Hybrid Threats: Implications for Moldova -2014

Hoffman s description of Hybrid Threats1 (hybrid threats - asymmetric risks) in the context of the intervention to destabilize a country has become highly relevant for Moldova. We are witnessing direct and indirect interventions from outside forces and inside stakeholders to achieve complex political, territorial, military, economic, and electoral goals as well as the subversion of democratic institutions in the region. Misunderstanding or turning a blind eye towards the threats which result from potential and unfolding hybrid interventions makes the government incapable of managing subsequent challenges effectively. The consequences could be unpredictable and unforeseen. It can result in a forced diversion of a nation s democratically legitimate political course; or the territorial fragmentation of the country and engender hostilities akin to a national or localized civil war.

Modalities to achieve these goals are known as the hybrid warfare mix of measures (Section 4.2), which consist of: targeted diplomatic initiatives against the country, direct and subtle political influence upon the political actors in the country, informational warfare using external and internal conventional and new media tools, economic pressures using imposed key production factors or the manipulation of the exchange rates. Furthermore imposing barriers for exports, facilitating terrorist attacks which target the provocation of the chaos, externally supported insurgencies with the aim of taking control of some regions power, the specific actions of forces and specialized groups to create alternative powers and authorities and demonstrating excessive military power in the region to induce volatility and mass aggressive support.

Decision-makers (representatives of the executive, political leaders, public security and intelligence services, police, emergency response services) need insight into the goals triggered by a hybrid warfare intervention. By understanding the goals and implications of such an intervention it is possible to devise measures to address them. Hybrid warfare is complex and therefore counter preparation and subsequent actions will have to be cautiously thought out and strategically organized– the response should be tailored in a similar complex and multifaceted manner, yet at a larger cost and effort to maintain stability in the country. The cost and type of the response (preventive and combative) are much higher given the country’s many vulnerabilities. In the absence of preventive measures, reactive responses will result in failure or inefficiency and as demonstrated by recent regional experience in Ukraine, this results in high costs that may become even prohibitive in nature. In a number of situations decision-makers are unable to identify the nature of the threat and thus have little chance to effectively guide the process or control or combat it. The result may be a disaster.

In this paper we propose to (better word) systematize the discussion of the hybrid or asymmetric threats given the context of the current developments in Ukraine (Chapter 2). Each identified threat is discussed in terms of nature, quantity, dynamics and likelihood of emergence. The threats playoff is likely to be developed into one of the 3 basic scenarios of the intervention – exemplifying for the sake of comprehension - exploited by a synergic effort and with the participation of external and internal actors. Internal and external stakeholders are identified (generically) as the scenarios of intervention by the protagonists.. The nature of actors is multivariate, including possible political and public entities, extremist or even moderate groups that can be polarized and criminal groups and commercial actors which all form part of a the lucrative system to achieve outlined goals. We also propose a series of actions as mitigation measures to counteract the identified risks. The analysis is a generic one – a more comprehensive exercise involving all relevant decision-makers across competent authorities will follow.

We discuss implications for different actors that can be used as tools for the asymmetric - hybrid warfare interventions (Chapter 3). Among these actors who play a potential role are subservient political forces motivated by outside interests, political forces driven by revanchist attitudes, undemocratic extremist groups, moderate groups with likely instabilities, opportunistic criminal and organized crime groups and the business sector capable of instigating significant economic disruption. In Chapter 4 we evaluate strategies of the external lead actors interested in destabilizing the situation in Moldova.

We discuss three hypothetical scenarios that can materialize as intermediate or evolutionary in different stages in certain circumstances. What triggers the shift from one to another scenario is a matter of the situational and opportunistic features depending on some internal actors or with the decisive support from the external actors. The 1st scenario intervention minimum (Section 1.3) is identified as having the purpose to dwarf or disrupt a political course. The scenario intervention is based on the actions of political, informational and economic warfare. This scenario aims to produce a political mandate. Considering the upcoming parliamentary elections and subsequent potential political instability these could have a major political impact.

The 2nd intervention scenario medium (Section 1.4) expands on the previous one and targets the additional legitimacy of the authorities and aims at the fragmentation of the country in some regions. In practice it escalates diplomatic intervention measures by involving international diplomatic measures with accentuated direct interventions in the country which involve political leaders subject to dishonest and corrupt deals, undercover agents, mercenaries’ insurgents and financial resources to facilitate the aggressive behavior of terrorists or forced secessionist movements. This scenario could not only result in the diversion of a politically democratic course (1st scenario) but also in the territorial fragmentation of the country. The 3rd intervention scenario (Section 1.5) aims to trigger clashes that can result in major civil conflicts that exceed the 2nd scenario with the deployment of large numbers of insurgent forces within the country, providing them with weapons and military guidance and setting up paramilitary groups. Furthermore, intelligence as and symbolic displays of military force at the state border are used. This scenario aims to induce a state of civil war and a partition of the country.

Mitigation of the outlined threats requires thoughtful complex measures. The size of the informational war in its most extreme form may require a solution of blocking highly harmful programs or stations entirely. The size and the nature of the economic pressure upon the country are so that such a solution will be only able to partially mitigate the negative influences. Intervention from the National Bank of Moldova and the Competition Council may partially mitigate market manipulation. Embargoes are inevitable and political negotiations can often prove to be ineffective. To obtain preventive measures and penalties from the WTO is only possible if procedures are launched immediately. An alternative western gas pipeline may undermine blackmail regarding the price of gas. To counteract the size of the interference in political development the following are recommended: visibility of governance outcomes, increased presence of pro-European messages and maximum avoidance of actions that are likely to cause outrage. Subversive aggressive and illegal actions can be controlled by regulations adopted by the competent efforts of the authorities. The presence of an absolutist and autocratic image including a religious extremist leadership may switch voter preferences; this is one of the challenges that needs to be addressed.

Regarding the mobilization and active disobedience of some segments of the society we recommend engagement and series of preventive actions as well as the creation of direct communication platforms with different social groups. The formation of various communication channels with local politicians and local leaders, such as through weekly meetings to determine the expectations and needs of the population is imperative. 2 The control of financial flows, especially those of illegal and criminal groups is extremely important. Finally, discouraging the use of weapons and monitoring firearms and weaponry deposits is another important factor in reducing the impact of a hybrid threat.

In regards to the threat of terrorist attacks, military groups separatist insurgents actions require building skills as well as developing thorough and deep analysis of the various people who have entered the country, including those in high risk groups and economic migrants from Russia. It is imperative to train the military and police to handle the variety of the situations as well as to secure their loyalty. The transfer of technology and skills in the field of counterterrorism activities during destabilizing conditions is urgently needed.. 

In a nutshell Ukraine presidential elections would yield some type of foreseeable stable (equilibrium) situation with either stable power in control across the country or stable with the fragmented in 2 oblasts – Luhansk and Donetsk – with stronger separatist movements. The focus of the attention will turn to Moldova, where 1st scenario could yield overall control over Moldova, 2nd scenario will damage further the legitimacy of the European integration path and 3rd scenario will make not only the European integration process impossible but will provide added-up source of instability with high spill-over potential onto South Ukrainian regions of Odesa and Herson.