the parents and relatives in the minority languages. For the state language the major source of the practice comes from the school.

The low competences and skills in the mastering of the state language preclude effective integration of the children into the society. This contrasts strongly with the desire of the children and parents as evidence in section 2.3 shows.

*- Low linguistic capacity presents a barrier for the integration of the national minorities into the society, participate in the labor market (private and public), society pays the additional price for the low linguistic competences,*

Generated evidence in section 2.3 show that mastering of the state language is seen as an important factor in the integration in the labor market, professional development, material well-being. This is the perspective of the parents about themselves and of their children. This comes from the parents' life experience.

Interviews and focus groups<sup>42</sup> with the selected private companies leadership shows that there is clear value for the skills and competences of mastering of the state language. The mastering of the state language is required to the extent that the skills are needed for the professional activity of the employee. In most of the cases, a potential candidate with the relevant skills in the state language, when other conditions are equal, is considered better fit for the job. Some companies report that employees that do not have the sufficient mastering of the state language appeal to their relevant colleagues for help when these skills are necessary. Some few companies say they make state language skills improvement investments of about 200-300 euro per employee who do not have the sufficient relevant state language skills. Other companies report that they simply do not hire the employees that do not have relevant state language skills.

---

<sup>40</sup> A strict economic analysis to quantify the economic and social costs to the society for the mismatch will be done separately.

<sup>41</sup> Francois Grin, Language Policy Evaluation and the European Charter for regional or Minority Languages, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, page 47,

<sup>42</sup> Resource Center for Human Rights research on the labor market expectations and practices of the use of state language, November 2008, based on interviews and focus groups with 12 private companies from across the industries.

Overall, combined evidence of parents' perception, value placed by the private companies and the growing tendency for the use of the state language makes the absence of the adequate knowledge of the state language a barrier for the integration into the labor market.


- *Gradual linguistic assimilation of Ukrainians and Bulgarians into Russian linguistic group.*

The quality and extend of mastering of the Ukrainian and Bulgarian languages decreases. There is no detailed and comprehensive research on the subject. Interviews and focus groups<sup>43</sup> show that extend of the use of the Ukrainian and Bulgarian languages decrease. Evidence from section 2.3 shows that children use less mother tongue among themselves as compared to adults, yet parents and children use of mother tongue is stable. Russian language takes the role of the minority languages in many areas, from the professional life to the use in public. This process of gradual loose of the mother tongue and the tendency of substitution of the other tongue with the Russian language go against the minority human rights values and principles. Specialized international organizations and the reports from local human rights organizations criticize the current assimilation practice as section 2.4 shows.

- *Problem fish-bone analysis*

Based on the frameworks of the problem analysis, we conclude with the fish-bone analysis<sup>44</sup> of problem. The absence of the multilingual education policy in Moldova presented below depicts a number of factors that put obstacles for the desired multilingual educational policy for the minorities.

Graph 4.1 Fish-bone analysis of the linguistic educational policy



The analysis of the current causes of problems shows multiple factors that influence negatively the situation. One can see that there is insufficient political will for the change of the policy. The evidence from the section 3.5 shows that the future political composition of the Parliament could

<sup>43</sup> Resource Center for Human Rights research on the labor market expectations and practices of the use of state language, November 2008, based on interviews and focus groups with teachers, representatives from ethnic communities groups and selected respondents.

<sup>44</sup> The problem is presented in the extreme right, while the causes as driving factors for the existing problem presented from left to right

be more favorable for the role of the state language and of the minority language. The future political representation could make it possible to remove obstacles for the multilingual education and even strengthen it. However, political leaders should be more involved in the understanding of the practical technical solutions for the existing problems.

Another problem is related to the low administrative and technical capacity to implement the policy<sup>45</sup>. This is very unlikely to be changed in the future. International support and projects from the specialized agencies from abroad could be helpful in this respect. The greater decentralization of the decision of the linguistic education policy will further lower the capacity to implement the policy.

Another group of factors refer to the role of the international community. International specialized human rights bodies have been active and vocal in this area, yet, their influence is limited on the situation. The role of the Russian government has been an important factor in keeping the status quo.

Policy change will require intervention with regard of the several factors mentioned above.

## 4.2 Outlining policy options

Construction of the policy options based on the available evidence and analysis will be dealt in the section. The summary of the policy options is contained in the graph 4.1 below. The construction of the policy options will be done considering the most important policy design and policy implementation variables. These are:

- a) negligent to strong role of the minority language as the medium of instruction (additive against subtractive bilingualism),
- b) negligent to strong role of the state language as the medium of instruction (additive against subtractive bilingualism),
- c) top-down against bottom-up approach in the implementation.

Option 1: status quo policy, monolingual, centralized.

This policy represents the existing status quo. The outcome of the policy is largely discussed and is perceived unsatisfactory on a number of accounts: minority human rights perspective, welfare perspective, greater social benefit perspective for the society.

Option 2: Multilingual, integrative, decentralized (radical)

This policy option is constructed on the basis of the European practice<sup>46</sup> of the multilingual education, increasing role of the state language and shift towards the local responsibility for the linguistic aspects of the education. Local authorities are provided either fiscal incentive of direct subventions for the programs on the multilingual education. A greater cooperation between central and local authorities is required.

The European practice of the multilingual education provides very good examples of the cultivation and maintenance of the minority culture and language and improves the opportunities

---

<sup>45</sup> Resource Center for Human Rights and CICO, Evaluation of administrative capacity of the educational sector. May 2008, 60 pages.

<sup>46</sup> Resource Center for Human Rights compendium of best practices on multilingual education in Europe, in Romanian 100 pages, 2007

for the minority integration into the society. Available research shows substantial benefits for this option.

Delegation of the content of the policy to the local authorities also follows the path of the European practice, yet, it requires the local authorities' good capacity or close and substantial cooperation with the central authorities.

Option 3: Multilingual, integrative, centralized (moderate)

This option differs from the previous one only with the aspect of non-decentralization of the policy content. This is very much top-down approach in the policy implementation as contrasted with the bottom-up previous policy option. The current educational system is very much centralized<sup>47</sup>, most of the finances being transferred from the central authorities, while regional authorities are responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the educational policy. Greater decentralization could run into significant implementation difficulties, while the straightforwardly applied multilingual educational policy could have much better chances.

Option 4: Integrative (official), centralized (moderate, on the table of politicians)

This policy option differs from the two previous by the greater role of the state language as one of the languages of the instruction. Russian language is maintained as one of the languages of instruction, while the minority language is seen as a subject only. This option will generate better integration of the minorities into the society as the possession of the state language will be higher, while the knowledge of the minority language will be likely decreasing giving rise to the assimilations effects.

This option could be realized top-down or bottom-up with the considerations and challenges described above.

Option 5: Assimilation, centralized

This option is an expression of the assimilation of the minorities. The state language takes the leading and the most important role in the educational linguistic policies.

---

<sup>47</sup> Resource Center for Human Rights and CICO, Evaluation of administrative capacity of the educational sector. May 2008, 60 pages

Graph 4.2 Policy options content and mid-term projected outcomes

Policy options	<b>Option 1: status quo policy, monolingual, centralized.</b>	<b>Option 2: Multilingual, integrative, decentralized (radical)</b>	<b>Option 3: Multilingual, integrative, centralized (moderate)</b>	<b>Option 4: Integrative (official), centralized (moderate, on the table of politicians)</b>	<b>Option 5: Assimilation, centralized</b>
Policy option content	<p>1. Educational policies centralized, both content and financially. 95% of the content, including language-wise as well as financing. Local authorities receive 50-60% of the budget, of which 60% is spent on the education.</p> <p>2. Russian language as a medium of instruction for national minorities (Ukrainians and Bulgarians), the national minorities also study their own mother tongue as a separate subject 2-3 hours per week only in less than 10% of the population and study of the official language.</p>	<p>1. Educational policy as content multilingual where state language is at least 30-40% presents (legal obligations) and Russian or minority language depends on the choice of the minority. The language content is decided by the rayon/local authorities.</p> <p>2. Local authorities are provided matching funds or fiscal revenue incentives for the minority languages.</p>	<p>1. Educational policy as content multilingual where state language is at least (legal obligations) 30-40% and Russian or minority language depends on the choice of the minority. The language content is decided by the rayon/local authorities.</p> <p>2. Central authorities provide direct grants to schools for the use of minority language as medium of instruction.</p>	<p>1. Educational policy as content bilingual with state language is at least (legal obligations) 50% and the other in minority language. The language content is decided by the central authorities.</p> <p>2. Local authorities receive 50-60% of the budget, of which 60% is spent on the education.</p> <p>3. Local authorities receive fiscal or grant incentives for the official language medium of instruction.</p>	<p>1. Educational policy as content monolingual with state language and study of the minority language. The language content is decided by the central authorities.</p> <p>2. Central authorities provide direct grants to schools for the use of minority language as medium of instruction.</p> <p>3. Local authorities receive fiscal or grant incentives for the official language medium of instruction.</p>
Long-term perspective of the policy option outcome	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Minority assimilation into Russian speaking group</li> <li>- non-integration into society</li> <li>- minority emigration trends out of the country</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- minority identity cultivation and development</li> <li>- linguistic integration of minorities into the society</li> <li>- preserving the Russian language role</li> <li>- greater decentralization of the educational policies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- minority identity cultivation and development</li> <li>- linguistic integration of minorities into the society</li> <li>- preserving the Russian language role</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- minority assimilation</li> <li>- linguistic integration of minorities into the society</li> <li>- preserving the role of Russian language</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- minority assimilation</li> <li>- reducing the role of Russian language</li> </ul>

### 4.3 Discussions of policy options

Discussion of the policy options will be done based on the set of six generic criteria used in the policy analysis. The comprehensive comparison should be done against the policy outcomes and not on the policy options. Previous sections provide good evidence on the policy outcomes, while some quantitative and financial evaluations of the policy outcomes are elaborated by the author elsewhere<sup>48</sup>. The summary of the policy options outcomes are outlined in the graph 4.2.

The effectiveness criterion means gaining the existing policy outcomes against the success of the integration and cultivation of the minority identity and languages. Equity refers to legal term of the nondiscrimination and the approach of the social justice for the rights of the national minorities. Cost-benefit analysis criterion refers to the quantifiable social (societal) costs and benefits as a result of the policy outcomes<sup>49</sup>.

A political acceptability criterion is straightforward and means the degree of the existence of the current and future political will to adopt and implement the policy. Linked to this is the capacity to implement of the policy – particularly the bureaucratic capacity of the machinery. Finally the compliance with the international legal obligations to which Moldova adhered is also considered.

Graph 4.3 Policy options comparison

<b>Policy options outcomes and criteria for comparison</b>	<b>Option 1: status quo policy, monolingual, centralized.</b>	<b>Option 2: Multilingual, integrative, decentralized (radical)</b>	<b>Option 3: Multilingual, integrative, centralized (moderate)</b>	<b>Option 4: Integrative (official), centralized (moderate, on the table of politicians)</b>	<b>Option 5: Assimilation, centralized</b>
<b>1. Effectiveness (results as integration)</b>	low	medium	medium	medium	low
<b>2. Equity</b>	low	high	high	medium	low
<b>3. Cost-benefit (mid-term)</b>	no costs – no additional benefits	benefits moderate and operational costs small, while investment costs medium	benefits moderate and operational costs small, while investment costs medium	benefits moderate and operational and investment costs are medium	benefits low and small costs
<b>4. Political acceptability</b>	high	low	low-to-medium	medium	medium-to-low
<b>5. Compliance</b>	low	high	high	medium	low

<sup>48</sup> Financial and economic policy outcome evaluations could be solicited from the author. The text has been removed to make the paper readable.

<sup>49</sup> Financial and economic considerations refer to the following *social costs*: 1) investment costs for the creation of the minority education curricular and manuals as the language of instruction in some selected subjects (investment cost), 2) (re-)training of teachers and other pedagogical staff to maintain the subjects in minority languages as the medium of instruction (investment costs and partly operational costs), 3) minor additional administration costs (operational), 4) other, and the following *social benefits (in parallel for state language acquisition and minority language acquisition)*: 1) improved skills and greater communication and opportunity creation 2) economy of the public and private investment in state language skills training, 3) economy of the individual investment, 4) seizure of the opportunities to cooperate in private international sphere for the business interests with Bulgaria and Ukraine, 5) seizure of the opportunities to cooperate in public international sphere with Bulgaria and Ukraine 6) retaining the integrated minorities talents in the country (demising emigration towards Bulgaria and Ukraine, calculated on the basis of the productivity loss or education investment if emigrated), 7) greater cohesion and diversity within the country (social capital considerations), 8) translation and other expenditures, 9) economy from the international and national lost suits brought for noncompliance with human rights principles and the damage for the country reputation, 10) other.



<b>with the EU, CoE obligations</b>					
<b>6.Capacity to implement</b>	high	low	medium	medium	medium
<b>Conclusions</b>		<i>Very good choice but not implementable</i>	<i>Good choice</i>	<b>Most preferred choice</b>	<i>Unacceptable choice</i>

One can see that Option 2 faces difficulty in the implementation given the strong preference for the top-down policy rather than decentralized policy implementation and low political acceptability. This option is not feasible.

Option 3 has good chances with the exception of the low political acceptability of the option outcome. This option, yet, might become the most preferred option in the long-term perspective.

The most recommended option in the mid-term perspective is the Option 4 given its gradual change of the current policy, increasing political support and still good tangible benefits that exceed the costs of the proposed policy.

## 5. Policy recommendation

Based on the outlined policy options discussed we suggest the adoption of the policy that will aim at the integration of the national minorities through the educational policies. The choice of the policy depends on the ranking of the policy option against the outlined criteria.

We suggest the adoption of the policy that provides for:

1. Greater role of the state language as the medium of instruction in the minority schools; this aspect is being supported by the most of the political parties and there will be an increased political support for the more important role of the state language in the schooling of the minorities; this can practically mean that the state language could be used in 2-3-4 subjects as the medium of instruction. This also matches well with the international agenda and international organizations findings, therefore the support of technical assistance could be provided upon the requisites. Minorities themselves are very keen on improving their state language mastering.
2. Growing role of the minority language, primarily as a separate subject in as much as possible schools with the minority children, given there is a strong demand in the minorities' community. A consideration should be given for the piloting of the minority language as the medium of instruction through technical assistance and governmental funds. This is politically acceptable and there will be growing political support in the future. The position of the international organizations is good and favorable for this option.
3. Preserving the policy largely centralized. This option is dictated by the fact that the decentralization of the educational policy requires substantial institutional and structural adjustments. This will be against the governing political majority and against the institutional bureaucracy options and therefore face strong implementation difficulties.
4. The threshold of 10% of the minority population should be applied for the policy. This threshold will provide an effective inclusion of all minorities into the policy.

This policy recommendation is seen in the mid-term perspective (3 year period of time) with a longer term perspective (5 year period of time) of the greater role of the minority language as the medium of instruction.

## 6. References

1. Resource Center for Human Rights and CICO, Evaluation of administrative capacity of the educational sector. May 2008, 60 pages
2. Resource Center for Human Rights compendium of best practices on multilingual education in Europe, in Romanian 100 pages, 2007
3. Resource Center for Human Rights research on the labor market expectations and practices of the use of state language, November 2008, based on interviews and focus groups with teachers, representatives from ethnic communities groups and selected respondents.
4. Francois Grin, Language Policy Evaluation and the European Charter for regional or Minority Languages, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, page 47,
5. Resource Center for Human Rights research on the labor market expectations and practices of the use of state language, November 2008, based on interviews and focus groups with 12 private companies from across the industries.
6. Proiectul bugetului de stat 2008, septembrie 2007, Ministerul Finantelor,
7. Stuart S. Nagel, Handbook of Public Evaluation, Sage, 2002,
8. William N. Dunn, Public Policy Analysis: An introduction, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Pearson, Prentice Hall, 2003
9. Henry M. Levon, Patrick J. McEwan, Cost-effectiveness and Educational Policy, American Education Finance Association, 2002,
10. David L. Weimer & Aidan R. Vining, Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice, 4<sup>th</sup> edition, Pearson, Prentice Hall, 2005,
11. Michael Hill & Peter Hupe, Implementing Public Policy, Sage, 2007,
12. Resolution ResCMN(2003)4, on implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Moldova, Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe.
13. Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on Moldova, March 2002.
14. Comments of the Government of the Republic of Moldova on the Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in the Republic of Moldova, July 2002.
15. Second Report submitted by Moldova on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, May 2004.
16. Outline of the state Reports to be submitted under the second monitoring circle, Committee of Ministers, 15 January 2003, 824<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Deputies.
17. Report on Human Rights Concerns of Roma Rural Communities in Moldova, Nicolae Radita and Serghei Ostaf, 2004, 87 pages, English and Romanian, Resource Center of Moldovan Human Rights NGOs, [http://www.coe.int/T/e/human\\_rights/Minorities/3\\_CO-OPERATION\\_ACTIVITIES/1\\_CO-operation\\_activities/2\\_Stability\\_Pact\\_activities/20040115\\_NDR\\_List\\_of\\_Final\\_Concept\\_Papers.asp#TopOfPage](http://www.coe.int/T/e/human_rights/Minorities/3_CO-OPERATION_ACTIVITIES/1_CO-operation_activities/2_Stability_Pact_activities/20040115_NDR_List_of_Final_Concept_Papers.asp#TopOfPage),
18. Assessment of the Use of Ukrainian and Bulgarian Languages in Public Sphere and Effectiveness of Ukrainian and Bulgarian Minorities Relevant Participation in Decision-making process, Serghei Ostaf, 2004, 72 pages, English, Resource Center of Moldovan Human Rights NGOs, [http://www.credo.md/pagini/consultanta\\_37.php?limba=eng](http://www.credo.md/pagini/consultanta_37.php?limba=eng)
19. Critique of Plan For Federalization Of Moldova as a means to solve Transnistrian conflict, Serghei Ostaf, 2004, 33 pages, English,

20. Critique of the MEMORANDUM on the basic principles of the foundation of the Federative Moldovan state, Serghei Ostaf, 2004, 25 pages, English,
21. Assessment of Provisions of Bilateral Agreements on Protection of Kin-state Minorities Concluded by Moldova, Serghei Ostaf, 2003, 54 pages, English, Resource Center of Moldovan Human Rights NGOs, [http://www.credo.md/pagini/consultanta\\_37.php?limba=eng](http://www.credo.md/pagini/consultanta_37.php?limba=eng)
22. Comprehensive Report on Respect for Human Rights in the Republic of Moldova: January 2001-January 2002, Serghei Ostaf (editor), 2003, 250 pages, English,
23. Observatiile pe marginea proiectului "Conceptiei Politicii Nationale de Stat" (TEZE), , Serghei Ostaf, 2004, 18 pages, Romanian, Resource Center of Moldovan Human Rights NGOs. [http://www.credo.md/pagini/consultanta\\_37.php?limba=eng](http://www.credo.md/pagini/consultanta_37.php?limba=eng)
24. Necesitati de imbunatatire a Legislatiei RM la capitolul protectia drepturilor minoritatilor nationale: analiza comparativa a prevederilor Conventiei cadru pentru protectia minoritatilor nationale si a legislatiei nationale, Serghei Ostaf, 2004, 8 pages, Romanian, Resource Center of Moldovan Human Rights NGOs. [http://www.credo.md/pagini/consultanta\\_37.php?limba=eng](http://www.credo.md/pagini/consultanta_37.php?limba=eng)
25. NON-DISCRIMINATION REVIEW Target Areas Study and NDR Legislative Questionnaire, is elaborated by a group of experts composed (in alphabetical order) of Vitalie NAGACEVSHI, Serghei OSTAF, Tatiana STOIANOVA, Victor VOLCHINSCHI, 2003, English, 159 pages, [http://www.coe.int/T/e/human\\_rights/Minorities/3\\_CO-OPERATION\\_ACTIVITIES/1\\_Co-operation\\_activities/2\\_Stability\\_Pact\\_activities/20040114\\_NDR\\_List\\_of\\_Preliminary\\_Assessment\\_Reports.asp#TopOfPage](http://www.coe.int/T/e/human_rights/Minorities/3_CO-OPERATION_ACTIVITIES/1_Co-operation_activities/2_Stability_Pact_activities/20040114_NDR_List_of_Preliminary_Assessment_Reports.asp#TopOfPage)
26. International Standards of Minority Protection and the Situation of Compactly Populated Ukrainian and Bulgarian Minority in Moldovan Communities, 2003, 277 pages, English, Atanasia Stoianova and Serghei Ostaf (coordinators), [http://www.coe.int/T/e/human\\_rights/Minorities/3\\_CO-OPERATION\\_ACTIVITIES/1\\_Co-operation\\_activities/2\\_Stability\\_Pact\\_activities/20040115\\_NDR\\_List\\_of\\_Final\\_Concept\\_Papers.asp#TopOfPage](http://www.coe.int/T/e/human_rights/Minorities/3_CO-OPERATION_ACTIVITIES/1_Co-operation_activities/2_Stability_Pact_activities/20040115_NDR_List_of_Final_Concept_Papers.asp#TopOfPage)
27. Shadow Report on the Implementation of the Framework Convention on National Minorities, En, July 2000 (first circle), by Serghei Ostaf, Resource Center for Human Rights,